Source: PostPravda.info 23.07.2026.
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/valerii-zaluzhnyis-analysis/
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/valerii-zaluzhnyis-analysis/
On July 8, 2026, another article by Valerii Zaluzhnyi was published. He is one of the most rational analysts of modern warfare. The general demonstrated his strategic talent in the autumn of 2022, when he planned and executed a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive that remains one of the most remarkable military operations of the 21st century. The central thesis of the article is that advances in military technology require a fundamental reassessment of conventional ideas about war, including the very concept of military victory. NATO no longer meets the challenges of modern warfare, as it is an alliance designed for a world that no longer exists. Are Western leaders, who bear responsibility for the fate of their nations, prepared to draw the necessary conclusions and rethink their strategic vision of war?
Can Modern Warfare Be Prepared for in Peacetime?
Four years ago, one could say without any doubt that NATO possessed clear military superiority. However, the war has changed its character. Are the NATO countries – which have indeed done a great deal in recent years to strengthen their defense capabilities – ready for this challenge?
The Russian army at the time of its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was considered the second most powerful in the world. However, if that 2022-version of the Russian army had faced the modern Ukrainian army, it would be completely destroyed in a very short time. This is because military technology has advanced dramatically over the past four and a half years. The longer countries remain at war, the more experience they accumulate and the more they develop new technologies and methods of warfare. Over the course of the conflict, the armed forces of both countries have reached a new level that remains beyond the capabilities of militaries without firsthand experience of modern warfare – even highly advanced forces such as those of NATO countries.
Many people are now talking about a turning point in the war. However, I agree with the author of the article: what we are witnessing is not a turning point at all, but a natural evolution in the character of warfare driven by new technologies. In the summer of 2024, the Russian army advanced rapidly toward Pokrovsk. Had it managed to maintain that momentum and quickly capture the city, the road to Pavlohrad would have been open across the flat steppe. In that scenario, the Russian army would have had a real opportunity to split the front in two and trigger its collapse. Ukraine was facing a critical shortage of soldiers, and only a technological revolution could have salvaged the situation. And that is exactly what happened. Soldiers on the front lines were increasingly replaced by drones and robotic systems, partially offsetting the manpower shortage. As a result, the threat of a collapse of the front largely disappeared. As General Zaluzhnyi argues, neither Russia nor Ukraine is currently capable of achieving victory on the battlefield.
Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s View of the Modern Battlefield
The author of the article argues that the development of modern technologies has made the accomplishment of tactical objectives on the ground almost impossible. The gray zone along the line of contact has become a kill zone, where drones destroy any moving target. The problem is no longer how to hold a particular position, but how to reach it in the first place, or how to conduct troop rotations and evacuate the wounded. Two years ago, the greatest nightmare for soldiers was finding themselves in operational encirclement, with all lines of communication under enemy fire control. Today, virtually all troops holding positions on the front line are in a situation resembling operational encirclement. Under these conditions, achieving even limited tactical objectives comes at the cost of enormous losses that are disproportionate to the results achieved. However, Russia can afford such losses, whereas Ukraine cannot. For the Russian command, soldiers are treated as cheap expendable resources that can be continuously sent into the kill zone until individual Ukrainian positions are overwhelmed by successive waves of Russian assault troops. This is how Russia’s slow, grinding offensive proceeds – an approach that fully suits Putin.
At the same time, Ukraine has managed not only to disrupt frontline logistics – which has already contributed to a fuel and energy crisis in Crimea – but also to inflict significant damage on the Russian economy, contributing to gasoline shortages. However, Valerii Zaluzhnyi believes that Ukraine’s technological advantage is temporary. Russia will soon begin employing the same technologies and methods of warfare. Since Russia and Ukraine possess roughly comparable capabilities for developing military technologies, every effective solution created by one side will eventually be adopted by the other. It is reasonable to expect that in the near future, frontline cities on both sides of the front will be isolated in much the same way as Crimea. Later, each side will place the entire territory of the opposing state under drone control. As a result, the territories of both Ukraine and Russia could become one continuous battlefield.
Are European Countries Prepared for This Type of War?
