"Agency". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 11.08.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/russias-lost-agency/

Under the UN Charter, respect for the right of peoples to self-determination is a fundamental principle of international relations. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) states: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status..."

However, not all nations have agency. If a people that in no way manifests its agency is burdened with responsibility for the state, it is likely to hand over the power to decide its fate to a dictator. Will the Russian people have the right to self-determination after their defeat in the war, or will their fate be decided by a coalition of the victors? To answer this question, it is necessary to clarify the concept of “agency,” to which Nikolai Karpitsky has devoted another article in the Dictionary of War on PostPravda.Info.

Agency

In the broadest sense, agency is the ability to act as an independent actor, to make one’s own decisions, and not to be subject to the will of others. In the social sense, it is the ability to be an independent agent of influence and to assert one’s interests in society or on the international stage.

The agency of an individual is determined by their free will, which is expressed in actions. Collective agency is possible only through free collective action, in which an individual fulfils themselves and receives recognition from others. However, collective actions can also be coerced, leading to the loss of collective agency and the rise of authoritarian or totalitarian social systems.

The bearer of individual agency is a free person conscious of their ability to act and make decisions independently. The bearers of collective agency are free individuals who, despite differences in beliefs and interests, voluntarily unite to express a common stance. They embody collective agency in particular social forms – a people, civil society, the state, a religious movement, and so on. If collective actions are carried out under duress, this leads to the collapse of collective agency. Collective agency does not require unanimity, for it is grounded in the common actions of free people who may hold different beliefs and frequently diverge in their views on many issues. Unanimity arises when a people renounces its agency in favour of dictatorship.

The Agency of a People

Recognition of another’s agency is expressed in the recognition of rights – in the case of a person or an association of individuals, and in the recognition of sovereignty – in the case of peoples and states. The principle enshrined in UN documents, respect for the right of peoples to self-determination, entails recognition of their ability to shape their own agency. The sovereign right of a people is enshrined in many constitutions, which declare that the source of authority lies with the people. However, if a people fails to exercise its agency in practice, a dictator will almost certainly usurp it.

Thus, the German people lost their agency when Hitler came to power. The Stalinist regime created a new “Soviet” agency that displaced the agencies of other peoples. The Palestinians did not succeed in forming their own agency, distinct from the pan-Arab one, and when the Gaza Strip effectively gained independence in 2005, the agency of the Palestinian population was usurped by the terrorist organization Hamas.

The Agency of the Ukrainian People

A people’s agency is expressed in historical moments when society succeeds in breaking social inertia. Ukraine, like many other post-Soviet countries, remained for a long time caught in the inertia of the post-Soviet era. However, society asserted its agency by rising against the post-Soviet corrupt oligarchic system, which led to the Orange Revolution (2004–2005) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014).

As a rule, in times of war, a rigid power vertical is established, and the agency of society diminishes. However, following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the agency of Ukrainian civil society has grown; it has asserted itself as an independent force in the country’s defence alongside the state. This is evident in the growth of the volunteer movement, the large-scale improvised production of drones, and the supplying of servicemen at the front with everything they need. Moreover, when the public believed that the authorities had passed a flawed law, mass protests broke out in many Ukrainian cities on 23 July 2025, forcing the authorities to listen to the public and alter their stance.

How do Ukrainians perceive the agency of Russians?

At the beginning of the war, many Ukrainians believed that the Putin regime was waging war against them and turned to their friends, relatives, and fellow believers in Russia in an effort to achieve mutual understanding. Today, Ukrainians are largely convinced that all of Russia is waging war against them, and attempts to reach an understanding with Russians have all but ceased. In other words, Ukrainians no longer perceive the Russian people as possessing their own agency, distinct from that of the authorities. For the same reason, they do not regard the Russian opposition, which speaks on behalf of an imaginary “other Russia,” as having genuine agency. Respect is reserved only for individual Russians who openly oppose the Putin regime and support Ukraine, but they are seen not as representatives of Russia but as solitary heroes. They are treated in the same way as anti-fascist Germans during the Second World War. After all, at that time, despite their struggle, no one recognised the agency of the German people as distinct from that of Nazi Germany.

