Source: PostPravda.info 11.08.2026.
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/zaluzhnyi-syrskyi-and-mykhailo-drapatyi/
Mykhailo Drapaty – the new Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Photo: АрміяINFORM
Mykhailo Drapatyi is the third Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale war. Russia enjoys military and economic superiority over Ukraine, and confronting such an adversary requires Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief to possess not only professionalism but also genuine military talent. It was thanks to a talented military decision that the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out their successful counteroffensive in the autumn of 2022, but in the years that followed, they lost the initiative. Ukraine now faces the challenge of reversing the course of the war during the transition to a new technological era, one that demands of the Commander-in-Chief not only experience and professionalism but also talent. Will Mykhailo Drapatyi be able to meet this challenge?
Not Every Professional Is a Talented Military Commander
When I studied history at school, I believed that the genius of a military commander lay in the ability to devise a maneuver capable of defeating a vastly superior enemy, as Hannibal did at the Battle of Cannae or Alexander the Great at the Battle of Gaugamela. Napoleon’s memoirs showed me that every seemingly unexpected military decision rests on a meticulous analysis of countless factors. A mistake in even one of them can turn what appears to be an almost certain victory into defeat. The genius of a commander lies in combining unconventional thinking and a fresh strategic vision with rigorous calculation and the careful analysis of a wide range of factors.
Since it is impossible to take every factor into account, mistakes are inevitable even for the most outstanding military commanders. This is precisely why professionalism is so important: it enables a commander to recognize and correct mistakes in time. The faster the response to mistakes, the higher the level of professionalism. Military talent, however, goes beyond correcting errors – it also consists in anticipating them. This requires the ability to recognize new circumstances and adapt to them, even when they have no precedent in previous military experience.
Typical Mistakes of the Soviet Military School
The operational plan for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was developed by the General Staff of the Russian Federation under the leadership of Valerii Gerasimov. The plan was professionally prepared in accordance with the traditions of the Soviet military school and, under certain circumstances, might have succeeded. However, Gerasimov failed to foresee new factors that lay outside his previous military experience, which ultimately led to the plan’s failure. Subsequently, he demonstrated an ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the war, but not the ability to abandon the fundamental assumptions of the Soviet military school, according to which success depends on numerical superiority, highly centralized command, prolonged frontal offensives, holding positions at any cost, etc. All of this characterizes Valerii Gerasimov as a competent professional military commander, but not as one possessing exceptional military talent in the broader sense. His approach remains firmly rooted in the traditions of the old Soviet military school.
The Soviet Army achieved success during the Second World War by launching rapid offensives with all available forces before the enemy had time to consolidate its positions. This often resulted in decisive victories, but at times it also led to catastrophic defeats. A striking example is the Battle of Rzhev (5 January 1942 – 31 March 1943), also known as the “Rzhev Meat Grinder,” during which the Soviet Army, under the command of Georgy Zhukov, lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers in futile attempts to storm well-fortified German positions.
This approach of ruthlessly expending manpower in suicidal assaults was inherited by the Russian Army, which has achieved military successes in Ukraine at the cost of enormous casualties. Numerical superiority has enabled the Russian military to treat its soldiers as expendable resources. Russian commanders understood that they would not be punished for heavy losses, whereas success on the battlefield would be rewarded. The Ukrainian command, by contrast, could not employ such tactics, both for moral reasons and because of its more limited human resources. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Army also inherited many traditions from the Soviet military, and there may also be precedents in it for a similar attitude toward the lives of soldiers.
The Ukrainian Counteroffensive of 2022: A Demonstration of Exceptional Military Talent
According to the principles of the Soviet military school, an attacking force should possess at least a three-to-one numerical advantage at the point of breakthrough. During the autumn 2022 counteroffensive, planned under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukrainian forces attacked an enemy that actually outnumbered them – a highly unusual departure from conventional Soviet doctrine. Moreover, the Ukrainian leadership openly announced preparations for an offensive in the Kherson region, which at first glance contradicted the basic military principle of concealing the direction of the main attack. Yet this very announcement diverted the attention of the Russian command and enabled Ukrainian forces to launch their decisive offensive in an unexpected location – the Kharkiv region. The offensive began on 6 September. On 8 September, the first town, Balakliia, was liberated, triggering the collapse of the Russian front in the area. On 10 September, the largest cities in the occupied part of Kharkiv Oblast – Izium and Kupiansk – were liberated, allowing Ukrainian forces to continue their advance.
Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Photo: Official Facebook page of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Knowing the outcome today, this decision may appear obvious. At the time, however, it involved enormous risk, as the success of the operation depended on a multitude of unpredictable factors that had to be anticipated. Any overlooked circumstance could have caused the offensive in the Kharkiv region to fail, which in turn would likely have undermined the offensive on the Kherson axis as well. Yet it is impossible to know in advance which particular factor will prove decisive. This is precisely why even the greatest military commanders occasionally make mistakes. Valerii Zaluzhnyi was required not only to recognize the opportunity for an unconventional military solution and possess the determination to implement it, but also to analyze a vast array of interrelated factors. In accomplishing this task, he demonstrated exceptional military talent.
The Offensive on Lyman: Professional Judgment or a Mistake?
The Kharkiv counteroffensive was directed operationally by Oleksandr Syrskyi. Overall, the operation was conducted professionally. However, a commander’s level of professionalism is measured not by the absence of mistakes but by the ability to identify them in time and adjust one’s actions accordingly. Oleksandr Syrskyi is a professional commander of the old military school, one characterized by a particular pattern of recurring errors. His operational concept was to disrupt the Russian force’s command-and-control and logistical systems as quickly as possible rather than to destroy each of its individual units.
After the liberation of Izium, the Ukrainian command faced two possible approaches to capturing Lyman. The first called or a direct assault on Liman from the direction of the Seversky Donets River — that is, from the south and west. The advantage of this option was that the assault could begin immediately, preserving the rapid momentum of the offensive. The second option was to bypass Lyman from the northeast and create the threat of encirclement. This course of action would have virtually guaranteed success but at the cost of slowing the advance, thereby giving Russian forces time to establish themselves on new defensive lines.
Oleksandr Syrskyi. Photo: Official Facebook page of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
A Soviet commander trained in the tradition of Georgy Zhukov would likely have attempted to seize Lyman through a frontal assault at any cost in order to preserve the momentum of the offensive, much as Zhukov himself did during the Battle of Rzhev. Within the Soviet military tradition, in which success is judged primarily by the outcome than by the losses incurred, such an approach is not always regarded as a mistake. This helps explain why, during the initial stages of the war, Russian commanders repeatedly launched frontal assaults on Ukrainian cities with little regard for casualties.
At that moment, Oleksandr Syrskyi could not yet know how stubbornly Russian forces would defend Lyman, although he was fully aware that the city was heavily fortified. The problem is that the decisive factors determining the success or failure of a military operation become obvious mainly in retrospect. Before an operation begins, they are concealed among countless other circumstances whose significance cannot always be assessed accurately in advance. For this reason, military art consists not only in the ability to make bold decisions but also in the willingness to abandon them timely when the course of events demonstrates that the original plan must be revised.
Following the liberation of Izium, Ukrainian forces launched an offensive against Lyman from across the Siverskyi Donets River, attacking from the west, south, and southeast of the city. This phase of the operation lasted approximately from 12 to 22 September. After the loss of Izium, the Russian command had enough time to reinforce the Lyman sector with additional troops. Unlike other parts of the front, this area was not thrown into chaos by the rapid Ukrainian advance, and Russian forces conducted their defense in an organized manner. The offensive was further complicated by the terrain: extensive forests and a limited road network favored the defenders. Although Ukrainian forces succeeded in liberating several villages in the area, the offensive from across the Siverskyi Donets River failed to capture Lyman.
Assessing the situation, the Ukrainian command abandoned further attempts at a frontal breakthrough and shifted its main effort to the north and northeast. This enabled Ukrainian forces to cut the Russian force’s lines of communication, place Lyman under operational encirclement on 30 September, and completely liberate the city on 1 October.
