Monday, November 11, 2024

Nikolai Karpitsky. Party of the Dead against Putin's Russia



On October 7, a “nicht verstehen” action against “Putinversteher” and Putin's policies was held in Bonn in front of the Russian consulate in Germany, timed to coincide with his birthday. The protest action was organized by the German branch of the “Party of the Dead”. Its founder, Maxim Evstropov, advocates the defense of the dead against the encroachments of the current Russian government. The activists placed a candle “for the repose of Putin's soul” and wished him a speedy “day of death”. The Party of the Dead emerged as an artistic and political project in 2017 in St. Petersburg and became known for its actions, performances and other events in Russia. The Kremlin authorities swiftly recognized it as a danger and began to persecute the members of the party. As a result many activists were forced to emigrate and now hold similar actions in different countries around the world. However, I think that such a party could only emerge in Russia and only in Russia the meaning of its actions is self-evident. It is connected to the special attitude towards death that is cultivated in modern Russia. 

The Cult of Death in Russia

Russia has waged wars of conquest throughout its history using the same tactics, ruthlessly expending masses of soldiers in suicidal attacks. This is the same tactic Russia is using now in Ukraine. What is surprising, however, is that Russian soldiers both before and now are willing to obediently march to their death over the corpses of their comrades. This willingness to die senselessly is linked to a special mood in which life ceases to be valuable enough to fight for. This special necrophilic mood is accompanied by a loss of the sense of life. In Russia it is somehow transmitted from one person to another, but outside Russia it is difficult to explain what it is at all. Maxim Evstropov describes it as follows: “While in Russia, I constantly felt that many people are in a state of ‘derealization’. It seems to them that they are not really living, nothing really happens to them. And in general, everything that happens in Russia seems to be “not real.” Some things that are common for Russians are really hard to comprehend, especially for an outsider. And the 'derealizer' is a psychological defense reaction against the horror that is going on.” (Derealizer is Maxim Evstropov's neologism, meaning a force or psychological mechanism that leads to the loss of a sense of reality).

Soldiers in the Russian army were always treated as expendable, but still the Orthodox Russian emperors believed that after death a person was no longer in their power, but in the power of God. However, the communists denied the existence of God and used the cult of dead heroes for their ideological purposes. Therefore, even now in Russia it is believed that if a hero survived, he is some kind of inferior hero. Only death can make a person a real hero. For example, pro-Russian propagandists used the fact that the Azov and other defenders of Mariupol surrendered and did not die as an argument that they are in fact false heroes. However, in the Ukrainian consciousness, real heroism is manifested not in death, but in the will to live, which the Azovites demonstrated by choosing captivity, which is more terrible than death.

The ideology of the Soviet Union contradictorily combined the ideals of a happy prosperous life with the cultivation of death and necrophilic symbolism. Soviet songs and movies cultivated heroic death, a mausoleum was built in the capital's Red Square, and the Kremlin wall was turned into a cemetery. Even the coat of arms of the Soviet Union was created in the likeness of a tombstone wreath. However, in the Soviet Union, the necrophilic attitude occupied a limited place in the system of ideology and propaganda, without canceling people's desire for a happy life. The current Russian authorities do not rely on any particular ideology, despite what many might believe, but instead promote such an idea of the world, in which the necrophilic attitude is expressed not in ideological formulations, but in a vague feeling that distorts the perception of events and devalues life. 


The difference between the necrophilic attitude in the Soviet Union and in present-day Russia is evident in the way Victory Day over fascism is celebrated. In the Soviet Union, death was glorified, but the holiday itself was perceived as a reminder of a tragedy that should never be repeated. Victory Day in today's Russia is held under the slogan “We can do it again!” and has turned into a celebration of imperial grandeur, for the sake of which any human sacrifice is justified. A neologism has emerged to name this bacchanalia - “pobedobesie”, which can be roughly translated as “victoradness”, i.e. - victory madness, but it's important to note, that the word “besit’sa”, to act crazy, has the same root as the word - “bes”, an imp or demon, so may be “victorimping” or “demonry” would be a better translation.  It is in fact a “substitution of the Victory Day celebration with a mad rampage of demonic forces”. 