Who will decide Russia's fate after the war?

The Russian Constitution enshrines the principle that the people are the source of power. But if the people have renounced their agency in favour of the regime, they have thereby also renounced their right to self-determination. This delegitimises Russia as a subject of international law, and it continues to be taken into account only because it poses a military threat. This raises the question: who will decide the fate of Russia in the event of its defeat in the war – the Russian people or a coalition of the victors? This issue is not yet under discussion, but history offers a precedent.

The German people, having relinquished their agency in favour of Hitler, lost the ability to determine their own post-war future, and the fate of Germany was decided by the victorious powers. Different models of agency took shape in the divided parts of Germany. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germans expressed a desire to integrate into the agency of the German people of the Federal Republic of Germany.

If, after Russia’s defeat in the war, the victorious countries also do not recognise the agency of the Russian people, this will create opportunities for developing new models of agency for the peoples of Russia. In some regions – Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and the Caucasus republics – statements asserting their own agency are already being voiced. In other regions, such as Siberia and the Far East, new models of agency have not yet taken shape, but the preconditions are already in place.

"Rashism". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 26.06.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/rashism-is-ideology-of-russian-regime/

Over the years of the war with Russia, the word “Rashism” has become firmly established in Ukrainian usage, although some political scientists regard it as a vague and unscientific notion. However, Ukrainians clearly understand what rashism is and how it differs from other forms of fascism. On May 2, 2023, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a definition of the term “rashism,” enumerating its main characteristics. This definition is descriptive in nature, and has therefore become the subject of another article by Nikolai Karpitsky for PostPravda.Info’s Dictionary of War.

Rashism

Rashism is a modern form of Russian fascism, an ideology of violently suppressing or destroying other cultural and national identities in order to expand the sphere of Russian identity’s dominance. 

The term “rashism” (from “Russian” and “fascism”) is used to denote a form of fascism that shares features with its historical manifestations – Italian fascism, German National Socialism (Nazism), and others. The ideology of rashism developed from the tradition of Russian chauvinism, which has historically had an imperial character.

Within rashist ideology, a special place is reserved for Ukraine. Rashists claim that Ukrainians and Russians are one people. Ukrainian identity is tolerated only as a provincial variant of Russian identity, while those Ukrainians who refuse to accept Russian identity as the sole valid one for themselves are treated as enemies. Whereas Hitler’s Nazism defined an enemy on the basis of race, rashism defines one on the basis of identity. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is justified by the supposed necessity of “bringing Ukraine back” and eradicating Ukrainian identity as an independent identity.

Rashism and Russian Chauvinism

Russian chauvinism has accompanied Russia’s development for centuries, manifesting both at the state level and in everyday life. At the level of state ideology, Russian chauvinism has taken various forms, from the concept of “Moscow, the Third Rome,” to the idea of communism, used to justify dictatorship, and up to the current concept of the “Russian world.” Yet its essence remained the same: the justification of military and political expansion, and the imposition of a single ideology in matters of culture, language, history, and religion. 

In everyday life, Russian chauvinism manifests itself in the belief that territories once conquered by Russia – such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia – automatically become an “integral part” of Russia. Residents of these regions are deprived of political subject status, including the right to self-determination. They are expected to adapt to the dominant Russian culture, speak Russian, and conform to the everyday norms familiar to Russians.

Meanwhile, Russians who move to these regions are not required to respect local languages and traditions. This attitude is evident in the so-called national republics within Russia, where even in major cities such as Kazan, landlords often openly state that they rent housing only to Russians. This discriminatory practice is treated as normal.

This trend was enshrined in law in August 2018, when the Law on Education was amended to remove the national languages of the republics from the list of compulsory school subjects. However, even before that, school remained the main tool for imposing the imperial version of Russian history on all the peoples of Russia.

