Thursday, May 14, 2026

Nikolai Karpitsky. Will Russian Zoomers Break the Cycle of Imperial Consciousness?



Russian imperial consciousness is reproduced from generation to generation through the family, the school system, and the very structure of everyday life. But is there hope that, in the new information age, this continuity will be broken? In Russia, young people have migrated en masse into the online space, where they form subcultures and acquire new knowledge and communication skills independently of school and family. However, the Russian authorities intend to restrict the free internet as much as possible. What could this lead to?

Who Are Zoomers?

People born from the mid-1990s to the early 2010s are the first generation of the digital age, often referred to as Generation Z, or zoomers. A typical representative of this generation cannot imagine life without the internet, smartphones, and social media; is less inclined toward smoking and alcohol consumption; and places a strong emphasis on a healthy lifestyle. Zoomers perceive themselves as cosmopolitans of a free online space, within which they unite into communities and form subcultures. It is there that they master the English language, which they were unable to learn properly at school, and gain a sense of freedom from national borders.

The Unpredictable Consequences of Information Technologies

Social processes are difficult to predict – they usually have to be explained after the fact. Who could have foreseen that the spread of information technologies would lead to the uprising of the archaic around the world and contribute to Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election? Nevertheless, this can be explained in hindsight.

A primitive and archaic worldview prevented many people from keeping pace with modern life, confining them within a small and familiar world. However, the new information space created by digital technologies destroyed this comfort zone by drawing them into the wider world – and this changed the balance of political forces. Zoomers, however, are still too young to become a comparable force in major politics. Decades must pass before the current participants in youth subcultures grow up and enter the elite that determines the direction of society’s development.

Meanwhile, the Russian authorities have long mobilized in support of everyone oriented toward archaic – and such people do not need the internet for this. The authorities intend to keep the younger generation in an informational reservation as a resource for replenishing manpower at the front and therefore are consistently fighting against the free internet. But is this actually possible?

As the experience of the ten-year occupation of eastern regions of Ukraine has shown, theoretically, this is possible. One of my students, who communicated with young people in territories occupied since 2014, noted that they seemed to have stopped developing: “While we are active in life, looking for jobs to support ourselves during our studies and making our own decisions, the local youth are infantile – it would never occur to them to decide anything for themselves.” During the full-scale invasion, all these young people were sent to die at the front. Can the same be done to the entirety of Russia’s youth? I believe that this is precisely one of the goals behind the struggle against the free internet.

The Struggle Against the Free Internet – a Transition from Authoritarianism to Totalitarianism

Until 2011, there were no restrictions on the internet in Russia for the same reason that the authorities are now trying to restrict it as much as possible: Russian dictator Vladimir Putin did not and does not understand what the internet is or what significance it has in the life of a modern person.

In 2012, a registry of banned websites was introduced, which internet providers were required to block. In 2014, the Prosecutor General’s Office received the authority to block websites without a court order. On November 1, 2019, “The Sovereign Internet Law” came into force, providing for the installation of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment on operators’ networks in order to establish full control over the network and isolate the Russian internet from the global web. After the start of the full-scale war on February 24, 2022, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and numerous independent media outlets were blocked. The transition from selective blocking to total political censorship had begun. In January 2026, the State Duma granted the FSB the authority to shut down any forms of communication – internet access and mobile communications – in any region of the country. From that moment on, internet access in Russia ceased to be a right and became a privilege granted by the authorities.

By blocking the internet, the Kremlin intends to confine young people to an informational reservation cut off from the outside world. But is an apolitical youth capable of resisting this?

Ukrainian and Russian Zoomers

Whereas Ukrainian zoomers generally seek to integrate the possibilities of new information technologies into their social lives, their Russian peers are, more often than not, escapists. This is explained by the different paths Ukraine and Russia have taken in the 21st century.

Ukrainian youth witnessed two democratic revolutions, and this instilled in them a belief in their own strength and in the possibility of influencing public life. They want a new Ukraine – free from corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy and open to every talented person. Young people are ready to fight for such a country, as the Cardboard Maidan demonstrated.

In Russia, by contrast, an authoritarian regime became established – initially in a relatively soft form: the authorities adhered to an unspoken social contract with the population: “You do not interfere in politics, and we do not interfere in your private life.” This encouraged young people to retreat into the online space. There emerged a social stratum of young people who wanted nothing to do with Russian social reality and had no interest in what was happening in the country. Conversations about politics in their circles were considered almost indecent – as reminders of the world from which they wished to distance themselves completely.