In 2011, journalists from the independent TV2 television company in Tomsk decided to counter this bacchanalia of imperial grandeur with the “Immortal Regiment” procession. They naively hoped that if ordinary people came out with portraits of their dead ancestors, they would shame those who turn the memory of the war into a necrophilic carnival. However, the Russian authorities appropriated the initiative of the “Immortal Regiment” and themselves began to organize processions with portraits of the dead, not in memory of the tragedy, but in support of imperial ambitions. This was their way of saying: “Even the dead support us! Our power extends not only to the living, but also to the dead!” Only the fear that portraits of those killed in Ukraine would appear in the “Immortal Regiment” procession, and thus people would recognize the scale of military losses, forced the Russian authorities to cancel this necrophilic social event.  

No one has the right to appropriate the voices of the dead

The Party of the Dead opposes the use of the dead as another resource for power and cultural and political necrophilia in contemporary Russia, which manifests itself in a militaristic and patriotic death cult and the absence of a project for the future. Maxim Evstropov, the party's founder states: “Posts in support of Putin are now distributed even from the social media accounts of those long gone. When votes are counted in elections, dead people vote. There were even cases when dead deputies voted in the State Duma. The dead are not allowed to be dead, the living are not allowed to be alive.” The Party of the Dead opposes this with a principle enshrined in its charter: “No one - no social group or individual living person - has the privileged and exclusive right to speak on behalf of the dead.”

To describe its activities the Party of the Dead uses the term “necroactivism”, which includes public art events and political actions in the form of street performances, where protest ideas are expressed through artistic means. For example, in 2018, at the May Day demonstration in St. Petersburg, Varya Mikhailova was detained for walking in the Party of the Dead column with the painting “9 Stages of Decomposition of the Leader”. It was a collage of a series of photographs capturing grass sprouting through Putin's portrait. Varya was awarded a colossal fine for those times, and the artwork itself was ordered by the court to be destroyed, despite the fact that the work was a digital collage and not a physical object.


The Party of the Dead is built on anarchist principles. Participants of street actions could gather in one place, could act synchronously in different places and even countries, despite the fact that sometimes they do not know each other personally. The party lacks centralized management and the usual signs of organization. Its activities are coordinated either by its ideological inspirer Maxim Evstropov or by the initiators of specific actions. During the actions, the Party of the Dead members hide their faces with skull masks, preserving their anonymity. In this way they symbolically identify themselves with the dead. If the Russian state speaks on behalf of the dead as a usurper of power over them, the participants of the actions do not separate themselves from the dead, they perceive themselves as their equals, believing that in a sense, albeit symbolically, the dead themselves gain subjectivity through such actions and act as critics of the state, war, hierarchies and ideas, exposing the absurdity of power.

Persecution of the Party of the Dead in Russia

Until 2022, Russian authorities systematically detained and fined Party of the Dead members, but criminal prosecutions began after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, when the Party of the Dead spoke out against the aggressive war and Russian military necropolitics. Many party members were forced to emigrate, establishing branches in different countries. The most active branches currently operate in Georgia and Germany. Those who stayed in Russia live under constant threat of arrest.

Thus, while staying in Georgia Maxim Evstropov learned from the media that in January 2023 a trial started against him, and in February 2023 the court decided to arrest him in absentia. I'm trying to imagine what a court hearing might look like. The judge is asking questions to an empty chair where the defendant, who has no idea he is being tried, should be sitting. The court-appointed lawyer answers instead of the absent person accused, asking to soften the measure of restraint, to replace the usual arrest in absentia with house arrest in absentia... Theater of the absurd! However, in Russia, the line between absurdity and reality has long been erased and now, it seems, everything is possible.