The development of combat drones has reached a new level, and Russia was unprepared for it: Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries caused gasoline shortages and fueled public discontent. However, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine itself was not prepared for systematic attacks on its energy infrastructure. Oil depots burned, fuel storage facilities were destroyed, and logistics were disrupted. Over time, every country at war adapts to the enemy’s most painful strikes – and this is only natural. Equally natural is the fact that countries not at war cannot adapt to this new type of warfare.
Many Europeans still hold the outdated view that, in the event of further Russian aggression, the combat zone would be limited to NATO’s eastern flank – Poland and the Baltic states – while the rest of Europe would remain deep in the rear. However, in the near future, the autonomy and large-scale deployment of unmanned systems will increase to such an extent that the very concept of a “deep rear” will lose all meaning. In the event of a major conflict, targets across Europe – from Portugal to Iceland – could come under threat. Moreover, Europe’s infrastructure is, in many respects, more vulnerable than Ukraine’s.
Over the years of war, Ukraine has learned to disperse critical infrastructure, create redundant capacity, and rapidly restore damaged facilities. There is no such experience in European countries. On the contrary, a significant share of their energy, transport, and industrial infrastructure is highly concentrated, which, under conditions of the mass employment of long-range drones, could make it a relatively easy target. Although Russia does not yet possess all the necessary capabilities to exert such pressure on Europe, at the current pace of technological development it will gain this capability in the foreseeable future. At that point, the main priority will no longer be holding the front line, but preserving the state’s ability to maintain the functioning of its economy, critical infrastructure, and system of governance under constant precision strikes.
Is Victory over Russia Possible?
It is impossible for Ukraine to defeat Russia on its own. As Valerii Zaluzhnyi argues, the war of attrition is now being waged far from the front line. The objective is no longer primarily to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, but to destroy logistical routes and critical infrastructure. This dramatically increases the threat to the civilian population, yet so far it has not brought the war any closer to an end. As Zaluzhnyi writes: “Talking about achieving political goals, winning the war through tactical actions on the battlefield, or even through effective strikes against logistics and critical infrastructure – clearly goes beyond the bounds of common sense.”
Western countries have ruled out direct participation in the war and, until recently, have helped Ukraine only to defend itself, not to win. Within the prevailing paradigm of Western public consciousness, peace is regarded as the normal state of affairs, while war is viewed as a temporary and exceptional event. Consequently, many believe that it will be entirely possible to reach a peace agreement with the Russian regime if the war becomes sufficiently hopeless and costly for it. This misconception is doomed to fail.
Within the prevailing paradigm of Russian public consciousness, by contrast, war is regarded as the normal state of affairs. The Russian authorities are largely insensitive to military losses and are prepared to continue the war regardless of the economic damage. Russia cannot coexist peacefully with Europe for long because the very structure of governing such a vast territory relies not on the rule of law, but on force – which sooner or later leads to renewed military expansion. Russia has now entered a phase in which it can no longer halt its aggression, and even in the event of a temporary truce, it will continue waging a hybrid war.
A reassessment of the war in Western public consciousness is a necessary precondition for victory over Russia. The new type of warfare also requires a new understanding of what victory means. Military success should no longer be measured by the amount of territory captured or liberated, but by the extent to which the enemy’s system of state governance is disrupted. The war will not end when the Russian authorities recognize the futility of continuing it, but when the Russian state loses its capacity to govern effectively – and this is precisely what Western leaders fear.
Is this achievable? In reality, Russia has significant structural vulnerabilities. All of Siberia is connected to the rest of Russia by a single railway line. If this vital link were severed at any point, neither cargo nor troops could be transported. Will regional elites take advantage of such a situation? Anything is possible if internal contradictions within Russia intensify – between business and the state, between regional bureaucracies and the central government, and between public expectations and reality. Deepening these contradictions is also an integral part of the struggle against Russia.
Ukraine is doing only its part of this effort, but that alone is not enough. Therefore, without the involvement of other European countries – at least in the form of hybrid warfare – this objective cannot be achieved. However, the NATO alliance is unlikely to be an effective instrument, as it was created for different challenges in a different era. As Valerii Zaluzhnyi aptly observed, NATO is an alliance of the old world that no longer exists. Europe must therefore find new forms of military cooperation. But for that to happen, it is first necessary to convince Western societies, which, unfortunately, still fail to recognize that Russia has long been waging not only a conventional war against Ukraine, but also a hybrid war against Europe as a whole.
