Nikolai Karpitsky. The Messianic Idea of Russia. Article Two. Is Russia’s Greatness More Important Than One’s Own Religion and the Lives of Fellow Believers?

Source: PostPravda.info 12.06.2026.
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/the-messianic-idea-of-russia/

 

It would seem that supporting a war of conquest accompanied by war crimes is incompatible with religious conscience. How can a religious person remain indifferent when the residents of a neighboring country – including fellow believers – are denied the right to live? Before the war, Russian Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Muslims, and Krishnaites communicated with their fellow believers in Ukraine, recognizing a shared identity. Yet when faced with the choice between supporting a war against a neighboring people and preserving fellowship with their Ukrainian co-believers, most of them chose the war. Is it possible to change their minds? How did it happen that the messianic idea of Russia became more important to them not only than the lives of their fellow believers, but even than their own religion?

If support for the war were merely connected to ignorance or misunderstanding resulting from exposure to Russian propaganda, they could perhaps be persuaded otherwise by the testimony of fellow believers and friends from Ukraine whom they had trusted before the war. However, this is not simply a matter of misconceptions, but of embracing a new goal-setting in defiance of their previous religious experience and relationships with fellow believers. This new goal-setting is accompanied by a particular type of collective emotional experience – a quasi-religious experience.

The Goal-Setting of Social Institutions

Why is Russia unable to abandon military expansion? This is connected to its goal-setting, namely the messianic idea of gathering lands. Goal-setting is an orientation toward a goal or mission that gives meaning to existence.

There are two types of goal-setting in social institutions:

The goal-setting of some institutions is expressed through supporting the internal life of a community, communication among its members, and the satisfaction of their needs. Examples include hobby clubs or regional associations, whose existence is justified simply by maintaining a shared space for communication and mutual support.

The goal-setting of other institutions lies in something external to the internal life of the community. For example, a political party has meaning only insofar as it implements a particular political program. If this task is not fulfilled, the party loses its reason for existence, even if its members still enjoy meeting and socializing with one another.

A similar distinction can also be observed at the level of states. Some states are oriented toward internal development, the welfare of the population, and peaceful coexistence with their neighbors. Others structure their existence around a particular mission. Such states are prepared to wage aggressive wars, even when doing so is destructive to themselves.

Every religion exists in two dimensions: in the inner lives of people as a spiritual tradition, and in external public life as a religious social institution. However, as a social institution, religion differs from secular institutions precisely in the nature of its goal-setting.

The goal-setting of secular institutions exists within the social sphere. They address specific political, economic, or cultural tasks and help organize public life. The goal-setting of religious institutions is oriented toward a higher realm – that is, toward transcendent being beyond everyday life. Their ultimate purpose is connected with human salvation, liberation from suffering, or overcoming the meaninglessness of existence through turning toward a higher reality.

Because of this, under normal conditions religion and secular society can coexist without interfering with one another, since they pursue different aims in social life and in relation to transcendent being.

The Messianic Idea of Russia Distorts Religious Goal-Setting

Under conditions of dictatorship, the Russian authorities demand complete loyalty from social institutions, including religious ones, as well as support for the war against Ukraine. In these circumstances, religious organizations face a choice: either adopt a neutral position, thereby risking marginalization and repression, or adapt themselves to the demands of the authorities. However, such adaptation requires altering religious goal-setting in such a way that the goal of religious salvation comes to be viewed as secondary to a supposedly higher objective – the fulfillment of Russia’s historical mission.

As a result, an ideology emerges that is religious in form but political in its goal-setting, and which can be classified neither as a religion nor as a secular worldview. At its core lies a fusion of religious practice with political messianism, allowing it to be characterized as a quasi-religion.

As early as the fifteenth century, during the confrontation between the Principality of Moscow and Novgorod, the messianic idea of the “gathering of lands” began to take shape. Initially, it received Orthodox religious justification through the concept of “Moscow as the Third Rome.” Later, during the Soviet period, it was reinterpreted within the framework of atheistic communist ideology while retaining its expansionist character. The current situation demonstrates that support for this messianic idea is not unique to the Orthodox Church, since it is shared by representatives of many different confessions, including Protestants, Muslims, and Krishnaites.

The Russian Quasi-Religion

Most Russians are convinced that they live in the most peace-loving country in the world – one that has never attacked anyone, but has only repeatedly been subjected to external aggression. In other words, they regard all wars fought by Russia as defensive, while the expansion of Russian territory resulting from these wars is interpreted as the liberation of other peoples and their voluntary reunification with Russia. Put differently, Russians perceive aggressive wars as the just restoration of world order. Only by becoming part of Russia, in their view, do other peoples acquire the true meaning of their existence.

In order to justify war within a religious context, it is necessary to portray the enemy not merely as a political rival, but as the embodiment of absolute evil and an enemy of God. As a result, the surrounding world comes to be perceived as a kingdom of evil opposed by Russia. The West is portrayed as the incarnation of evil forces seeking to destroy traditional values, religion, and the “Russian world.” Consequently, the idea of human salvation is replaced by the idea of struggle against Western civilization.

In religion, movement toward a higher transcendent principle may be accompanied by spiritual struggle against dark otherworldly forces that hinder human salvation. In a quasi-religion, however, the image of these dark forces is projected onto Western civilization as a whole. Ukraine is viewed as an apostate that has fallen away from Russia and sided with evil, and therefore must either be brought back by force or destroyed. For this reason, Russian believers not only refuse to listen to their Ukrainian fellow believers, but recoil from them with religious horror, as though they were people who had crossed over to the side of demonic forces.

As religion is gradually displaced by quasi-religion, inner religious experiences are replaced by experiences resembling psychological dependency. They can be compared to addiction: a person experiences euphoria from participation in a “great mission,” but when confronted with the truth and moments of mental clarity, they undergo something akin to withdrawal symptoms. This, in turn, provokes aggression toward anyone attempting to convey truthful information to them. As a result, they once again return to listening to propagandists in order to regain the euphoric state.

On the basis of this quasi-religious experience, adherents of different religions develop a new shared identity with all those who recognize Russia’s mission as the highest value, while excluding their Ukrainian fellow believers from this community. The round table discussion “World Religions Against the Ideology of Nazism and Fascism in the 21st Century,” held in the building of the State Duma of the Russian Federation on March 29, 2022, clearly demonstrated how representatives of different confessions unite around a dualistic perception of the world based on the opposition between “us” and “them,” good and absolute evil. Through their speeches at the round table, they effectively proclaimed a new quasi-religion in relation to which their traditional religious differences were regarded as secondary. Since these speeches did not provoke any significant critical reaction from their followers, it can be concluded that this quasi-religion has become one of the most important social factors shaping religious consciousness in Russia – a factor that cannot be ignored.

 

Nikolai Karpitsky. Russia’s Messianic Idea. Article One. The Baltic States Under Threat

Source: PostPravda.info 26.05.2026.
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/baltic-states-under-threat/

 

Are the Baltic states threatened by a Russian invasion? The Kremlin leader may well decide that a window of opportunity has opened precisely now. The Russian army has experience fighting a modern war. In the event of an attack on the Baltic states, it would take at least several months for European armies and the military-industrial complex to adapt to the modern type of warfare. U.S. President Donald Trump is demonstrating his unwillingness to come to the aid of Europeans. But are there real preconditions for such an invasion? Western intelligence services still do not see signs of preparations for it, and a number of political and economic arguments can be made against such a scenario. However, there is another argument that is often overlooked – Russia’s messianic goal-setting, which is what brought a man like Putin to power.

Could Russia attack the Baltic states before the war in Ukraine ends?

There are strong arguments as to why Russia cannot start a new war right now. First, from a military standpoint, it is not yet ready for a new war. Second, Russia is already bogged down in the war against Ukraine and therefore cannot divert forces to a new conflict. Third, attacking other countries would worsen Russia’s already difficult economic situation and intensify public dissatisfaction.