The basis for the prosecution was an anonymous message in social networks describing a then-upcoming action of the Party of the Dead, which Maxim did not even attend. Here I will provide the text in full and in its original form, with no capital letters, so that everyone can evaluate for themselves how insignificant a reason for mass searches, political persecution and criminal punishment can be. This short message is rather artistic in nature, as it uses the artistic device of alternating fragments of two different texts, one of which is an Easter greeting:

in the very heart of the russian world - in the russian cemetery - a bright easter holiday took place recently. no one rose from the dead.
“russia will rise free,” says death
“if,” say the spartans
death hopes for the best
christ is risen!
- and the conscript has not yet
by death trampling death
- the groom has arrived
christ is risen
-  and we have flies over here 
christ is risen indeed
- and patriarch kirill of the russian orthodox church blesses the war and thinks that turning cities into ruins, exterminating their inhabitants, as well as raping and pillaging for the sake of some pseudo-imperialist bullshit in a z-shaped circumvention of all the commandments is ok fine and sacred
well, godspeed!”

The author's black humor, which is typical for the performances of the Party of the Dead, peeks through the lines of this message. I know Maxim very well, we graduated from the same philosophy department, we worked together, I knew his son and his wife, who was my student, and therefore I can say that the performances of the Party of the Dead, albeit in a sarcastic manner, express his absolutely serious attitude towards death as well as his existential, not just political, rejection of the regime in Russia. If ordinary politicians cover up their non-seriousness by imitating serious activity, in the Party of the Dead it is the opposite, a serious attitude to death and power is covered up by grotesque play and black humor.

Is the Party of the Dead a political opposition?

The Russian opposition is increasingly making me feel ashamed, but this is quite natural. After all, Russians have no common self-identification or understanding of themselves as one people, so there can be no all-Russian opposition. There are people who wish to identify as the Russian opposition, but are engaged in imitation instead. Maxim Evstropov is not an oppositionist, but a political artist, an art activist. But he is also a philosopher, so he gives a philosophical understanding of his political activity. I respect Maxim as a philosopher, as a colleague, and as a professional - a candidate of philosophical sciences, author of scientific articles and monographs, but his philosophical language is very different from mine, and is not always clear to me. Therefore, I will try to present his position as I understood it, although he may disagree with my interpretations in some respects.

The political situation in Russia is such that the complete helplessness of the opposition only causes despair. Maxim explains that political despair is a situation of political impossibility, loss of hopes and illusions. It can be called “political death,” which is quite akin to the position of an animal or a corpse. This despair is total and becomes the background of every action and every thought. However, Maxim believes that the possibility of overcoming despair lies in despair itself. To do this, one must despair absolutely. One must despair in order to act. This is how “political death” becomes the starting point of political struggle. Humor is one of the keys to turning despair into action. When there is nothing left to lose, all that remains is laughter. 


Humor makes it possible to look at any situation from two perspectives: a serious one, where everything has unconditional significance, and a non-serious one, where all significance turns into nothing. Laughter is affective in its nature - it is an affect that exists both inside and outside of a lived experience, of a situation, it is a transcendence of the self, an outsider's view. In the moment of ridicule, things lose their defined boundaries. However, in a situation of political despair, humor becomes black. It does not justify or legitimize political death in any way, but at the same time it opens a way out of the life situation into the space of freedom. Maxim believes that the “way out” of despair lies in a paradox: to get rid of despair, one must despair. Black humor lives political death and forms a new phenomenon with it, which we can observe in the street actions and performances of the Party of the Dead.

Let me give an example of how political desperation in a situation where elections are impossible led the Russian opposition to a dead end. Some members of the opposition called for a protest vote, others for an election boycott, and as a result neither strategy was implemented. The Party of the Dead translated this political despair into action and called for a vote for the dead, stating, “We remind you that this sub-fascist police state is essentially dead (strength is in truth, and truth is in death), it has buried its future, it is made up of apartment pyramids of corpses who still can't admit that they are already dead. They will persist for a long time to come, but the soil is more persistent.” The black humor of such an appeal really broke down the boundaries into which the Russian opposition had driven itself. 