This raises the question of whether the frontal offensive against Lyman from across the Siverskyi Donets River was a sound professional military decision intended to pin down Russian forces, or whether it was, in fact, a mistake. Likewise, was the subsequent offensive from the northeast, which resulted in the operational encirclement of Lyman, merely a response to the failure of the original plan, or was it instead a planned continuation of that strategy? I have been unable to find definitive answers to these questions in open sources. The opinions of various authors largely depend on subjective interpretation. I believe historians will continue to debate this issue for years to come, yet historians themselves are not immune to subjective judgments. For example, some historians argue that even the disastrous Battle of Rzhev had positive strategic value because it tied down substantial Wehrmacht forces.
At that moment, Oleksandr Syrskyi could not yet know how stubbornly Russian forces would defend Lyman, although he was fully aware that the city was heavily fortified. The problem is that the decisive factors determining the success or failure of a military operation become obvious mainly in retrospect. Before an operation begins, they are concealed among countless other circumstances whose significance cannot always be assessed accurately in advance. For this reason, military art consists not only in the ability to make bold decisions but also in the willingness to abandon them timely when the course of events demonstrates that the original plan must be revised.
Following the liberation of Izium, Ukrainian forces launched an offensive against Lyman from across the Siverskyi Donets River, attacking from the west, south, and southeast of the city. This phase of the operation lasted approximately from 12 to 22 September. After the loss of Izium, the Russian command had enough time to reinforce the Lyman sector with additional troops. Unlike other parts of the front, this area was not thrown into chaos by the rapid Ukrainian advance, and Russian forces conducted their defense in an organized manner. The offensive was further complicated by the terrain: extensive forests and a limited road network favored the defenders. Although Ukrainian forces succeeded in liberating several villages in the area, the offensive from across the Siverskyi Donets River failed to capture Lyman.
Assessing the situation, the Ukrainian command abandoned further attempts at a frontal breakthrough and shifted its main effort to the north and northeast. This enabled Ukrainian forces to cut the Russian force’s lines of communication, place Lyman under operational encirclement on 30 September, and completely liberate the city on 1 October.
This raises the question of whether the frontal offensive against Lyman from across the Siverskyi Donets River was a sound professional military decision intended to pin down Russian forces, or whether it was, in fact, a mistake. Likewise, was the subsequent offensive from the northeast, which resulted in the operational encirclement of Lyman, merely a response to the failure of the original plan, or was it instead a planned continuation of that strategy? I have been unable to find definitive answers to these questions in open sources. The opinions of various authors largely depend on subjective interpretation. I believe historians will continue to debate this issue for years to come, yet historians themselves are not immune to subjective judgments. For example, some historians argue that even the disastrous Battle of Rzhev had positive strategic value because it tied down substantial Wehrmacht forces.
The Opinion of an Eyewitness
To gain additional insight, I spoke with an eyewitness to those events – retired officer and volunteer Oleksandr Palchenko from Kramatorsk, who at the time was delivering humanitarian aid and communicating personally with soldiers on the front line. He told me: “I cannot speak about the situation around Lyman as a whole, but I know the situation near Yampil very well because I was there myself. There was a bridge in Torske over the Zherebets River carrying the road to Kreminna. Instead of bypassing Yampil from the east along the old railway line from the direction of Ozerne, reaching the village of Torske, and cutting off the entire Russian force in Lyman, they began a frontal assault on Yampil, and the whole operation dragged on for ten days. The enemy managed to evacuate from Lyman and withdrew toward Kreminna.”
Yampil is a settlement southeast of Lyman. Had it been captured quickly, Ukrainian forces would have gained access to Lyman from the south. The experience of the Second World War suggests that Soviet commanders consistently favored the option promising the quickest immediate result than the one that was strategically more effective, and this preference often led to costly mistakes. Oleksandr Palchenko believes that it was not even necessary to wait for the northern offensive, which ultimately liberated Lyman. In his view, it would have been sufficient to advance from the south, bypass Yampil, and seize the bridge over the Zherebets River at Torske, thereby cutting off the Russian lines of retreat and trapping the entire Russian force in an operational encirclement. According to his assessment, such a success would have enabled Ukrainian forces to advance much farther east and liberate several additional towns.