In response to the first argument, it can be noted that preparation for war is an endless process, because as an army is modernized, it simultaneously becomes obsolete. The situation is constantly changing, and if wars only began when armies were fully prepared, no country would ever be able to start one. History teaches that wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured. The Russian army was also unprepared for this new type of warfare when it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Armies adapt during the course of war itself, and through this process they become stronger than even the most powerful peacetime armies. Therefore, at present the Russian and Ukrainian armies are among the strongest in the world, despite the fact that by formal indicators they may lag behind NATO armies.

In response to the second argument, one can cite examples of countries at war launching new military campaigns even in times of crisis. At the end of August 1941, while Hitler was carrying out the operation to encircle Kyiv and destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, the Soviet Union launched a new large-scale military campaign at the very moment of this military catastrophe – it invaded Iran and occupied its northern part.

Finally, there is a more recent example. In August 2024, the position of the Ukrainian army in Donbas was critical. The Russian army was advancing toward Pokrovsk, and no one knew whether it could be stopped or whether the front would collapse. At that time, drones still did not play the role they do today, and there was a catastrophic shortage of soldiers. It was precisely at this moment that the Ukrainian army launched a successful offensive in the Kursk region, even though such an offensive required Ukraine to redeploy forces from Donbas. The Russian command did not expect this, because it operated according to military logic: after all, opening a new front is disadvantageous precisely for the side with fewer resources. Even any gamer who plays computer strategy games knows this.

In such cases, political considerations outweigh military ones. Especially since an attack on one or several Baltic states also has its own military logic behind it: if the Ukrainian section of the front has become practically impregnable, why not strike at a vulnerable sector? Even if the blitzkrieg of “Tallinn in three days” fails, a ceasefire in the Baltics could be traded for an end to military aid to Ukraine.

The third argument is connected to the mistaken belief that actions can always be explained rationally by taking into account factors such as benefit and external circumstances. In reality, both people and states very often act contrary to their own interests, and the motivations behind their actions can vary widely, ranging from rational to irrational.

For some, material gain is the primary motivation, which makes it possible to predict the behavior of politicians such as Donald Trump. For others, it is a messianic idea that influences the decisions of Vladimir Putin.

Why Are Some States Peaceful While Others Are Aggressive?

Why do some states coexist peacefully with their neighbors, while others constantly wage wars? Does this depend on the political situation, the history of the people, or something else? The same can be observed among individuals. There are aggressive people who will inevitably attack someone as soon as the opportunity arises, and there are kind, peaceful people who would never behave that way. The difference between them is rooted in their differing attitudes toward life, which define both the meaning of their lives and their identities as individuals. In a similar way, the character of a state is determined by the mission that, in the eyes of its inhabitants, gives meaning to its existence.

Like people, states can be either peaceful or aggressive. In relation to some, we are confident that they would not attack weaker neighbors even if they knew they could do so with impunity. But there are also states ready to unleash war even if they themselves would suffer enormous losses as a result. The priority value of peaceful states is the life and well-being of their citizens. Their mission lies in development and in ensuring the prosperity of their own country. Aggressive states, however, see their mission in something external to the everyday lives of their citizens and therefore are willing to sacrifice those citizens’ lives.

For example, under the Shah’s Iran cooperated with Israel for pragmatic reasons, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to destroy the Jewish state and is willing to make sacrifices for that goal. In this case, the destruction of another country takes priority over the prosperity of one’s own.

What Is Goal-Setting?

A mission is a goal that gives meaning to existence. That is, it is not just any goal, but one determined through a free choice of values. This choice, which defines both the meaning of a person’s life and the mission of a state, will be referred to here as “goal-setting.”

The loss of goal-setting leads to disillusionment with the meaning of existence. For example, the goal-setting of the Soviet Union was the construction of a global communist system. This supreme mission was considered more important than the well-being of citizens and served as justification for countless sacrifices of human lives. Mass disillusionment with this mission led to the collapse of the entire Soviet system.

Russia’s Imperial Mission

The process of transforming the Principality of Moscow into Russia began in the fifteenth century with the annexation of the Novgorod Republic, which led to the destruction of one of the East Slavic peoples with its own language, culture, and social traditions. This was justified by the mission of the “gathering of lands,” around which a centralized state took shape, constantly expanding its borders through military conquest.

Later, Russia’s wars of expansion led to the physical destruction of a whole series of other peoples. Renouncing this mission would have meant losing the very meaning of Russia’s existence, and therefore any sacrifice could be justified in its name. The brutal oppression of its own subjects contributed to making them willing to fight and die for this mission, while the Russian authorities ruthlessly expended human lives in every war.

However, we know that people can change. Could Russia have changed by abandoning its goal-setting? I believe this was possible, although extremely difficult to achieve. Such an attempt was made after the victory of the democratic revolution in Russia in August 1991. Masses of people supported the democratic movement in the hope of building a new Russia as a peaceful and civilized country. However, it very quickly became clear that if Russia lost its imperial mission, nothing would remain capable of holding together all the territories that had been forcibly incorporated into it. The centrifugal forces within the country frightened not only the authorities but also ordinary Russians, for it is precisely they who are the main bearers of the messianic consciousness on which politicians parasitize.

During the First Chechen War of 1994–1996, the majority of Russians supported peace and an end to the fighting in the Caucasus. Any normal person intuitively senses the unnaturalness of war, and at that moment Russians were psychologically unprepared to justify the suffering and death caused by it. However, opposition to the war did not amount to a rejection of the Russian messianic idea. Gradually, fear of the country’s collapse – which was associated with chaos and a threat to personal survival – outweighed fear of war, and by 1999 Russians were already massively supporting a new war in Chechnya.

The reason for the mass support of Vladimir Putin and all the aggressive wars he unleashed is that, for many Russians, he became the embodiment of the mission of the “gathering of lands.” It is telling that many of those who had opposed him before 2014 switched to supporting him after the occupation of Crimea. Today they may express dissatisfaction with the war in Ukraine, but this dissatisfaction is not caused by the criminal nature of the war; rather, it stems from the belief that the war has not been successful enough. Therefore, many of them would support military intervention in the Baltic states as long as there remained hope for its success.

So, Will Russia Attack the Baltic States?

A new war in Europe depends not so much on objective factors as on the subjective perceptions of one man – Vladimir Putin – who himself does not know how he will act. However, Russia’s very goal-setting, which he seeks to embody, implies that military expansion cannot stop with Ukraine alone.

So is a new war inevitable? Imagine that you have let a kleptomaniac or a sexual predator into your house. You believe that committing a crime there would not be beneficial for him, and to be completely sure, you even make certain that no opportunity presents itself. But you overlook the main thing: he will inevitably commit a crime when, according to his own subjective perceptions, he considers it possible – perceptions that you cannot rationally calculate.

Historically, it so happened that the deviant behavior of one man – Vladimir Putin – coincided with a deviant historical phenomenon: Russia’s goal-setting. Therefore, he will inevitably start a new war against one or several European countries as soon as, according to his own subjective perceptions, he decides that a window of opportunity has opened.

 

Nikolai Karpitsky. Will Russian Zoomers Break the Cycle of Imperial Consciousness?

Source: PostPravda.info 13.05.2026.
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/russian-zoomers/

Russian imperial consciousness is reproduced from generation to generation through the family, the school system, and the very structure of everyday life. But is there hope that, in the new information age, this continuity will be broken? In Russia, young people have migrated en masse into the online space, where they form subcultures and acquire new knowledge and communication skills independently of school and family. However, the Russian authorities intend to restrict the free internet as much as possible. What could this lead to?

Who Are Zoomers?

People born from the mid-1990s to the early 2010s are the first generation of the digital age, often referred to as Generation Z, or zoomers. A typical representative of this generation cannot imagine life without the internet, smartphones, and social media; is less inclined toward smoking and alcohol consumption; and places a strong emphasis on a healthy lifestyle. Zoomers perceive themselves as cosmopolitans of a free online space, within which they unite into communities and form subcultures. It is there that they master the English language, which they were unable to learn properly at school, and gain a sense of freedom from national borders.