After the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the authoritarian Kremlin regime finally transformed into a totalitarian one, seeking to control every sphere of human life, including the internet. Nevertheless, escapist zoomers try not to notice this.

On the one hand, this is an escape from responsibility for social life. From a Ukrainian point of view, such a position is perceived as a manifestation of infantilism and irresponsibility, as well as silent complicity in the crimes committed by Russia.

On the other hand, Russian zoomers are the first generation to shape themselves independently of the state within their own subcultures. And this offers a chance to finally break the vicious chain through which Russian imperial consciousness has been reproduced from generation to generation. It is a kind of escape that leaves open the possibility of returning to reality – armed with newly acquired knowledge and skills.

The Russian authorities cannot allow this and will do everything possible to fill the still largely apolitical consciousness of zoomers with their own ideological content. Yet the archaic worldview promoted by Kremlin propaganda is completely incompatible with the image of the informational future. On the one hand, there is a world without borders, the ability to communicate with anyone from any corner of the Earth, and access to the entirety of humanity’s cultural heritage and all modern scientific achievements at the distance of a single click. On the other hand, there is a return to medieval “spiritual bonds” supposedly meant to protect society from the influence of modern civilization.

Modern Russian youth will have to make their choice.

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Wednesday, May 13, 2026

Nikolai Karpitsky. Russia Cannot Renounce Further Military Expansion


 
Recent attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often rely on conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for such a war. Philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky argues, however, that preparation for war is an endless process, and therefore wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.

Is Russia ready to open a second front against the Baltic states? At first glance, this seems contrary to common sense, since the Russian army is bogged down in Ukraine. However, history offers examples of countries at war launching new military campaigns even in times of crisis. At the end of August 1941, when Adolf Hitler began the operation to encircle Kyiv and destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, the Soviet Union invaded Iran and occupied its northern territories.

A more recent example came in August 2024, when Ukraine, unable to contain the Russian offensive in Donbas, launched a military operation in the Kursk region. From a military standpoint, it is illogical to open a new front and redirect forces there from critical sectors when the enemy enjoys superiority in manpower and materiel. However, in such cases, political considerations outweigh military ones.

Attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often stem from conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for war. Yet preparation for war is an endless process, so wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.

The Russian army was also unprepared for this new type of warfare when it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. If Vladimir Putin had waited until it was fully prepared, he would never have been able to start the war. Armies adapt during war itself, which is why the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces are now among the most experienced in the world in conducting modern warfare.

When we calculate the military or economic feasibility of aggression, we often project our own assumptions onto the adversary. That is why many people do not believe an attack on the Baltic states is possible. But Vladimir Putin has a different picture of the world in mind. He may decide to begin a new war regardless of the situation on the Ukrainian front or in the Russian economy.

That decision will be made at the moment when, based on his own internal perceptions, the Kremlin dictator believes that a window of opportunity for such an attack has opened.

A State Becomes Aggressive When It Assumes a Messianic Role

To assess the reality of the threat of Russian aggression, one must take into account that both people and states often act against their own interests. It may be advantageous to steal from a neighbor, but most people do not do so. Becoming a criminal means changing one’s destiny through a particular life choice. The same applies to states: most countries coexist peacefully with their neighbors, even when they have the opportunity to conquer them.

A state becomes aggressive when it assumes a “higher mission.” For example, the Shah’s Iran cooperated with Israel because doing so was beneficial. But the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to destroy the Jewish state, sacrificing the well-being of its own country and the lives of its citizens for the sake of this “mission.” Political and economic conditions are secondary here: they determine the timing and form of aggression, but they are not its root cause.

Russia Is a Country That Has Lost the Meaning of Life

Every state has a purpose and a meaning underlying its existence and functioning. But if that purpose is false, then the meaning of existence itself is lost.

For example, the meaning of the Soviet Union’s existence lay in spreading the communist system, which is why it sacrificed the well-being of its citizens in order to expand its influence throughout the world. Abandoning this mission because of exhausted resources and the bankruptcy of the communist idea meant losing the very meaning of its existence, which led to the inevitable collapse of the USSR.

Modern Russia has returned to the mission of “gathering lands,” though now stripped of communist ideology. It was precisely this mission that transformed the Principality of Moscow into the Russia that, throughout its history, waged wars of conquest. This mission first took shape in the 15th century, when Moscow destroyed the people of Novgorod as an independent ethnic group with their own language, culture, and social traditions.