The philosophy of the Party of the Dead allows us to better understand what is happening not only inside Russia, but also on the front. When the AFU captured a bridgehead in the Kursk region, many hoped that the Russian command would transfer forces from Donbass to this region, which in turn would lead to a weakening of the Russian offensive in that direction. But nothing of the sort happened. Maxim Evstropov explains it this way: “It must be that the task of the so-called ‘special military operation’ is to seize and turn the Ukrainian territories into the ‘Russian world’, i.e. into something uninhabitable. In this case, the loss of its own territories (Kursk, Belgorod region, etc.) is of no significant importance for the Russian Federation, because they already represent the “Russian world”, i.e. they are not designed for life. The fact that some people still live there is more of an unfortunate coincidence from the authorities' point of view”.

I call Russia's current state system necroimperialism because it cultivates death and is unacceptable for the living. Maxim Evstropov believes that it is unacceptable not only for the living, but also for the dead. 

Translation: Sasha Starost.

Thursday, October 3, 2024

Appeal to the Honourable Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi from Prof. Nikolai Karpitsky

To the Honourable Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi

Dear Mr. Prime Minister!

In the year 2011, the Russian authorities tried to ban Bhagavad Gita as extremist literature. India was the only country in the world that supported Vaishnavas in Russia and showed that defence of Dharma is more important than political gains. Now Dharma in Russia is in even greater danger. So we again hope for the support of the government and people of India. The Russian government has created a quasi-religion of hatred to justify new colonial wars - expansion of the “Russian world”. The Russian Orthodox Church leadership was the first to fall under its influence and for this reason supported the persecution of Vaishnavas in 2011 and now supports the war. However, many members of the Russian Orthodox Church disagree, they have openly defended the Bhagavad Gita, and now they refuse to pray for Russia's victory. For this reason they are being persecuted and suffer repression. Now the Russian government is imposing a quasi-religion of hate on all faiths. Many Vaishnavas have been forced to leave Russia, but many remain and out of fear support the quasi-religion of hatred and the war against Ukraine. But they still remain alien to the adherents of the ‘Russian world’, so, sooner or later Vaishnavism may again be banned in Russia. Your authority in the international arena may persuade many to abandon moral relativism and evaluate the war against Ukraine from the position of the universal moral law of all humankind, which in India is called Dharma. You can convince the international community that this is not the age of archaic colonial empires, and therefore, all countries need to unite to issue an ultimatum to Russia. Either Russia will abandon the imperial form of state structure and transform itself into a democratic federation safe for the world, or it will cease to exist as a single state.

A participant in the defence of the Bhagavad Gita trial in 2011 Prof. Nikolai Karpitsky

Registration Number : PMOPG/E/2024/0149253



Monday, September 23, 2024

Nikolai Karpitsky. Followers of Hare Krishna go to fight for Ukraine. War has changed Krishnaites

Source: PostPravda.info 2024-09-23
URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/reports/followers-of-hare-krishna-fight/


War is rapidly changing people’s consciousness. These changes are visible as if through a magnifying glass in religious communities that previously distanced themselves from political life and preached pacifism, but now support the Ukrainian Armed Forces. If before the war Russian and Ukrainian believers of Hare Krishna were unaware of their differences, now it is as if they live on different planets. Having lost their common language of communication, they no longer understand each other.

The Hare Krishna movement: pacifists or warriors?

The Hare Krishna movement preaches the principle of non-violence – ahimsa. Its representatives, the Vaishnavas or, as they are called, Krishnaites, are vegetarians and refuse to kill not only humans but also animals. Therefore, the Ukrainian government has recognized their right to alternative civil service. The Hare Krishna movement originated in Bengal in the 16th century, and in the second half of the 20th century it spread throughout the world, including Ukraine. Its largest association in Ukraine is the “Society for Krishna Consciousness,” but there are others related to it.

They all come from the same root and there is no contradiction between them. They differ only in their “religious flavor.” Krishnaites preach love for one God, whom they call Krishna, and practice repetition of the Hare Krishna mantra. Everything a Krishnaite does in his daily life, even when he takes a shower or cooks a meal, he does it for Krishna, to please God. There is simply no room for violence in such a life. Before the war, it was hard to imagine that these peaceful people dancing in Indian costumes on the streets of Ukrainian cities would become warriors.