The Unpredictable Consequences of Information Technologies

Social processes are difficult to predict – they usually have to be explained after the fact. Who could have foreseen that the spread of information technologies would lead to the uprising of the archaic around the world and contribute to Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election? Nevertheless, this can be explained in hindsight.

A primitive and archaic worldview prevented many people from keeping pace with modern life, confining them within a small and familiar world. However, the new information space created by digital technologies destroyed this comfort zone by drawing them into the wider world – and this changed the balance of political forces. Zoomers, however, are still too young to become a comparable force in major politics. Decades must pass before the current participants in youth subcultures grow up and enter the elite that determines the direction of society’s development.

Meanwhile, the Russian authorities have long mobilized in support of everyone oriented toward archaic – and such people do not need the internet for this. The authorities intend to keep the younger generation in an informational reservation as a resource for replenishing manpower at the front and therefore are consistently fighting against the free internet. But is this actually possible?

As the experience of the ten-year occupation of eastern regions of Ukraine has shown, theoretically, this is possible. One of my students, who communicated with young people in territories occupied since 2014, noted that they seemed to have stopped developing: “While we are active in life, looking for jobs to support ourselves during our studies and making our own decisions, the local youth are infantile – it would never occur to them to decide anything for themselves.” During the full-scale invasion, all these young people were sent to die at the front. Can the same be done to the entirety of Russia’s youth? I believe that this is precisely one of the goals behind the struggle against the free internet.

The Struggle Against the Free Internet – a Transition from Authoritarianism to Totalitarianism

Until 2011, there were no restrictions on the internet in Russia for the same reason that the authorities are now trying to restrict it as much as possible: Russian dictator Vladimir Putin did not and does not understand what the internet is or what significance it has in the life of a modern person.

In 2012, a registry of banned websites was introduced, which internet providers were required to block. In 2014, the Prosecutor General’s Office received the authority to block websites without a court order. On November 1, 2019, “The Sovereign Internet Law” came into force, providing for the installation of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment on operators’ networks in order to establish full control over the network and isolate the Russian internet from the global web. After the start of the full-scale war on February 24, 2022, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and numerous independent media outlets were blocked. The transition from selective blocking to total political censorship had begun. In January 2026, the State Duma granted the FSB the authority to shut down any forms of communication – internet access and mobile communications – in any region of the country. From that moment on, internet access in Russia ceased to be a right and became a privilege granted by the authorities.

By blocking the internet, the Kremlin intends to confine young people to an informational reservation cut off from the outside world. But is an apolitical youth capable of resisting this?

Ukrainian and Russian Zoomers

Whereas Ukrainian zoomers generally seek to integrate the possibilities of new information technologies into their social lives, their Russian peers are, more often than not, escapists. This is explained by the different paths Ukraine and Russia have taken in the 21st century.

Ukrainian youth witnessed two democratic revolutions, and this instilled in them a belief in their own strength and in the possibility of influencing public life. They want a new Ukraine – free from corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy and open to every talented person. Young people are ready to fight for such a country, as the Cardboard Maidan demonstrated.

In Russia, by contrast, an authoritarian regime became established – initially in a relatively soft form: the authorities adhered to an unspoken social contract with the population: “You do not interfere in politics, and we do not interfere in your private life.” This encouraged young people to retreat into the online space. There emerged a social stratum of young people who wanted nothing to do with Russian social reality and had no interest in what was happening in the country. Conversations about politics in their circles were considered almost indecent – as reminders of the world from which they wished to distance themselves completely.

After the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the authoritarian Kremlin regime finally transformed into a totalitarian one, seeking to control every sphere of human life, including the internet. Nevertheless, escapist zoomers try not to notice this.

On the one hand, this is an escape from responsibility for social life. From a Ukrainian point of view, such a position is perceived as a manifestation of infantilism and irresponsibility, as well as silent complicity in the crimes committed by Russia.

On the other hand, Russian zoomers are the first generation to shape themselves independently of the state within their own subcultures. And this offers a chance to finally break the vicious chain through which Russian imperial consciousness has been reproduced from generation to generation. It is a kind of escape that leaves open the possibility of returning to reality – armed with newly acquired knowledge and skills.

The Russian authorities cannot allow this and will do everything possible to fill the still largely apolitical consciousness of zoomers with their own ideological content. Yet the archaic worldview promoted by Kremlin propaganda is completely incompatible with the image of the informational future. On the one hand, there is a world without borders, the ability to communicate with anyone from any corner of the Earth, and access to the entirety of humanity’s cultural heritage and all modern scientific achievements at the distance of a single click. On the other hand, there is a return to medieval “spiritual bonds” supposedly meant to protect society from the influence of modern civilization.

Modern Russian youth will have to make their choice.

Nikolai Karpitsky. Russia Cannot Renounce Further Military Expansion

Translation from Russian: Postimees 07.05.2026.
URL: https://rus.postimees.ee/8464998/nikolay-karpickiy-rossiya-ne-mozhet-otkazatsya-ot-dalneyshey-voennoy-ekspansii

 

Recent attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often rely on conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for such a war. Philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky argues, however, that preparation for war is an endless process, and therefore wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.

Is Russia ready to open a second front against the Baltic states? At first glance, this seems contrary to common sense, since the Russian army is bogged down in Ukraine. However, history offers examples of countries at war launching new military campaigns even in times of crisis. At the end of August 1941, when Adolf Hitler began the operation to encircle Kyiv and destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, the Soviet Union invaded Iran and occupied its northern territories.

A more recent example came in August 2024, when Ukraine, unable to contain the Russian offensive in Donbas, launched a military operation in the Kursk region. From a military standpoint, it is illogical to open a new front and redirect forces there from critical sectors when the enemy enjoys superiority in manpower and materiel. However, in such cases, political considerations outweigh military ones.

Attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often stem from conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for war. Yet preparation for war is an endless process, so wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.

The Russian army was also unprepared for this new type of warfare when it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. If Vladimir Putin had waited until it was fully prepared, he would never have been able to start the war. Armies adapt during war itself, which is why the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces are now among the most experienced in the world in conducting modern warfare.

When we calculate the military or economic feasibility of aggression, we often project our own assumptions onto the adversary. That is why many people do not believe an attack on the Baltic states is possible. But Vladimir Putin has a different picture of the world in mind. He may decide to begin a new war regardless of the situation on the Ukrainian front or in the Russian economy.

That decision will be made at the moment when, based on his own internal perceptions, the Kremlin dictator believes that a window of opportunity for such an attack has opened.

A State Becomes Aggressive When It Assumes a Messianic Role

To assess the reality of the threat of Russian aggression, one must take into account that both people and states often act against their own interests. It may be advantageous to steal from a neighbor, but most people do not do so. Becoming a criminal means changing one’s destiny through a particular life choice. The same applies to states: most countries coexist peacefully with their neighbors, even when they have the opportunity to conquer them.

A state becomes aggressive when it assumes a “higher mission.” For example, the Shah’s Iran cooperated with Israel because doing so was beneficial. But the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to destroy the Jewish state, sacrificing the well-being of its own country and the lives of its citizens for the sake of this “mission.” Political and economic conditions are secondary here: they determine the timing and form of aggression, but they are not its root cause.

Russia Is a Country That Has Lost the Meaning of Life

Every state has a purpose and a meaning underlying its existence and functioning. But if that purpose is false, then the meaning of existence itself is lost.

For example, the meaning of the Soviet Union’s existence lay in spreading the communist system, which is why it sacrificed the well-being of its citizens in order to expand its influence throughout the world. Abandoning this mission because of exhausted resources and the bankruptcy of the communist idea meant losing the very meaning of its existence, which led to the inevitable collapse of the USSR.