Paradoxically, most Russians believe they live in the most peaceful country in the world — one that has never attacked anyone, but has only repeatedly been the victim of external aggression while always emerging victorious in every war. This blindness is explained by the fact that many Russians perceive aggressive wars as the just restoration of world order.

For them, Russia is any territory on which a Russian person has ever set foot and which has at some point been under Moscow’s rule. And it does not matter whether this was 500 years ago or 30 years ago. In this worldview, countries that break away from Russian control violate the natural order of the world, while everyone who actively resists Russia’s expansion serves global evil.

After the victory of the revolution in Russia in August 1991, the democratic movement sought to build a new Russia as a peaceful and self-sufficient country. However, Russia is “stitched together” from different national territories that were incorporated into it by force. The rejection by Yeltsin’s liberals of the mission of “gathering lands” as state ideology led to the emergence of centrifugal forces within the country and to the separation of the national peripheries from Moscow.

During the First Chechen War of 1994–1996, most Russians supported peace and an end to hostilities in the Caucasus, because it is unnatural for people to support the suffering and death brought about by war. Russian reformer Yegor Gaidar then said: “Better 100 years of negotiations than one day of war.” However, those same Russians overwhelmingly supported the Second Chechen War in 1999. One reason for this shift in public sentiment was fear of the country’s collapse, which was associated with chaos and a threat to personal survival.

In the view of most Russians, the West seeks to dismantle and destroy Russia. Therefore, the war against Ukraine is perceived by them as a defensive and just war waged by Russia against Western aggression. Accordingly, an attack on the Baltic states would likewise be perceived merely as a necessary defensive operation within the broader war that the West is allegedly already waging against Russia.

Abandoning the doctrine of confrontation with the West and the policy of expanding the “Russian world” under the paradigm that “Russia’s borders never end” would threaten the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s regime, which would then simply lose the very meaning of its existence.

An Attack on the Baltic States Can Be Prevented

Vladimir Putin is confident of mass support from Russians in the event of an invasion of the Baltic states. The readiness of the Russian army, possible military and economic losses, and the situation on the Ukrainian front are of secondary importance to him — the mission matters more. However, the prospect of a collective military response from NATO could deter him from attacking the Baltic states. But does he believe such a response would actually occur?

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for an automatic military response; it merely states that member states will provide assistance to the victim of aggression in whatever form they deem necessary. But what kind of assistance would Donald Trump consider necessary? Since he has demonstrated grievances toward other alliance members and reluctance to come to their aid in the event of war, Putin may believe that such assistance would be limited to another round of sanctions and calls for negotiations.

At the same time, since there is currently no observable transfer of Russian troops to the borders of the Baltic states, there is still time to act. The strongest step NATO could take would be a political declaration stating that, in the event of Russian aggression, all alliance countries would automatically enter the war without requiring additional approval from their political leadership.

It is possible that secret protocols for automatic responses to certain scenarios of Russian aggression already exist. However, Putin, convinced of his own impunity, will continue testing the alliance through provocations until he encounters a decisive military response. Therefore, a political declaration from NATO regarding the immediate use of force in the event of Russian aggression against alliance member states must be clearly communicated to the Kremlin.

Until such a declaration exists, the Baltic states can adopt the Ukrainian experience of creating a “wall of drones” and establishing high-tech defensive lines on land and underground, on water and underwater, in the air, and in space. Putin’s regime is already experiencing economic and military decline and is therefore, like a wounded beast, mortally dangerous. There can never be too much defense; there can only be too little time to prepare for war.

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Saturday, May 2, 2026

"Propaganda". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

 
The photo shows the Ostankino TV Tower, which is used to broadcast Kremlin propaganda. Photo: Nikita Nikitenko on Unsplash

In another article for the Dictionary of War on PostPravda.Info, Nikolai Karpitsky explains what propaganda is and introduces key concepts – manipulation, falsehood, and indoctrination – that help explain how it operates during the Russian–Ukrainian war.

Propaganda

Propaganda is a system for shaping people’s emotional and ideological attitudes toward social phenomena, ideas, and worldviews. It may be directed either at mass audiences or at specific target groups. When its aim becomes the formation of a particular worldview, it turns into an instrument of indoctrination.

