Source: PostPravda.info 08.09.2025
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/stockholm-syndrome-of-russian-krishnaites/
Do the most oppressed communities really constitute an opposition to dictatorship? The Russian authorities use the concept of “traditional religions of Russia” as the basis for persecuting all religions they deem non-traditional – in particular, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, or ISKCON. In 2011, intervention from India saved the movement from a complete ban in Russia. However, today many Krishnaites trust anti-Ukrainian Kremlin propaganda more than their own fellow believers in Ukraine. Perhaps this is how Stockholm syndrome manifests itself, closely tied to the identity crisis of Russian Hare Krishnas.
Repression and Betrayal of Fellow Believers
The repressive apparatus in Russia develops according to the same logic as any bureaucracy in an authoritarian system: in order to justify its growth, it must constantly expand the circle of potential victims. The simplest way is to ban some religious organization from the “non-traditional” list. This opens new opportunities: bonuses, career advancement, expanding staff. For this very purpose, harsh laws restricting missionary activity were adopted in Russia, and in 2017 the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization was banned.
But repression could have started much earlier. Back in 2011, the Tomsk prosecutor’s office tried to declare the sacred book of the Krishnaites – the Bhagavadgita as It Is with commentary by ISKCON founder Srila Prabhupada – as extremist by the court. Fortunately, they failed. Otherwise, as early as 2012, mass temple closures and arrests of Krishnaites on charges of extremism would have begun, along with parallel processes against other faiths.
Six months before the trial over the Bhagavadgita, in the village of Kandinka, Tomsk region, local authorities resorted to bureaucratic manipulations to achieve the demolition of Krishnaites houses built on legally acquired land. At that time, representatives of different faiths in Tomsk decided to support the Hare Krishnas and began holding regular meetings. Thus, the Tomsk Interfaith Dialogue was born
I compare the position of the Interfaith Dialogue participants then and now, 14 years later. Back then, everyone sympathized with the Krishnaites whose houses were demolished. But at least they still had time to leave calmly and take their belongings. Now the Russian army is destroying entire cities in Ukraine, and many people find themselves in a far worse situation – forced to flee, abandoning everything. About half of the Interfaith Dialogue participants either left Russia, as I did, or went into internal emigration. Only those loyal to the regime remained, and the dialogue has turned into its opposite. If I had the chance, I would ask them: “What is the point of staying in a religion if you have abandoned your fellow believers in Ukraine?”
The Trial of the Bhagavadgita
The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) had been preparing for the trial of the Bhagavadgita for a long time – at least two years, as far as I know – before handing the case over to the Tomsk prosecutor’s office. But it is unlikely that they themselves would have come up with the idea of targeting this particular book. During the trial, the prosecutor’s representative not only said nothing about the content of the book but could not even pronounce its title correctly. All the ideological framing for the attempt to ban this book was provided by Maxim Stepanenko, head of the missionary department of the Tomsk diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, while his immediate superior – the diocesan bishop – deliberately took a neutral stance.
I do not think the FSB or the prosecutor’s office cared about the doctrine of the Krishnaites; they wanted to ban the book for material and career benefits. For the head of the Orthodox missionary department, however, the fight against the Krishnaites was perceived as a struggle against enemies of the “true faith.” Although he spoke on behalf of Orthodoxy, in practice he embodied the opposite – a quasi-religious ideology of seeking an enemy to fight by all possible means. Today, it is precisely this ideology that the Russian authorities use to justify the necessity of destroying Ukraine. Its essence is the denial of other people’s right to exist. Back then, during the trial of the Bhagavadgita, it was about the Krishna devotees alone; now it is about all Ukrainians. From the standpoint of any religious tradition, such an ideology is considered demonic.