Modern Russia has returned to the mission of “gathering lands,” though now stripped of communist ideology. It was precisely this mission that transformed the Principality of Moscow into the Russia that, throughout its history, waged wars of conquest. This mission first took shape in the 15th century, when Moscow destroyed the people of Novgorod as an independent ethnic group with their own language, culture, and social traditions.

Paradoxically, most Russians believe they live in the most peaceful country in the world — one that has never attacked anyone, but has only repeatedly been the victim of external aggression while always emerging victorious in every war. This blindness is explained by the fact that many Russians perceive aggressive wars as the just restoration of world order.

For them, Russia is any territory on which a Russian person has ever set foot and which has at some point been under Moscow’s rule. And it does not matter whether this was 500 years ago or 30 years ago. In this worldview, countries that break away from Russian control violate the natural order of the world, while everyone who actively resists Russia’s expansion serves global evil.

After the victory of the revolution in Russia in August 1991, the democratic movement sought to build a new Russia as a peaceful and self-sufficient country. However, Russia is “stitched together” from different national territories that were incorporated into it by force. The rejection by Yeltsin’s liberals of the mission of “gathering lands” as state ideology led to the emergence of centrifugal forces within the country and to the separation of the national peripheries from Moscow.

During the First Chechen War of 1994–1996, most Russians supported peace and an end to hostilities in the Caucasus, because it is unnatural for people to support the suffering and death brought about by war. Russian reformer Yegor Gaidar then said: “Better 100 years of negotiations than one day of war.” However, those same Russians overwhelmingly supported the Second Chechen War in 1999. One reason for this shift in public sentiment was fear of the country’s collapse, which was associated with chaos and a threat to personal survival.

In the view of most Russians, the West seeks to dismantle and destroy Russia. Therefore, the war against Ukraine is perceived by them as a defensive and just war waged by Russia against Western aggression. Accordingly, an attack on the Baltic states would likewise be perceived merely as a necessary defensive operation within the broader war that the West is allegedly already waging against Russia.

Abandoning the doctrine of confrontation with the West and the policy of expanding the “Russian world” under the paradigm that “Russia’s borders never end” would threaten the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s regime, which would then simply lose the very meaning of its existence.

An Attack on the Baltic States Can Be Prevented

Vladimir Putin is confident of mass support from Russians in the event of an invasion of the Baltic states. The readiness of the Russian army, possible military and economic losses, and the situation on the Ukrainian front are of secondary importance to him — the mission matters more. However, the prospect of a collective military response from NATO could deter him from attacking the Baltic states. But does he believe such a response would actually occur?

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for an automatic military response; it merely states that member states will provide assistance to the victim of aggression in whatever form they deem necessary. But what kind of assistance would Donald Trump consider necessary? Since he has demonstrated grievances toward other alliance members and reluctance to come to their aid in the event of war, Putin may believe that such assistance would be limited to another round of sanctions and calls for negotiations.

At the same time, since there is currently no observable transfer of Russian troops to the borders of the Baltic states, there is still time to act. The strongest step NATO could take would be a political declaration stating that, in the event of Russian aggression, all alliance countries would automatically enter the war without requiring additional approval from their political leadership.

It is possible that secret protocols for automatic responses to certain scenarios of Russian aggression already exist. However, Putin, convinced of his own impunity, will continue testing the alliance through provocations until he encounters a decisive military response. Therefore, a political declaration from NATO regarding the immediate use of force in the event of Russian aggression against alliance member states must be clearly communicated to the Kremlin.

Until such a declaration exists, the Baltic states can adopt the Ukrainian experience of creating a “wall of drones” and establishing high-tech defensive lines on land and underground, on water and underwater, in the air, and in space. Putin’s regime is already experiencing economic and military decline and is therefore, like a wounded beast, mortally dangerous. There can never be too much defense; there can only be too little time to prepare for war.

"Propaganda". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 01.05.2026
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/propaganda-russian-ukrainian-war/

 

The photo shows the Ostankino TV Tower, which is used to broadcast Kremlin propaganda. Photo: Nikita Nikitenko on Unsplash

In another article for the Dictionary of War on PostPravda.Info, Nikolai Karpitsky explains what propaganda is and introduces key concepts – manipulation, falsehood, and indoctrination – that help explain how it operates during the Russian–Ukrainian war.

Propaganda

Propaganda is a system for shaping people’s emotional and ideological attitudes toward social phenomena, ideas, and worldviews. It may be directed either at mass audiences or at specific target groups. When its aim becomes the formation of a particular worldview, it turns into an instrument of indoctrination.

Shaping Attitudes Toward Phenomena and Ideas

Propaganda does not always rely on manipulation and falsehood. Some of its forms are based on the truthful presentation of facts and appeals to positive emotions (such as the pursuit of justice or patriotism) and are aimed at improving social conditions (for example, combating corruption or resisting external aggression). However, even in such cases, a necessary element remains emotional influence – suggestion or deliberate persuasion – aimed at shaping a particular attitude toward social phenomena and ideas.

The desire to impose one’s own perception on others is also characteristic of everyday communication, especially on social media. In its most aggressive form, this occurs when a person not only expresses an opinion but also seeks to provoke an emotional reaction in their interlocutor, using a propaganda technique – emotional pressure. However, we can speak of propaganda only when such practices are systematic and purposeful.

Moral or religious preaching, like propaganda, also seeks to persuade people by using vivid imagery, emotional arguments, and appeals to authority. However, propaganda more often pursues political goals, whereas preaching pursues moral or religious ones – although in practice the boundary between them may be blurred. The fundamental difference is that preaching encourages a person to make a conscious and free choice, whereas propaganda pushes them toward accepting a predetermined position, disregarding the possibility of such a choice.

Propagandistic Manipulation

Propaganda may employ manipulative techniques. The main ones include:

– the use of truthful but incomplete information;
– substitution of the context of the interpretation or evaluation of the event;
– the provocation of strong emotional reactions in which psychological defense mechanisms hinder adequate perception;
– appeals to false authority.

For example, the claim that corruption exists in Ukraine and that therefore the country is doomed to defeat in the war is a manipulation based on incomplete information. In reality, the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts depends on the development of civil society, and in Ukraine this process is progressing with varying degrees of success, in line with general patterns observed in European countries.

The assertion that corruption levels in Ukraine and Russia are the same, and that therefore these countries are fundamentally no different, constitutes a substitution of context. Meanwhile, the claim that discussing corruption “plays into the enemy’s hands” appeals to a sensitive perception of social reality and triggers psychological defense mechanisms. Each of these manipulations may be reinforced by references to false authorities – bloggers, analysts, public opinion, or officials.

Propagandistic Falsehood

Its main types are:

– Factual falsehood – the assertion of false facts and the denial of verified ones.
– Contextual falsehood – the interpretation of accurate facts within a context that reverses their meaning. Such a context may consist of a worldview imposed by propaganda.
– Intentional falsehood – a biased presentation of accurate facts that creates a new context for their interpretation. If a person does not share the imposed worldview, the facts are presented in a way that encourages them to change their views.

An example of factual falsehood is the claim that it was not Russia but Ukraine that started the war.
An example of contextual falsehood is the claim that Russia was forced to attack Ukraine in order to defend itself from NATO – here, facts are placed within the context of a nonexistent threat.
An example of intentional falsehood is the claim that in any conflict there are no completely innocent parties and that each side bears some responsibility. In this case, facts are presented in a way that leads to a false conclusion. The propagandist does not insist directly on an interpretation within their worldview but instead suggests acknowledging real mistakes on the Ukrainian side in order to push toward the misleading conclusion that the responsibility of the perpetrator is comparable to that of the victim.

Indoctrination

Official Kremlin propaganda functions as a tool of indoctrination and leads to a rupture in the shared space of mutual understanding with those outside its sphere of influence. Indoctrination is the systematic influence on people’s consciousness aimed at shaping a particular ideology, worldview, or picture of reality, resulting in a transformation of values and perception. As a result, a person begins to perceive cause-and-effect relationships in society differently and assigns new – sometimes even opposite – meanings to social phenomena.