Eyewitness Oleksandr Palchenko points out the site of the fighting near Sloviansk during the 2014 Russian invasion of Donbas to PostPravda.Info contributors Yuliia Fil and Jędrzej Morawiecki. Photo: Nikolai Karpitsky
Oleksandr Palchenko’s testimony leads me to conclude that the subsequent Ukrainian offensive from the north was a response to the failure of the original plan rather than its intended continuation. A professional military commander is capable of recognizing in time that an original operational concept requires adjustment, whereas a truly talented commander is able to foresee potential mistakes before they occur. Since overall operational responsibility for the campaign rested with Oleksandr Syrskyi, I can acknowledge him as a professional military commander of the old Soviet school. However, I cannot describe him as a commander with military talent.
For its part, the Russian command, in its determination to turn Lyman into a stronghold from which to stabilize its collapsing front, committed another error typical of the Soviet military school – it chose to hold the city at any cost. As a result, on 30 September, Lyman found itself under operational encirclement, and during the night Russian forces were forced to break out along a road that was under Ukrainian fire control. On 1 October, Ukrainian forces entered and liberated the city. It should also be acknowledged that commanders within the Ukrainian Armed Forces who had been trained in the traditions of the Soviet military school occasionally made the same mistake, leading to unnecessary casualties.
For its part, the Russian command, in its determination to turn Lyman into a stronghold from which to stabilize its collapsing front, committed another error typical of the Soviet military school – it chose to hold the city at any cost. As a result, on 30 September, Lyman found itself under operational encirclement, and during the night Russian forces were forced to break out along a road that was under Ukrainian fire control. On 1 October, Ukrainian forces entered and liberated the city. It should also be acknowledged that commanders within the Ukrainian Armed Forces who had been trained in the traditions of the Soviet military school occasionally made the same mistake, leading to unnecessary casualties.
Mykhailo Drapatyi: A Representative of a New Generation of Ukrainian Military Leadership
On 22 July 2026, Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He represents a new generation of Ukrainian military leaders, and the types of mistakes characteristic of commanders shaped by the Soviet military tradition are generally absent from his record. Unlike many staff generals, Drapatyi developed as a commander through direct leadership of troops in combat, beginning in 2014. His appointment was welcomed enthusiastically by Ukrainian society, where many associate him with a break from the Soviet command culture and with hopes of improving the situation on the battlefield.
Mykhailo Drapatyi’s military talent can be assessed by examining the organization of the defense of the Pokrovsk sector. Throughout 2024, Russian forces steadily advanced toward Pokrovsk, and it remained uncertain whether their offensive could be halted. At that stage of the war, both armies were only beginning to master the large-scale use of drones, while Russia continued to enjoy a substantial advantage in artillery and manpower. A rapid fall of Pokrovsk would have opened the way for further Russian offensives on several axes and created the risk of a broader collapse of the front. For Ukraine, it was vital to gain time until the widespread deployment of drones transformed the nature of the battlefield and significantly reduced the importance of numerical superiority in artillery and manpower.
Mykhailo Drapatyi in 2022. Photo: ArmyINFORM
Toward the end of 2024, after Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed commander of the operational grouping responsible for this sector, the situation around Pokrovsk gradually began to change. The Russian offensive did not cease, but its pace slowed noticeably, and in several sectors Ukrainian units were able to launch localized counterattacks. There are strong grounds for associating this shift with Drapatyi’s leadership, particularly the transition from a predominantly linear defense to an active, maneuver-oriented defense. The objective of this approach is not to hold every kilometer of territory at any cost, but rather to inflict the maximum possible attrition on the attacking enemy.
Ukrainian units in Donbas often sought to hold their positions until the very last moment, a practice that resulted in unnecessary personnel losses. For example, when Oleksandr Syrskyi ordered the withdrawal from Avdiivka during the night of 17 February 2024, some Ukrainian servicemen became trapped in the city and were taken prisoner. Under Mykhailo Drapatyi, by contrast, active defense has more frequently relied on the timely withdrawal from disadvantageous positions, followed by short counterattacks to recapture lost strongpoints. This approach denied the enemy the opportunity to consolidate its newly captured positions and exploit its gains.
Whereas unmanned systems units in many brigades had previously operated with considerable autonomy, after Mykhailo Drapatyi assumed command of the Pokrovsk sector they were increasingly employed as components of an integrated reconnaissance and fire-strike system. As a result, Russian assault groups more frequently suffered substantial losses before even reaching Ukrainian positions. At the same time, the number of FPV drone teams increased, the use of remote mining expanded, and coordination among unmanned systems units, artillery, mechanized formations, and air assault units improved.