Nikolai
Karpitsky at the trial of the Bhagavadgita on August 12, 2011. Photo: author's
archive
Only the Selfless Defenders of the Bhagavadgita Now Selflessly Support Ukraine
It is often wrongly assumed that all Orthodox Christians support the authorities and the persecution of other religions, while the representatives of other religions stand for justice. In reality, things are more complex. There were Orthodox Christians who supported the Krishnaites and, during the trial of the Bhagavadgita, openly defended it. And today there are Krishnaites who support the war and refuse to listen to their Ukrainian fellow believers. How many are there? In 2024, Yulia Fil, a researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, conducted research, asking Tomsk devotees an indirect question: “Under what conditions would you be ready to resume communication with your Ukrainian fellow believers after the war?”
The results showed:
– 27% are willing to communicate unconditionally and believe that one must ask forgiveness for Russia’s actions;
– 52% are willing to communicate on the condition that political disagreements are not raised – these are the ones who see their Ukrainian fellow believers as some abstraction and do not acknowledge Russia’s crimes against them;
– about 21% regard their Ukrainian fellow believers as enemies and do not wish to resume contact.
The Bhagavadgita was defended not only by Krishnaites but also by scholars and representatives of other faiths, including Orthodox Christianity – and as a rule, these same people still stand with the Ukrainian devotees of Krishna and oppose Russian fascism. However, when it comes to the former defenders of the Bhagavadgita within ISKCON, there is no such clarity. For example, on YouTube one can find a recording of Enver Izmailov, head of the Tomsk ISKCON community and one of the defenders of the Bhagavadgita at the trial. In this video, he engages in an indirect debate with the contemporary ideologue of Russian fascism, Alexander Dugin, adopting his intellectual framework and discussing how exactly one should justify Russia’s “special path.” Ukrainian Krishnaites were shocked by what they saw, but they had no opportunity to engage in dialogue with Enver Izmailov, since, in his opinion, they were “not yet ready for communication.”
This reveals the paradox: people who do not belong to the Hare Krishna movement but who selflessly rose to defend the Bhagavadgita turned out to be closer to the Ukrainian Krishnaites than many ISKCON spiritual leaders. My hypothesis is this: if someone who is not a representative of Hare Krishna takes up the fight for the movement, they expect neither material nor spiritual personal gain. For the same reason, such a person will just as selflessly support Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression. But if an ISKCON representative defends their spiritual tradition for the sake of personal spiritual or material well-being, then they will adapt to the authorities – even if that means supporting something that contradicts their own religion.
The Crisis of Religious Identity
Thus, a striking symptom of a crisis of religious identity: instead of supporting their fellow believers being bombed by Russia, a religious authority reflects on Russia’s special path. Unfortunately, this is not the only symptom.
The charitable vegetarian food distribution project Food for Life was initiated by ISKCON founder Srila Prabhupada and became an important means of presenting the Krishnaites to society. However, the Donetsk branch of Food for Life, operating in the occupied territory, nowhere mentions its ties to ISKCON, and vegetarianism – which for any devotee has a religious meaning – is presented merely as healthy eating. At the same time, it publishes on social media expressions of gratitude from the occupation authorities for helping local residents and emphasizes its identification with the “vast Motherland,” i.e., with Russia. One can only wonder whether these authorities even realize that they are dealing with Hare Krishna.
However, religious communities differ from secular ones in that when they lose the ability to carry out their spiritual mission, they lose the very meaning of their existence – even if they continue to perform important social services. Under a dictatorship, many Russian religious organizations are forced to adapt in order to survive, which at times not only prevents them from fulfilling their spiritual mission but leads them to adopt positions that contradict their own religion. In such cases, identification with imperial Russia begins to conflict with, or even suppress, identification with their own religious tradition.
In Captivity of State Ideology
Unlike some other Russian religious organizations, ISKCON Russia did not take part in official events openly supporting the invasion of Ukraine, such as the roundtable “World Religions Against the Ideology of Nazism and Fascism in the 21st Century” on March 29, 2022. The organization granted each of its followers the freedom to determine their own stance on the war. The official position of ISKCON Russia is “law-abidingness,” without any public evaluation of the government’s actions. In practice, however, such “law-abidingness” often turns into demonstrative support.