In the Soviet Union, total indoctrination was carried out on the basis of communist ideology, which could be rationally understood, making it possible to engage in debate with its adherents. Contemporary Kremlin propaganda, by contrast, imposes an irrational picture of the world in which ideology plays an instrumental role and can be replaced when necessary. This allows the Russian leadership to secure support from people with different ideological views, united by a shared worldview based on the demonization of the opponent.

Such a worldview distorts inner experience and the perception of reality to such an extent that any common ground for mutual understanding between its adherents and others disappears. As a result, meaningful discussion between them becomes practically impossible. Accordingly, propaganda that shapes public opinion within Russia often remains incomprehensible beyond its borders. For this reason, the Russian leadership constructs different propaganda systems for different audiences – separately for domestic and external consumption.

 

Nikolai Karpitsky

Dictionary of War

 

Nikolai Karpitsky. The Moment of Truth: A View of the Russian–Ukrainian War Through the Eyes of a Resident of Sloviansk

Source: PostPravda.info 22.04.2026.
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/the-moment-of-truth-the-war/

Are the Russians bombing civilians? – The moment of truth: Sloviansk after the bombing on April 15, 2026. Photo: Ukrainian National Police

People view the Russian–Ukrainian war through the lens of their own beliefs and expectations, often assuming that only their perspective is correct. Is there such a moment of truth that would allow us to see the war as it really is, regardless of worldview or the influence of propaganda? This is what Nikolai Karpitsky reflects on, having lived through all four years of the war in the frontline city of Sloviansk.

Why do millions of Russians support the war?

I remember my school years. For the most part, Soviet people did not need ideology to support the invasion of Afghanistan. They relied on an instinct to oppose outsiders, much like a gang of schoolchildren heading to another school to beat someone up. In some people, this instinct manifests in an aggressive form. Later, they actively supported the wars against Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine. In others, it takes the form of a desire to align with the majority; they mask their passive support for war with peaceful rhetoric and claims that “no one really knows the truth.”

There are also those who claim to value critical thinking, scientific objectivity, or a connection to a higher religious truth. Among them are people who not only support Ukraine but also feel a sense of shame – though these are rare cases. Far more numerous are those who support the aggressive war, and even more are those who try not to notice it.

A special category includes those who understand the criminal nature of the Kremlin regime and the war it has unleashed, yet declare themselves neutral. One highly educated Vaishnava teacher – a true intellectual who suffered under Russian authorities and was forced to emigrate – fully understands that Ukraine is the victim of the war, yet tried to convince me that it is unacceptable to assess the war from a religious perspective. On the one hand, such a warning is justified, as it helps prevent religion from turning into ideology. On the other hand, if we do not find a moment of truth, such neutrality can turn into tolerance for any political position that justifies crimes, including aggressive war.

In practice, it turns out that, while opposing moral relativism from a religious standpoint, this respected Vaishnava teacher inadvertently arrives at justifying moral relativism in politics. This is illustrated by his polemical statement about the Russian–Ukrainian war during a discussion with me: “Both sides claim they are right and are fighting for their survival, while the other side wants to destroy them. This only adds fuel to the fire of war and leads to new deaths and suffering. From this perspective, it follows that the other side is absolute evil, and the only thing left to do is to fight until either the supposedly ‘good’ side wins or is completely destroyed. This is a dead-end path.” I think most modern Western politicians and religious leaders who sympathize with Ukraine would agree with his words.

Is Death the Moment of Truth?

Over time, my own political views have changed, and I have often been mistaken in my assessments of events and politicians. That is why it is important for me to find a moment of truth – to overcome my own misconceptions. A moment of truth is an undeniable fact that allows one to reassess one’s understanding of what is happening, regardless of personal beliefs or expectations.

For example, I cannot determine who is at fault if a husband and wife in a neighboring apartment are constantly arguing. Each constructs a convincing narrative in which the other is to blame. But if the worst happens – if the husband kills the wife – that becomes a moment of truth for me, independent of whatever justifications the murderer may offer.

Death is an absolute reality, independent of opinions or interpretations. That is why I responded to the respected Vaishnava teacher as follows: “Many things can be obscured by arguments that no one knows the truth – but not death. A person is either alive or dead. I know that if I remain under occupation, I will not survive – and that is the truth of life. Why should I care about intellectual games based on moral relativism?”

Every Step Toward a Larger War Revealed Its Own Moment of Truth

In the autumn of 1999, a series of apartment bombings in various Russian cities became the pretext for a new war against Chechnya. While preparing another attack – the bombing of a residential building – a group of Moscow FSB officers was reportedly caught in the act. This fact is presented as a moment of truth that does not depend on political beliefs. Nevertheless, most Russians ignored it and, six months later, voted for Putin in the presidential election, thereby supporting a security-service takeover in Russia and an aggressive war.

In February 2014, Russia occupied Crimea and began sending organized armed groups into eastern Ukraine to ignite war there as well. This was done under the cover of a propaganda campaign about a “Kyiv junta,” alleged reprisals against Russians, and massive flows of refugees from Ukraine. One may hold different political views and be misled by propaganda, but one cannot ignore the moment of truth – the question of who first brought death to Donbas.

On March 13, 2014, in central Donetsk, pro-Russian militants, after a peaceful rally had ended, stabbed a young man, Dmytro Cherniavsky, to death. This is a moment of truth that does not depend on political beliefs or worldview.

On April 12, 2014, pro-Russian militants led by Igor Girkin seized Sloviansk, while Russian propaganda claimed that it was the residents of Donbas themselves who were rising up against Kyiv. Most people in Russia believed this. I tried to persuade them otherwise, but it was completely futile, because people relied on their beliefs and ignored the moment of truth revealed by a simple question: when did reprisals against peaceful residents of Sloviansk begin – before this event or after?

There are numerous testimonies of torture and killings of civilians by Girkin’s militants, and not a single testimony of comparable crimes from the Ukrainian side. I will cite an account I know from Natalia Bradarska, the wife of a deacon of the Pentecostal church “Transfiguration of the Lord,” who was shot.

On June 8, the feast of Trinity, pro-Russian militants abducted four Christians immediately after the service, right outside the church: two deacons – Viktor Bradarsky and Volodymyr Velychko – and the two sons of the pastor, Ruvym and Albert Pavenko. That same day, the abducted men were brutally tortured, and during the night, they were executed. The occupiers concealed the fact of the killings from the families, but after the liberation of Sloviansk, it became possible to reconstruct the crime in detail.

I told representatives of different religious denominations in Tomsk about this event – people with whom I had previously organized interfaith dialogue. I thought this would be the moment of truth that would force them to reassess the situation in Ukraine. But my former Russian friends ignored my message and did not change their attitude toward the war in any way.

A Distorted Picture of the World and the Reality of War

It would seem that the launch of an unprovoked war of conquest against a neighboring state should have become a moment of truth for the citizens of the aggressor country – but the opposite happened. Many Russians who declared political neutrality in 2014 ultimately locked themselves into their distorted worldview and began to justify the war against Ukraine.

A colleague of mine in Russia, also a Doctor of Philosophy, a scholar of religion, and a Vaishnava – an adherent of an Indian spiritual tradition – recently wrote a comment under my post: “The USSR imposed its ideology, and did so in vain, and lost. Now the United States imposes Pax Americana. They interfered in the peaceful neighborly relations between Ukraine and Russia.” Such a statement is only possible with a complete misunderstanding or disregard for lived experience in Ukraine, when instead of searching for a moment of truth, the assumptions of a distorted worldview are accepted by default. In other words, neither scientific critical thinking nor a sense of connection to a higher religious truth provides sufficient grounding for an adequate perception of reality.