How many of them are now in the Ukrainian Armed Forces? It’s hard to say exactly, because the Krishnaites don’t have records of members. Ukraine’s spiritual leadership claims to know exactly about 80, while Mykhailo Tashkov, head of the Spiritual Matter Project, a supporter of the Hare Krishna movement and an Officer in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, claims to have identified 136 Krishnaite warriors, and there may be more than two hundred in total. For a relatively small “pacifist” religious community, that’s a lot, as there were about 40,000 of them in Ukraine before the war, and perhaps twice as many now.

Mykhailo Tashkov says that 29 Krishnaite warriors are already known to have died, four more are missing, and one is in captivity. His “Spiritual Matter” project aims to promote a theological justification for the need to defend one’s country with weapons, and from this position he and his fellow warriors are engaged in a fierce polemic with the community’s leadership. So what motivates members of a “pacifist” religion to voluntarily go to war with an aggressor?

Hare Krishna followers who died during the war in Ukraine. Photo: Facebook

A view of war in the Hare Krishna movement

The Hare Krishna movement is one of the strands of Hinduism. According to Hindu ideas, the world is governed by a universal moral law – dharma, which at the same time manifests as an inner duty, and each person has his own, according to his inner nature. For spiritual people, dharma is to know the truth, to devote oneself to the service of God, for warriors – to protect the weak, for peasants and merchants – to ensure material life.

In line with this, there is the concept of warnas in India. They are something like social states. The varna of priests – brahmins, the varna of warriors – kshatriyas, the varna of peasants and merchants – vaisyas. In some strands of Hinduism, the varnas are believed to be defined by birth, but in the Hare Krishna movement the varnas are believed to be an indicator of a person’s personal qualities, which do not depend on the family into which they are born. Because of this understanding, people of different nationalities from all countries can join the movement.

“Hare Krishna” is a brahminical movement oriented exclusively toward spiritual life, with the goal of devotional service to God. Therefore, its followers had little participation in public life, since such participation is the duty of a kshatriya, not a brahmin. The political beliefs of the Krishnaites are generally the same as those they held before joining the movement, and generally reflect public sentiment. Religious leaders tend to take a neutral stance on political issues and try to keep any political disputes out of community life. They viewed wars as an inevitable evil. According to Vedic ideas, we live in the age of wars, viz. in Kali-yuga, and salvation can only be achieved through devotional service to God.

However, when the February 24, 2022 the large-scale Russian invasion began, it became clear to Ukrainian Krishnaites that this was not just one of the Kali-yuga wars on the outskirts of their country, but a genocidal war against all Ukrainians, a war of annihilation. No one is safe in Ukraine now; Krishnaites are dying just like other Ukrainians. The occupiers have destroyed three Krishna temples. In the Kherson region, a drunken Russian soldier shot a Krishnaite family in their home for no reason. At the moment, the deaths of five civilian Krishnaites are known, but how many were killed in total is still unknown.

If in the past total focus on God and detachment from material problems was seen as a sign of spirituality, in the context of genocidal war it is seen quite the opposite – as moral relativism. After all, such complete detachment when people, children are dying all around, shows indifference to suffering and unwillingness to take responsibility for what is happening around us. Does God need such an irresponsible follower?

Thus, a division has emerged among Ukrainian Krishnaites between those who believe it is necessary to lead a religious life as before and those who believe it is necessary to take an active part in defending their country. The fierce polemic between the two is sometimes accompanied by unfair mutual accusations. However, both are opposed to Russia’s aggression, they only argue about whether and in what form this aggression should be fought. Ukrainian Krishnaites do not even enter into discussions with supporters of an openly pro-Russian position, so the split between Ukrainian and Russian Krishnaites cannot be overcome.