For example, on October 1, 2022, Alexander Khakimov, a member of ISKCON’s Governing Body Commission from Russia and one of its most influential spiritual teachers, insisted on the necessity of complying with state demands when asked about mobilization:
“As for military action, this also applies to our martial duty, to the laws of the state. It is not simply an unjustly imposed obligation but something destined for me by fate. This is my duty… I submit only to the will of Providence and accept it as the will of Krishna. There is law – I must follow the law.”
Later, on October 17, 2023, he went even further, stating:
“It is duty… He who dies in the performance of duty is elevated, purified of his karma.”
Earlier, on June 5, 2022, addressing his followers, he expressed admiration for Putin, calling him the only ruler in the world among the leaders of secular states who allegedly acknowledges the supreme authority of God. Some less influential representatives of ISKCON Russia voiced even more radical statements, framing Russia’s war against Ukraine not in Vaishnava categories but in a Manichaean spirit – as a battle of absolute good against absolute evil, with modern Western civilization identified with evil.
When religious leaders compromise between their spiritual mission and accommodation to political power, they call into question the very meaning of their tradition’s existence. And when their followers begin to trust state propaganda more than their Ukrainian fellow believers, religion turns into its opposite – a quasi-religious ideology, which inevitably produces a crisis of religious identity.
Stockholm Syndrome
Stockholm syndrome is a protective psychological mechanism that arises in situations of fear and helplessness. The victim subconsciously begins to identify with the aggressor, developing trust and even affection toward him. Its emergence is influenced by several factors:
– dependence on the aggressor, which drives the victim to search for signs of humanity in the aggressor's actions;
– learned helplessness, where even the slightest signs of kindness from the aggressor are perceived as something particularly valuable;
– fear, which the person defends against by self-suggestion, convincing himself that they are "on the same side" with the aggressor;
– emotional isolation, which leads to the transfer of positive feelings intended for close loved ones onto the aggressor.
All these signs fully describe the situation with the Krishnaites in Russia. The authorities created a threat for them – attempting to ban the movement, but at the same time, they showed "humanity" by allowing it to exist. However, this decision can be reversed at any moment, which creates a sense of complete dependence. In such a situation, the Krishnaites begin to look for positive aspects in the authorities, for example, in the fact that Putin talks about God and "traditional values"; they lose emotional contact with their co-believers in Ukraine and convince themselves that they, together with Putin, are "on the same side" in opposition to the "immoral West."
Naturally, the Krishnaites identify not only with their tradition but also with their country. This is what drives many Ukrainian devotees to defend their homeland with arms in hand, despite the fact that the core of their doctrine is the principle of ahimsa – nonviolence. However, even in this case, their religious identity dominates over their national one.
Krishnaites
honor the memory of their fellow believers who died for Ukraine. Photo:
Facebook page “Spiritual Matter”
In Russia, however, the situation is different: the Stockholm syndrome of Russian Krishna devotees pushes religious identity into the background. The problem is not that they identify themselves with Russia, but that their image of Russia is not cultural but imperial in nature. For them, Russia is any territory where Russian power has been established. Accordingly, all peoples who resist Russian expansion are automatically perceived as hostile. This leads to a split in the common space of communication among followers of the Hare Krishna movement and, along with it, to the loss of integrity in religious worldview, which is replaced by an ideological quasi-religion that proclaims Western civilization to be the source of evil.
It should be noted that this process takes place much more rapidly in the occupied territories of Ukraine than in Russia itself. Similar processes can also be observed in other religious communities that the Russian authorities classify as “non-traditional,” for example, in Evangelical churches.
And yet, despite the pressure from the Russian authorities and their own religious environment, many Russian Krishna devotees—as well as representatives of other confessions—have managed to preserve genuine faith, remain morally on the side of Ukraine, and seek ways to ask Ukrainians for forgiveness for the crimes of their country. However, for obvious reasons, I cannot speak openly about them.