A commander’s talent is demonstrated not only through spectacular victories and unconventional operational decisions. The greater part of a commander’s work consists of the everyday, often unnoticed, effort to enhance combat effectiveness and improve the command-and-control system. One of Mykhailo Drapatyi’s important organizational decisions was to abandon the rigid assignment of reserve forces to specific sectors of the front. Instead, reserves came to be employed more extensively as a mobile instrument for rapidly sealing breakthroughs, conducting localized counterattacks, and reinforcing the most threatened sectors. This increased the resilience of the defense and reduced the effectiveness of the Russian tactic of employing small assault groups.
Journalist Peter Sauer wrote in The Guardian about Mykhailo Drapatyi: “He took up drone warfare early, and pushed authority down to junior officers and expected them to answer for their own decisions.” Although I have not encountered documentary evidence showing that this decentralized command system was formally institutionalized, there is abundant eyewitness testimony indicating that this approach was widely practiced.
Following his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Mykhailo Drapatyi faces several challenges that require a high degree of professionalism: stabilizing the front, integrating unmanned systems units into a unified military structure, and optimizing the employment of reserve forces. Above all, however, he must introduce modern principles of command that will enable the Armed Forces to move beyond the outdated Soviet command culture and advance to a fundamentally new level. Accomplishing this task requires more than experience and professional competence – it also demands genuine military talent. Mykhailo Drapatyi has already demonstrated his abilities as a gifted commander at the operational and tactical levels. Whether he can also establish himself as a military strategist capable of planning and directing large-scale offensive operations remains a question that only time can answer.
Ukrainian units in Donbas often sought to hold their positions until the very last moment, a practice that resulted in unnecessary personnel losses. For example, when Oleksandr Syrskyi ordered the withdrawal from Avdiivka during the night of 17 February 2024, some Ukrainian servicemen became trapped in the city and were taken prisoner. Under Mykhailo Drapatyi, by contrast, active defense has more frequently relied on the timely withdrawal from disadvantageous positions, followed by short counterattacks to recapture lost strongpoints. This approach denied the enemy the opportunity to consolidate its newly captured positions and exploit its gains.
Whereas unmanned systems units in many brigades had previously operated with considerable autonomy, after Mykhailo Drapatyi assumed command of the Pokrovsk sector they were increasingly employed as components of an integrated reconnaissance and fire-strike system. As a result, Russian assault groups more frequently suffered substantial losses before even reaching Ukrainian positions. At the same time, the number of FPV drone teams increased, the use of remote mining expanded, and coordination among unmanned systems units, artillery, mechanized formations, and air assault units improved.
A commander’s talent is demonstrated not only through spectacular victories and unconventional operational decisions. The greater part of a commander’s work consists of the everyday, often unnoticed, effort to enhance combat effectiveness and improve the command-and-control system. One of Mykhailo Drapatyi’s important organizational decisions was to abandon the rigid assignment of reserve forces to specific sectors of the front. Instead, reserves came to be employed more extensively as a mobile instrument for rapidly sealing breakthroughs, conducting localized counterattacks, and reinforcing the most threatened sectors. This increased the resilience of the defense and reduced the effectiveness of the Russian tactic of employing small assault groups.
Journalist Peter Sauer wrote in The Guardian about Mykhailo Drapatyi: “He took up drone warfare early, and pushed authority down to junior officers and expected them to answer for their own decisions.” Although I have not encountered documentary evidence showing that this decentralized command system was formally institutionalized, there is abundant eyewitness testimony indicating that this approach was widely practiced.
Following his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Mykhailo Drapatyi faces several challenges that require a high degree of professionalism: stabilizing the front, integrating unmanned systems units into a unified military structure, and optimizing the employment of reserve forces. Above all, however, he must introduce modern principles of command that will enable the Armed Forces to move beyond the outdated Soviet command culture and advance to a fundamentally new level. Accomplishing this task requires more than experience and professional competence – it also demands genuine military talent. Mykhailo Drapatyi has already demonstrated his abilities as a gifted commander at the operational and tactical levels. Whether he can also establish himself as a military strategist capable of planning and directing large-scale offensive operations remains a question that only time can answer.