Relations between Ukrainian and Russian Krishnaites

Before the war, Ukrainian and Russian Krishnaites felt no differences between them and paid no attention to the fact that a dictatorship had been established in Russia. At least until 2011, when the Russian government made a clumsy attempt to outlaw the Krishna Consciousness Society. To that end, the FSB initiated a trial in the Siberian city of Tomsk to admit the Krishnaite holy book as extremist. At the time, there were still remnants of civil society in Tomsk that supported the Krishnaites, but the support of the public and the Indian government played a decisive role. The holy book managed to be protected.

Ukrainian Krishnaites morally supported their Russian co-religionists, and it came as a shock to them that their spiritual brethren, who themselves almost became victims of repression by the Russian government, supported the occupation of Crimea and the 2014 military invasion of eastern Ukraine. Initially, Ukrainian Krishnaites tried to reach the minds of their Russian co-religionists, but now such attempts have finally ceased. The fact is that the existential experience of war between the two is so different that they simply don’t understand each other, even if they both advocate for Ukraine and against the war.

It is clear to Ukrainian Krishnaites that Russia is waging a war against all Ukrainians for the purpose of destruction, that this is a special war that differs from any other war in that it is being waged not for any political gain, but for the purpose of destroying Ukraine and Ukrainian identity. However, even for those Russian Krishnaites who oppose the war and wholeheartedly sympathize with their Ukrainian co-religionists, this is just one of the Kali-yuga wars, which is being waged not by Russia, but by the Russian government, supposedly separate from Russia. This gap in perceptions of the war prevents communication even among those who oppose the political regime in Russia.

Hare Krishna followers in Ukraine. Photo: Facebook

Most Russian Krishnaites try to maintain neutrality, which easily degenerates into moral relativism and equating the victim with the aggressor. The most common opinions are: “Everyone is to blame for the conflict, Russia, Ukraine and the West”; “Vaishnavites should not get involved in politics”; “Demons fight demons, and Vaishnavites should remain neutral”; “War is a punishment for meat-eating people, everyone is guilty, there are no innocents.”

Along with supporters of this neutral position of moral relativism, there are many among Russian Krishnaites who trust Russian propaganda. They blame the war on either Ukraine, where Russians are allegedly oppressed, or the West, which is allegedly fighting Russia with Ukraine’s hands. There are also those who see it as a global conspiracy of “architects” who secretly rule the world. The ideas of pro-Russian Krishnaites about what is happening in Ukraine are absurd and grotesque. For example, I know a Russian Krishnaite who claimed that Russians are being caught in Kharkiv, and then Russian passports are nailed to various parts of their bodies. At the same time, he categorically refuses to communicate with his Ukrainian co-religionists.

However, with the onset of the large-scale war, Ukrainian Krishnaites faced another problem. The fact is that in the Hare Krishna movement, as in Hinduism in general, the guru, or one’s own spiritual teacher, has absolute authority. God Himself is believed to act through him. However, before the war, Ukraine had no teachers of its own, and the initiation of Ukrainian Krishnaites was carried out by teachers from other countries, including Russia, namely Bhakti Vigyana Goswami (Vadim Tuneev), the spiritual leader of the Krishna Consciousness Society in Russia, and also Chaitanya Chandra Czaran das (Alexander Chakimov).

Vadim Tuneev resigned from the leadership of the Russian Krishna Consciousness Society, emigrated and morally supports Ukraine and Ukrainian co-religionists, but Alexander Chakimov took the opposite stance. Not only did he spread the Russian propaganda narrative that Ukraine had been bombing the Donbas for eight years, but he also urged Russian Krishnaites to obey the mobilization decree, saying that it was Krishna’s duty and will to fight, and if a Vaishnav dies fighting against Ukraine, it will be a glorious death that will purify him of karma. Unfortunately, Alexander Khakimov has a large number of disciples in Ukraine, many of whom absolutely disagree with his position, but cannot abandon the teacher, as it contradicts the creed.