We can all be mistaken, because we interpret events within the framework of our own worldview. In particular, despite the obvious Russian threat, it is difficult for residents of European countries to imagine that their cities could be destroyed by bombardment. It was also difficult for me to imagine that Russia would destroy Ukrainian cities, even though I already knew how Russian forces had destroyed Grozny and Aleppo.

At the beginning of the invasion, the horizon of expectations for Ukrainian residents was very limited – several weeks, or at most a few months. It was too frightening to imagine that the war would last for many years: the psyche’s defense mechanisms do not allow one to fully confront such a possibility. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on moment of truth that help restore an adequate perception of reality, even if doing so is very painful.

We arrive at a moment of truth during war when we discard subjective judgments and expectations and identify what is undeniable. During war, what is undeniable is the proximity of death. That is why I responded to my Russian colleague as follows: “If you were to kill or rape someone, could your actions be justified by claiming that American propaganda destroyed your good neighborly relations with the victim? For four years now, Russians have been trying to kill me, my friends, and my colleagues, and tens of millions support this intention. After that, hearing about good neighborly relations is insulting.”

Random and Inevitable Death

There is no safe place in Ukraine: any resident can be killed at any moment. Random death from a missile threatens even those deep in the rear. However, the more dangerous a place is, the faster you get used to it. It is impossible to constantly think about the threat to your life, and when the bombing stops, you simply forget about the danger.

The full-scale invasion shattered the habitual feeling of life. In the first days, the “fog of war” plunged us into a state of complete uncertainty – it was impossible to adequately assess the immediate threat to our lives. The explosion of a cruise missile right above my home dispelled this fog: random death can strike at any moment. That first time, it was so unfamiliar that I was a few minutes late for a class with my students, which I was conducting remotely. Later, I became so accustomed to such explosions that I stopped paying attention to them.

This became another moment of truth for me: an entire state is working to kill the residents of a neighboring country. Soon, among my friends and colleagues, there were casualties, and through this prism of death, I began to look at my former friends in Russia. The moment of truth revealed the falseness of those who expressed sympathy for Ukraine while claiming that “brotherly nations” had been set against each other by Americans, that all sides were to blame for the war, and that it was not Russia but only Putin who was waging the war against Ukraine.

As I began writing this article, a one-and-a-half-ton aerial bomb was dropped in the center of Sloviansk. Strikes on the city had occurred before, quite regularly, but usually 250-kilogram bombs were used. This one was six times more powerful: two buildings were destroyed, 39 apartment blocks were damaged, and I was left without electricity. When it was restored, I learned that on the night of April 15–16, Russia had carried out a large-scale combined attack across Ukraine. According to preliminary data, 16–17 people were killed and more than 120 were injured. The main strikes hit residential areas: people were killed in their apartments in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and other cities.

Russia is a large country, and it is difficult to govern it through precise commands: there is no guarantee that orders will not be distorted as they pass down the hierarchy. Therefore, it is governed through guidelines. The leadership makes clear what it wants, and subordinates try to curry favor, sometimes contrary to expediency and common sense. Russia also wages war in accordance with such guidelines. For example, during the February frosts, there was a guideline to disable the energy system and freeze Ukraine. Now it is spring; the leadership’s interest in this goal has waned, and with it the zeal of those carrying out the orders.

While I was writing this, another heavy aerial bomb was dropped on the center of our city. The electricity went out briefly; when it came back, I continued writing – and then two powerful explosions sounded very close by. All of this suggests that the Russian leadership has issued a new guideline – to deliberately bomb residential neighborhoods. Of course, they were bombed before as well, but now the likelihood of being killed has increased many times over – at least until another guideline is issued.

The Approaching Kill Zone – a Moment of Truth for Those Living in Frontline Areas

Death from shelling is random – it is like “Russian roulette.” Another matter is the wave of occupiers who destroy everything in their path. Even if one manages to survive it, one may end up in an occupied zone – and then it is not just death that threatens, but death after torture.

This summer, Russian forces are again trying to capture Sloviansk; they first attempted this in the summer of 2022. Over the four years of war that I have spent in Sloviansk, an entire technological era of warfare has changed: you no longer see multiple rocket launch systems on the streets, and tanks are perceived like mammoths from a prehistoric age. Now it is a war of drones, robots, and electronic technologies.

In the spring of 2022, I could hear, week after week, the artillery cannonade drawing closer: first somewhere far away – forty kilometers from us – then thirty, then twenty… In the evenings, white flashes could be seen over the horizon – there was fighting there too, but so far away that the sounds did not reach us. The most frightening thing was the information isolation during prolonged power outages, when you do not know what is happening at the front: what if the enemy has already broken through, and it is too late to flee?

Russian forces advanced, creating in front of them a wall of artillery fire that ground everything into dust. It felt as if a wave of orcs was approaching, destroying everything in its path. Appealing to their humanity is pointless, and there is no hope for mercy. This approaching death became a moment of truth, demonstrating that Russia is waging this war for destruction, not for any political gain.

Now it is a different era of war – this is evident if you walk through the city. You no longer encounter armored vehicles crushing the asphalt as in 2022; now the roads look new and are covered with anti-drone nets. There are no warplanes roaring overhead; instead, you increasingly hear the buzzing, humming, and sometimes whistling of deadly drones. You never know whether that sound will be the last you hear in your life. These drones control the territory around the city, and fifteen kilometers to the east begins a continuous kill zone, where everything that moves is destroyed.

So far, it has not been possible to stop the advance of this zone; moreover, Russia is bringing in additional troops in our direction. How the summer battle for Donbas will end is unknown. I hope that Russian forces will not succeed in capturing our city, but the probability that it will end up within the kill zone remains high.

Once, I lived in Russia and communicated with people who seemed intelligent and decent. Back then, they appeared quite normal: some demonstrated critical thinking grounded in culture, while others preached goodness and moral values based on their religious experience. Now, however, they assess the war within their distorted worldview. I cannot draw their attention to the moment of truth – they will neither listen to nor read me. Nevertheless, I share with them a common collective responsibility for their attitude toward the war.

"Guilt". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 01.04.2026
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/guilt-and-the-feeling-of-collective-guilt/

 

Are all Russians guilty of the war? Can we speak of collective guilt, or can guilt only be personal? How does a sense of collective guilt arise?

Guilt

Guilt is always connected to an action. The subject of an action may be an individual, a state, or a social institution that possesses a unified decision-making mechanism. If such a mechanism does not exist, then guilt cannot exist either. A subject bears guilt for an action in two cases: either when it was originally based on malicious intent, or when – regardless of intent – the action led to injustice and caused harm to people. Unlike the state, a people cannot be the subject of an action and therefore cannot be guilty of committing it, since a people represent an imagined unity of individuals, each of whom acts in their own way, while decision-making mechanisms belong not to the people as such but to specific social institutions.

Guilt presupposes political, legal, or moral punishment. Guilt is borne by an individual subject, not a collective one: a person, not society; a state, not a people; a church organization, not Christians, and so on. Punishment must always be applied only to an individual subject, even if the consequences of this punishment affect others. For example, when an outstanding cultural figure is punished for a criminal offense, society suffers, but this is not grounds for exempting that person from responsibility. Similarly, when a state is punished for unleashing an aggressive war, the entire people suffer; however, this is not grounds for exempting the state from punishment – boycotts, sanctions, and other measures, up to and including its complete dismantling. At the same time, each citizen may bear their own personal guilt for inaction or, all the more so, for complicity in the crimes of the state; in every case, however, each person has their own specific guilt.

The Feeling of Collective Guilt

It is necessary to distinguish between actual guilt and the feeling of guilt. Although a people cannot bear collective guilt, a person may experience a feeling of guilt for their people, since a feeling of guilt can relate not only to one’s own actions but also to the actions of other people or groups with whom one identifies. For example, children are not guilty of their parents’ actions, but they may feel guilt for them. Thus, although collective guilt cannot exist, a feeling of collective guilt is formed on the basis of common identity. A person can experience it together with those with whom they identify: family, church, people, country, and so on.