The turning point that marked the transformation of Russian chauvinism into a fully fledged ideology of rashism came in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas. It was then that Russian propaganda began actively employing chauvinist narratives to justify military aggression and terror against the Ukrainian people. Rashism is no longer merely cultural or political arrogance, but an ideological justification of war and of war crimes committed in the name of eradicating another national identity. Even someone who does not openly support aggression but propagates narratives that justify its aims – such as the idea of a “single people” or the mission of the “Russian world” – can also be regarded as an adherent of rashist ideology.

Rashist Ideology

Rashism is an imperial ideology built on the image of an enemy, mythologised history, and the concept of Russia’s special mission to expand the so-called “Russian world.” In the rashist worldview, the modern world is a battlefield between the “soulless” West and “spiritual” Russia. 

In this discourse, Ukrainian identity is regarded as unnatural, supposedly imposed by the West to weaken Russia. By this logic, Russia “must” reclaim Ukraine by force, and Ukrainians who reject Russian identity are to be regarded as traitors and enemies. 

In rashism, the ideological constructs of “Russian culture” and “Orthodoxy” substitute for both genuine culture and genuine religiosity. This artificial construct borrows elements from both the Soviet and the Tsarist eras, creating a self-contradictory system, yet rashists themselves generally fail to recognise these contradictions.

Rashists and Their Stance

Supporters of rashism largely back Putin’s regime, as they see it as an instrument in the struggle against Ukrainian identity. At the same time, they may express dissatisfaction with the government in other areas, such as corruption, social policy, or economic management. Within the rashist camp there is also a radical wing that opposes Putin, believing him not decisive or harsh enough in the struggle against Ukraine.

In Ukrainian public consciousness, a distinction is drawn between ideological rashists and those who support rashism passively and unthinkingly, without firm conviction. The first category includes rashists in the strict sense of the word – people who knowingly justify Russia’s aggression. The second category includes the “vatniki” – ordinary people who avoid responsibility for moral choices and are inclined toward relativism: “not everything is so clear-cut,” “everyone is guilty in the conflict,” “only God knows the truth,” and so on. A separate category is made up of the “orcs”. These are criminals who joined the army for material gain or to avoid criminal punishment. Their motivation is not ideological: they commit war crimes driven by personal cruelty and a sense of impunity.

What rashists, vatniki, and orcs have in common is a lack of empathy for the victims of aggression and an unwillingness to accept responsibility for their country’s actions.

Rashism and Necro-Imperialism

If rashism represents the ideological stance of the Russian authorities, then necro-imperialism describes the actual state of Russian public consciousness and the political system. The difference is like that between communism as an ideology and Stalinism as actual practice: while the ideologically justified goal was the struggle against “class enemies,” in reality Stalinism manifested itself in mass denunciations and the repression of innocent people. Accordingly, if rashism denotes the ideology of expanding the “Russian world,” necro-imperialism describes, on the one hand, the authorities’ treatment of the population as a resource to be expended in pursuit of their goals, and, on the other, the people’s own willingness to accept such a role – evident in their readiness to die pointlessly on the front lines in Ukraine.

The ruling clique in Russia, made up largely of former security service operatives, is not bound to any particular ideology. Their attitude toward ideological constructs is purely instrumental: these constructs are used only insofar as they help maintain power. This cynicism was inherited from the Soviet security services. However, shifts in ideology according to political conditions do not alter the worldview underlying necro-imperialism.

Thus, rashism is an ideological conceptualisation of the fear of the world’s complexity and the drive to destroy everything that cannot be dominated, while necro-imperialism is the manifestation of this drive in social consciousness and the political system. 

Legal Definition of Rashism

On May 2, 2023, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution “On the use of the ideology of rashism by the political regime of the Russian Federation, and on the condemnation of the principles and practices of rashism as totalitarian and misanthropic” (No. 3078-IX).

