Quiet for now, explosions are rarely heard. Russian troops have taken Izyum and are preparing for a new offensive. Now they are 30 kilometers from us. It’s going to be very hot soon. Yesterday morning Alexander Palchenko came with his wife and told a lot of interesting things. He’s a fourth-generation officer, and now he’s a volunteer. He professionally understands the military situation in the Donbass, and I took the opportunity to ask about how the Ukrainian army is fighting.
According to military assessments by western experts, Ukraine’s organized resistance was to collapse within three days. And these assessments were quite objective. The Russian military machine had an absolute technical advantage, and if the Ukrainian army had tried to hold the armored avalanche, it would first have been mixed with the ground by missile airstrike, and then rammed down with tanks. And if it started to retreat, it would have got into cauldrons, losing command centers and supply bases as a result of missile attacks. That’s why the Western allies gave only defensive guerrilla weapons. Evidently, it was hoped that the guerrilla war in Ukraine would buy them time to prepare for the defense against Russia’s attack on the countries of Eastern Europe. However, contrary to all calculations, Ukraine has contained the onslaught of the second world army, which was not even expected by Western politicians and military experts.
As Alexander Palchenko explained to me, the Ukrainian army uses «makhno» tactics, which in modern conditions nobody expected. During the Civil War, the Makhnovists invented tachanka, which ran on the steppe and decimated both white and red. Here goes the army on the steppe, and suddenly out of nowhere comes a hundred tachankas and starts to mow down everyone, and then it dissolves, as if it was not there. How to fight them, if they are elusive, do not occupy fixed positions, and therefore there is simply nothing to seize? It’s the same now. Let’s suppose the Russian battalion tactical group is advancing. One can try to stop it, but it's a loss. The Ukrainian military let it through, allowing it to stretch for many kilometers, and then they cut off the supply trucks in the rear, destroying it piece by piece.
The Russian army is still accumulating forces near Izyum to attack us, but it will not be easy for it to pass these thirty kilometers to Slavyansk. The hilly forest area between us is an ideal shelter for the dispersed maneuverable Ukrainian units. They can suddenly attack the enemy and then dissolve in the forest again, preventing enemy artillery from destroying themselves. As soon as the enemy accumulates forces and begins to move, it is immediately tracked, and dispersed Ukrainian detachments are instantly united for a joint operation. Somewhere hidden, the battery strikes the column and immediately changes position to avoid being hit back, while an infantry platoon with grenade projectors ambushes the retreating.
If necessary, someone else can be thrown who is nearby. But as soon as the enemy tries to strike back, everyone disappears into the forest again. The cannonade accompanying such fights, I regularly hear when I write here at home messages to my chronicle.
Thanks to such makhno tactics, it is possible to contain the offensive of the incomparably more powerful, but sluggish, Russian army. If a Russian platoon urgently needs the help of a battery, then it should ask for it only through the high command, which will think until it is too late. In the Russian army, all decisions come down from above, and unapproved initiative is not allowed. However, in Putin’s government system all this is made worse by the fact that even the highest command is afraid to take the initiative, so it continues to follow the plans that have already failed and thus condemns the soldiers to death, forbidding them to change their doomed positions or sending them on pointless offensives.
On the contrary, the Ukrainian army has been given the opportunity to take the initiative at all levels. This establishes horizontal links between the sergeants, who can instantly coordinate the dispersed platoons in order to take advantage of the unexpectedly opened opportunity to destroy the units of the occupier, and then break up again and walk away from the counterattack. The High Command assigns tasks, and in the field they are carried out in the most expedient way, thanks to the horizontal coordination of the army. At the same time, each platoon can conduct its own reconnaissance, planning and make responsible decisions, so the occupiers simply do not have time to react to the actions of the Ukrainian military.
In addition, the Russian army is fundamentally unable to restructure and adopt Ukrainian tactics, as it is not motivated to fight. After all, the Russian soldiers came as occupiers without understanding why, and if they were given the initiative, they would certainly do nothing. They’re already sabotaging high-command decisions, simulating military activity. Therefore, high-ranking officers have to come to the field to deal with sabotage, and at that moment they become convenient targets for the Ukrainian military. This explains the unprecedented losses of senior officers.
Therefore, the Russian army is doomed to fight the way it fights, while the Ukrainian command may allow local initiative, as Ukrainian soldiers understand that the war is being waged to destroy Ukraine, and that they are defending their families and their loved ones, so without tips they will act in the most effective way.