In mythological and religious contexts, the feeling of collective guilt and guilt itself are practically indistinguishable; therefore, it is entirely justified to say that God, fate, history, or higher powers punish a people for guilt.

Types of Guilt

Criminal guilt is determined by the fact of committing a crime that is legally defined and punishable by law. It is always personal in nature. Even if a crime is committed by an organization, each of its members is legally responsible for their own personal guilt. In addition to criminal guilt, Karl Jaspers distinguishes political, moral, and metaphysical guilt.

If the residents of a country supported the regime, they bear moral guilt for this; ignorance, lack of understanding of the situation, or the absence of its legal qualification cannot serve as justification. Moral guilt is personal in nature, since it concerns specific subjects and their actions.

Political guilt is the guilt of all citizens for the regime they endure, even if they themselves are victims of that regime and did not directly participate in its crimes. This is where its collective character manifests itself. Since factual guilt cannot be collective, political guilt is expressed in the feeling of guilt and in a willingness to bear responsibility for the crimes of one’s own state and of one’s fellow citizens who supported the regime.

Metaphysical guilt is expressed in a feeling of responsibility for one’s own inaction when crimes are being committed nearby. Every Russian bears metaphysical guilt for Russia’s crimes, because there is always something they could have done but did not do. Since this remainder cannot be precisely determined, metaphysical guilt is given not as a universally valid fact, but as a feeling of personal responsibility for not having done everything one could. At the core of metaphysical guilt lies a feeling of shared human solidarity; the denial of metaphysical guilt is a sign of indifference toward other people and toward their right to life.

Metaphysical Guilt and Responsibility for Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Hannah Arendt draws a distinction between guilt and responsibility. While criminal and moral guilt are factual in nature – that is, they are determined by the actions of a specific subject – political and metaphysical guilt may be unrelated to one’s own actions and, in such cases, manifest only as an inner feeling. Accordingly, what Karl Jaspers called political and metaphysical guilt is understood by Hannah Arendt as a form of responsibility rather than factual guilt.

Guilt for Russia’s war against Ukraine is borne by the state as a social institution, as well as by all those who are complicit in this crime. At the same time, an individual citizen of Russia may experience a feeling of metaphysical guilt for not having done everything possible to stop the war, and a feeling of political guilt for their affiliation with the aggressor state. These experiences express both the personal and the collective responsibility of a citizen for the war unleashed by their state. Although this feeling is experienced individually, it can be shared by others, leading to the formation in public consciousness of a collective feeling of guilt for the war, on the basis of which an understanding of collective responsibility arises. If a person ignores this responsibility, they bear personal guilt for their own irresponsibility.

 

Nikolai Karpitsky

Dictionary of War

 

Nikolai Karpitsky. The Kremlin’s Quasi-Religion

Source: PostPravda.info 18.08.2025.
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/kremlins-quasi-religion/

 

A new quasi-religion for traditional faiths in Russia. Photo: duma.gov.ru

 

The Kremlin demands unconditional loyalty from all religious denominations, including those it systematically persecutes. In 2014, during Russia’s invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin was still satisfied with declarations of political neutrality from Russian religious organizations, provided they did not speak out in support of Ukraine or their Ukrainian co-believers. However, after the start of the full-scale war, the Kremlin demanded more – namely, religious justification for the war against Ukraine. On March 29, 2022, in the building of the State Duma, representatives of various confessions jointly formulated the foundations of a new doctrine – Manichaean necro-imperialism. Its essence lies in the idea that Russia must once again become a great empire in order to destroy the “evil” embodied by the West and Ukraine. This new quasi-religion is incompatible with genuine religiosity, regardless of denomination.

Discrimination and Repression Against Religious Organizations in Russia

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced an unprecedented level of religious freedom in its history. However, after Vladimir Putin came to power, the concept of the “traditional religions of Russia” began to be imposed, within which all other confessions were regarded as inferior and subjected to discrimination – initially subtle, but increasingly severe with each passing year.

The war in Chechnya also provoked repression against Muslims, despite the fact that Islam is considered one of the “traditional” religions. For career and material gain – promotions and bonuses – FSB officers began searching for “extremists” in other regions as well. As a result, the list of extremist materials banned in Russia came to include works by Muslim theologians and philosophers studied around the world. Even one translation of the Qur’an was banned.

Moreover, adding any “non-traditional” denomination to the list of extremist organizations provided Russian security services with an easy way to improve their “performance” statistics. In 2011, the prosecutor’s office, at the initiative of the FSB, initiated a trial against a sacred Hindu text – the Bhagavad Gita with commentary by the founder of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), Srila Prabhupada. Had the court declared the book extremist, practicing Krishna devotion in Russia would have become a criminal offense punishable by a long prison sentence. Thanks to protests by civil society in Tomsk and support from India, these plans were thwarted, delaying – but not preventing – the escalation of religious repression.

In 2016, amendments to legislation (the so-called “Yarovaya package”) were adopted, restricting the public dissemination of religious beliefs, tightening penalties, and expanding the powers of security services. In 2017, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation recognized Jehovah’s Witnesses as an extremist organization, and their followers began to be sentenced to imprisonment. Harsh sentences (7–8.5 years) have become routine since 2021. A similar threat has loomed over other religious organizations labeled as “non-traditional.”

To Tell the Truth or Adapt?

While Ukrainian Pentecostals enjoy full religious freedom, their fellow believers in Russia have been forced to constantly look over their shoulders at the authorities’ attitude toward them. One might expect this to encourage a more critical view of Russian policy.

In 2014, church leaders of Ukrainian and Russian Pentecostal communities held a series of meetings to develop a common position regarding Russia’s invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Pentecostals proceeded from the belief that the Church should be a herald of truth and has a duty to speak openly about the suffering caused by Russian aggression. In response, Russian Pentecostals stated that they were “outside politics” and “love everyone,” and therefore saw no need to discuss the war or the actions of the Russian authorities – not only publicly, but even in private conversations. Soon, both sides became convinced of the futility of such meetings, and communication between Ukrainian and Russian Pentecostals ceased. A similar process took place among followers of other religions.

A New Quasi-Religion: Washington as the Lair of Satan, and “We Will Become a Great Empire!”

With the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities were no longer satisfied with the “neutrality” of religious organizations and demanded not just support, but religious justification for the war against Ukraine. To this end, on March 29, 2022, representatives of various religions gathered in the State Duma of the Russian Federation for a roundtable titled “World Religions Against the Ideology of Nazism and Fascism in the 21st Century.” The participants were expected to formulate a common religious position justifying Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Among the participants in the roundtable were:

– Vakhtang Kipshidze, Deputy Chairman of the Synodal Department for Church Relations with Society and Media of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church;
– Metropolitan Korniliy of the Russian Orthodox Old Believer Church;
– Albir Krganov, Head of the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia;
– Talgat Tadzhuddin, Supreme Mufti and Chairman of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia;
– Aaron Gurevich, Head of the Department of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia for Cooperation with the Armed Forces, EMERCOM, and Law Enforcement Agencies;
– Did Khambo Lama Dashinima Sodnomdorzhiev, representative of the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia;
– Archbishop Yezras, Head of the Russian and New Nakhichevan Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church;
– Sergey Ryakhovsky, Presiding Bishop of the Russian United Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals);
– and other members of Russian religious organizations.

At the time, the media wrote extensively about this event but underestimated its historical significance. For the first time, representatives of different religions in Russia jointly engaged in shaping a unified religious stance on the war against Ukraine. Each participant contributed to formulating the core tenets of a new quasi-religion – Manichaean necro-imperialism.