So Ukrainian Krishnaites faced a theological challenge – how to explain that a spiritual person, a teacher through whom God Himself acts, takes a demonic position? The situation improved somewhat when, in the spring of 2024, the spiritual leader of the Krishna Consciousness Society in Ukraine and Moldova, Achyuta Priya (Artem Chumachenko), became a guru (teacher) with the right to give initiations, while at the same time recommendations for initiations from Russian teachers were banned. However, what to do with those who have already taken initiation from Alexander Khakimov is an open question.

Dominant trends among Krishnaites

It is difficult to accurately gauge the prevailing trends in the Krishnaite community, but one can certainly speak to the mood among those Krishnaites with an online presence. Yulia Fil, a researcher at the UAN Institute of Oriental Studies, conducted an online survey in April 2024 to determine how the war has affected relations between Ukrainian and Russian Krishnaites. More than a third of Ukrainian Krishnaites do not want contact with Russian co-religionists at all (36.7%), and slightly less than a third are willing to restore relations only if their Russian co-religionists take responsibility for Russia’s crimes in Ukraine.

In other words, two-thirds of Krishnaites take a radically pro-Ukrainian position and are not ready to make any compromises in the name of communication. Before the war, such principledness on political issues could not have been imagined. The war has changed the Krishnaites a great deal. Only 13.3% responded that it was necessary to restore communication with the Russians, leaving aside political issues. If at the beginning of the war Ukrainian Krishnaites actively engaged in discussions on social networks in an attempt to change the minds of their Russian co-religionists, now only 5% express such an intention. This is in line with the general mood throughout Ukrainian society, where the desire to convince Russians has been marginalized.

The position that, for the sake of communication, one should agree with the position of Russians is somewhere within the statistical error – less than 2%. As the survey of Russian Krishnaites in Tomsk shows, the mood there is different. Slightly more than half (52%) take a position of political neutrality and favor restoring communication with Ukrainian co-religionists, without raising political issues. Slightly more than a quarter (27%) believe that it is necessary to meet with Ukrainian co-religionists, recognizing their right. The rest take a pro-Russian stance: a little more than a tenth (11.5%) believe that one should not communicate with Ukrainian co-religionists at all, and another 10% believe that one should try to convince them that Russia is right.

I think these figures reflect the situation of social consciousness in Tomsk as a whole, which is a university city and a cultural center. In Russia’s depressed cities, the situation is probably much worse; I think Russian propaganda of hatred for Ukraine absolutely dominates there. The genocidal war is changing everyone, and it is already clear that neither the Hari Krishna movement nor other religions in Ukraine will remain the same. Disputes and crises within religious communities reflect similar disputes and crises throughout Ukrainian society, and Ukraine’s future will depend on how it overcomes these internal contradictions.


Monday, April 1, 2024

Nikolai Karpitsky: About the current situation in a few short theses

The reason for the Russian-Ukrainian war is the messianic idea of collecting land. After the rebirth of the imperial consciousness into a necro-imperial one, this idea was transformed into the idea of destroying evil, which is seen in everything that is beyond the control of the Kremlin junta.

The reason for the weak support of Ukraine from Western countries is the rejection of values in favor of conformism under the influence of the illusion that everything can be rationally explained by vested interests, which means that it is possible to come to an agreement with the enemy.

The reason for the suspension of aid to Ukraine from the US is the ochlocratic uprising led by Trump. In the information society, thanks to the Internet, ochlos gained access to information and influence on politics that he did not have before. The US two-party system is like an airplane with two engines, and the first engine – the Republican Party – has already broken. If the ochlos breaks the second motor, disaster will follow.

The reason that Ukraine does not have time to mobilize the country and military production, does not use the potential of diplomacy to unite forces against the aggressor, and makes critical mistakes - post-Soviet inertia, weakness of civil society, incompetent bureaucracy.

The reason that Russia was able to rebuild itself for an endless war of attrition is an aggressive ideology and a totalitarian system that makes it possible to redirect the aggression and inertia of a degrading society into one stream.

The cause of the Third World War is the interaction of totalitarian regimes and laziness in democratic civilized countries against the background of weakness and conformity of Western political elites.