Shaping Attitudes Toward Phenomena and Ideas

Propaganda does not always rely on manipulation and falsehood. Some of its forms are based on the truthful presentation of facts and appeals to positive emotions (such as the pursuit of justice or patriotism) and are aimed at improving social conditions (for example, combating corruption or resisting external aggression). However, even in such cases, a necessary element remains emotional influence – suggestion or deliberate persuasion – aimed at shaping a particular attitude toward social phenomena and ideas.

The desire to impose one’s own perception on others is also characteristic of everyday communication, especially on social media. In its most aggressive form, this occurs when a person not only expresses an opinion but also seeks to provoke an emotional reaction in their interlocutor, using a propaganda technique – emotional pressure. However, we can speak of propaganda only when such practices are systematic and purposeful.

Moral or religious preaching, like propaganda, also seeks to persuade people by using vivid imagery, emotional arguments, and appeals to authority. However, propaganda more often pursues political goals, whereas preaching pursues moral or religious ones – although in practice the boundary between them may be blurred. The fundamental difference is that preaching encourages a person to make a conscious and free choice, whereas propaganda pushes them toward accepting a predetermined position, disregarding the possibility of such a choice.

Propagandistic Manipulation

Propaganda may employ manipulative techniques. The main ones include:

– the use of truthful but incomplete information;
– substitution of the context of the interpretation or evaluation of the event;
– the provocation of strong emotional reactions in which psychological defense mechanisms hinder adequate perception;
– appeals to false authority.

For example, the claim that corruption exists in Ukraine and that therefore the country is doomed to defeat in the war is a manipulation based on incomplete information. In reality, the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts depends on the development of civil society, and in Ukraine this process is progressing with varying degrees of success, in line with general patterns observed in European countries.

The assertion that corruption levels in Ukraine and Russia are the same, and that therefore these countries are fundamentally no different, constitutes a substitution of context. Meanwhile, the claim that discussing corruption “plays into the enemy’s hands” appeals to a sensitive perception of social reality and triggers psychological defense mechanisms. Each of these manipulations may be reinforced by references to false authorities – bloggers, analysts, public opinion, or officials.

Propagandistic Falsehood

Its main types are:

– Factual falsehood – the assertion of false facts and the denial of verified ones.
– Contextual falsehood – the interpretation of accurate facts within a context that reverses their meaning. Such a context may consist of a worldview imposed by propaganda.
– Intentional falsehood – a biased presentation of accurate facts that creates a new context for their interpretation. If a person does not share the imposed worldview, the facts are presented in a way that encourages them to change their views.

An example of factual falsehood is the claim that it was not Russia but Ukraine that started the war.
An example of contextual falsehood is the claim that Russia was forced to attack Ukraine in order to defend itself from NATO – here, facts are placed within the context of a nonexistent threat.
An example of intentional falsehood is the claim that in any conflict there are no completely innocent parties and that each side bears some responsibility. In this case, facts are presented in a way that leads to a false conclusion. The propagandist does not insist directly on an interpretation within their worldview but instead suggests acknowledging real mistakes on the Ukrainian side in order to push toward the misleading conclusion that the responsibility of the perpetrator is comparable to that of the victim.

Indoctrination

Official Kremlin propaganda functions as a tool of indoctrination and leads to a rupture in the shared space of mutual understanding with those outside its sphere of influence. Indoctrination is the systematic influence on people’s consciousness aimed at shaping a particular ideology, worldview, or picture of reality, resulting in a transformation of values and perception. As a result, a person begins to perceive cause-and-effect relationships in society differently and assigns new – sometimes even opposite – meanings to social phenomena.

In the Soviet Union, total indoctrination was carried out on the basis of communist ideology, which could be rationally understood, making it possible to engage in debate with its adherents. Contemporary Kremlin propaganda, by contrast, imposes an irrational picture of the world in which ideology plays an instrumental role and can be replaced when necessary. This allows the Russian leadership to secure support from people with different ideological views, united by a shared worldview based on the demonization of the opponent.

Such a worldview distorts inner experience and the perception of reality to such an extent that any common ground for mutual understanding between its adherents and others disappears. As a result, meaningful discussion between them becomes practically impossible. Accordingly, propaganda that shapes public opinion within Russia often remains incomprehensible beyond its borders. For this reason, the Russian leadership constructs different propaganda systems for different audiences – separately for domestic and external consumption.
 
Nikolai Karpitsky
 
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