Note. Manichaeism, like Gnosticism, is an ancient doctrine according to which the material world is evil. The difference between them lies in the fact that a follower of Gnosticism is passive and indifferent to what is happening around them, whereas a follower of Manichaeism is oriented toward active struggle against the external world. Gnosticism holds that the material world was created by an “evil god,” and therefore life and struggle are meaningless. Manichaeism, by contrast, asserts that the “evil god” invaded the realm of the “good god,” and therefore true adherents of the good must fight to cleanse the world of evil. Bolshevik ideology is, in essence, an atheistic transformation of Manichaeism, since it proceeds from the idea that the old world must be purged of evil through class struggle.

The head of the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia, Albir Krganov, stated that in the 21st century the ideology of Nazism and fascism has intensified in a number of countries, manifesting itself in violence against civilians.

Monk Kiprian declared that Washington is the lair of the devil, that God is on the side not of the West but of Russia, and that, therefore, victory will belong to Russia. He added that Russia is an instrument in God’s hands, destined to stop the spread across the Earth of abominations before the Lord – everything immoral emanating from the United States.

Deputy Chairman of the Synodal Department Vakhtang Kipshidze argued that, with the support of the Constantinople Patriarchate and the United States, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was created – a “quasi-religious structure” that united schismatics sharing a commitment to extreme nationalism. In turn, the Russian Orthodox Church assists Russian military forces.

Metropolitan Korniliy of the Russian Orthodox Old Believer Church claimed that the authorities in Ukraine have allegedly renounced God; that the ideas of Nazism are widespread in Ukraine and in European countries and have received state-level support, which has led to genocide – the alleged extermination of Russians in Donbas and Luhansk; that Ukraine is waging war against civilians and using them as a shield; and that “Nazi authorities,” supported by the tolerant West, trample all norms of Christian morality. He urged people to pray for the soldiers, especially for Putin, and concluded his speech by stating: “We will be a great nation; we will be a great empire.”

It is worth noting that when the moderator of the roundtable pressed a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate from Luhansk to confirm “Nazi atrocities,” she heard nothing beyond an account of the charitable activities of the Luhansk diocese.

Lama Dashinima Sodnomdorzhiev – the only participant whom the moderator asked to keep his remarks very brief – showed no offense and called for unity against fascism and Nazism, and for defeating and destroying this evil so that others would not dare to repeat it.

The representative of Jewish communities, Aaron Gurevich, spoke about Nazism in general terms, occasionally gesturing toward the West.

The Presiding Bishop of the Russian United Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals), Sergey Ryakhovsky, stated that he is driven by love – but a kind of love that “destroys evil” – and emphasized how important it was that Putin had invoked words from the Bible to justify the military invasion of Ukraine, since there was no other way to defend the truth.

The Supreme Mufti and Chairman of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia, Talgat Tadzhuddin, called for fighting the devil without being deceived by slogans about democracy and civilization, as had happened in Syria and was now occurring in Ukraine. He expressed satisfaction that Russian troops were positioned around Kyiv and that Ukraine’s naval, air defense, and missile forces had been “destroyed.” He also stated that on the very first day – February 24 – the Council of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia adopted a declaration fully supporting the military actions against Ukraine. He further emphasized their significance from a religious perspective: Putin is a ruler, and the ruler is the shadow of God on earth; therefore, in the war against Ukraine, the Almighty grants Putin inexhaustible strength.
 

Russia’s Chief Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin has called for a fight against the devil in Ukraine. duma.gov.ru

 

 Salah Mitaevich Mezhiev reported that the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Chechen Republic supported the military operation “against Nazism, fascism, and Satanism in Ukraine” on the second day and issued a fatwa according to which Muslims participating in the war against Ukraine are fighting for the Qur’an and for the Prophet Muhammad. He declared that the war with Ukraine is a jihad and that anyone who falls will be a shahid (martyr); that it is a war against the globalization of Satanism; and that Ukraine and European countries are dominated by Satanists, devils, Nazis, fascists, the LGBT community, Kharijites, and Wahhabis, toward whom he feels only hatred. He also reproached other participants in the roundtable for calling for love. “There is only one way to deal with them – they must be beheaded, and that’s all,” he concluded.

Archpriest Alexander Alexandrovich Pelin from St. Petersburg stated that Ukraine is not Christian but pagan. He supported this claim by asserting that the Ukrainian coat of arms – the trident of Prince Volodymyr – is a pagan symbol, namely the falcon of Rarog, a false god in Scandinavian mythology, which allegedly became established under the influence of Austria-Hungary in the 19th century. Therefore, he argued, Russian Christians are now fighting not Ukrainian Christians but pagans.

Ismail Berdiev, Chairman of the Coordination Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus, stated that no negotiations should be conducted with Ukrainians. Even if they agreed to capitulate, he said, this should not be accepted; instead, they should be destroyed completely. “There should be no Ukraine,” he declared.

Later, in June 2022, Sergey Ryakhovsky made it clear that neither he nor his church would take any action in response to the appeal of Ukrainian Protestant churches to repent for their statements at this roundtable and to condemn Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. He stated that the appeal of his Ukrainian co-believers had been made in the spirit of “Russophobia,” allegedly spreading around the world.

Why Does the Kremlin Need the Support of Religious Communities?

At the time of the invasion, the Kremlin fully controlled public opinion and the situation within the country, yet it still demanded that religious denominations abandon their “neutrality,” which had previously sufficed. Putin and his inner circle appear to hold a dualistic worldview: the world is divided into “us” and “enemies,” who must be destroyed not for the sake of gain, but simply because they are enemies – even if this requires sacrifices and leads to crisis within their own country.

From a pragmatic point of view, this is meaningless; that is why Western politicians tried to reach agreements with Putin by appealing to his self-interest. However, the motivation of the Russian authorities is irrational, and in order to legitimize it, they have demanded that religious denominations provide a religious justification for the war against Ukraine.

Although the participants in the roundtable differed in the details, the general contours of their position can be identified:

– Ukraine has no right to exist independently of Russia;
– God is on Russia’s side in the war against Ukraine;
– religious communities must support this war;
– this is a war against Western civilization, which embodies evil – Nazism, Satanism, immorality, and the rejection of “traditional values.”

These theses reveal the outlines of a new doctrine deeply hostile not only to the West and Ukraine but also to the very religions on whose behalf the participants in the roundtable spoke. This doctrine is a revived form of Manichaeism based on Russian necro-imperialism – in other words, Manichaean necro-imperialism.

Manichaean Necro-Imperialism and Gnostic Fatalism

The Russian authorities need both those who justify the war and those who are ready to go and die. What is at stake here is not so much belief as an attitude toward life, and the authorities are interested in soldiers obediently going to certain death, believing that life has no meaning. This attitude toward life is embodied in Gnostic fatalism. But in order for ordinary people to support the killing of their friends and relatives in a neighboring country, they are persuaded that they are surrounded by enemies – and this attitude is embodied in Manichaean necro-imperialism.

Under the conditions of life in Russia, Gnostic fatalism forms spontaneously – no additional effort by the authorities is required. Of course, Russian soldiers who obediently accept dying senselessly are unlikely to believe in the existence of an “evil god,” as ancient Gnosticism teaches; however, they spontaneously reproduce the ancient Gnostic attitude toward life: if everything is meaningless, then there are no moral constraints, and no life – neither another’s nor one’s own – has value. Unlike Gnosticism, Manichaeism provides motivation to struggle against the surrounding world, onto which the image of the enemy is projected. Since such projection occurs spontaneously, the Russian authorities have needed the assistance of religious organizations to channel this process into hatred toward the West. This is precisely why the roundtable of March 29, 2022, was held.

But why would Russian adherents of different religions support this quasi-religion? The motivation here may be quite down-to-earth. Religious organizations seek to adapt to the conditions of life in Russia, to protect themselves by demonstrating their loyalty and usefulness to the authorities. At first glance, this seems paradoxical: in doing so, they place a social task above their spiritual mission. After all, if a religion abandons its higher purpose for the sake of survival, it loses the very meaning of its existence. There is, however, another possible reason – the Stockholm syndrome. But that is a topic for a separate discussion.