In its statement, the Verkhovna Rada defines rashism as “a new variety of totalitarian ideology and practices that underlie the regime formed in the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin, based on the traditions of Russian chauvinism and imperialism, the practices of the Soviet communist regime, and National Socialism (Nazism); … the characteristic features and consequences of rashism are:

– systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

- cult of power and militarism;

– a cult of personality around the leader at the top of the power vertical, and the sacralisation of state institutions;

– the self-glorification of Russia and Russians through the violent suppression and/or denial of the existence of other peoples;

– the use of practices aimed at spreading the Russian language and culture, the Russian Orthodox Church, the media, political and civic institutions, and the promotion of the ideas of the “Russian world” among other peoples, in order to implement expansionist state policy;

– systematic violation of universally recognised principles and norms of international law, including respect for the sovereignty of other states, their territorial integrity and internationally recognised borders, and failure to observe the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force;

– the creation, financing, and armed support of unlawful armed groups and separatist movements on the territory of other sovereign states, and the creation and support of terrorist organisations;

the use of prohibited methods of warfare and the systematic commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity;

– the systematic organisation and perpetration of mass killings, executions, torture, deportations, the creation of artificial conditions leading to famine, other forms of mass physical terror, genocide, and persecution on ethnic, national, religious, political, or other grounds;

– the systematic use of economic and energy coercion against other states;

– regular threats to use nuclear weapons against other states and to cause technological (man-made) disasters.”

"Evil". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 22.05.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/evil-an-evaluative-concept-or-a-reality-a-chasm-between-eyewitnesses-of-war-and-observers-from-afar/

An ordinary person perceives as evil anything that harms them or contradicts their ethical and religious beliefs. On this basis, researchers often conclude that evil is an evaluative concept and should therefore be excluded from the objective analysis of social processes. However, with the outbreak of the war, Ukrainians came to realise through their own experience that the question of evil is not abstract but existential: it is bound up with their right to life.

However, in conversations with their friends, relatives, and fellow believers in Russia, Ukrainians began to hear different responses: some said that no one can know the whole truth, and that calling the full-scale invasion of Ukraine evil is merely a subjective judgment; others claimed that both sides are to blame for the war and Russia cannot be blamed alone; still others openly described the aggression as good and the resistance of the Ukrainian people as evil. 

Anyone who directly witnesses the evil of war cannot agree with such interpretations of evil:

 – agnosticism – “We cannot know who is to blame for the war”;

 – subjectivism – “You consider the war against you evil – but that is your subjective judgment; we think otherwise”;

 – relativism – “It is impossible to clearly determine what constitutes evil, because in war everyone is to blame, both the aggressor and the victim of aggression.”

 – antihumanism – “We attacked you because you are evil that must be destroyed”.

For Ukrainians, it is of existential importance to have a definition of evil that does not depend on subjective judgments or ideological biases.

Evil

Evil in the broadest sense is that whose existence is unacceptable in light of values; it is that which exists despite everything thought not to be allowed to exist. However, this definition requires clarification, as it admits of two opposing interpretations that must be regarded as mistaken because they undermine the moral compass.

Misinterpretations of Evil

1. The Absolutisation of Evil

The first mistake is to ascribe evil to the very essence of humanity, life, the world, or any part of it. Such an understanding makes evil absolute and leads to a hostile perception of reality and the justification of misanthropic ideologies. History offers examples: The Bolsheviks ascribed evil to the social nature of “class enemies,” while the Nazis attributed it to the racial or biological nature of their victims. Russia’s current aggression against Ukraine is likewise justified by the notion that evil is allegedly inherent in the nature of Western civilisation – a civilisation Russia claims to oppose.

From the standpoint of theistic religions, such a position is utterly unacceptable, for to claim that evil is inherent in the very essence of something is to accuse God of creating evil. Although historical doctrines have attributed evil to the essence of God or to the material world, they have always proved destructive to traditional cultures. In contrast, in ancient thought, evil was understood as the absence or deficiency of good, while Christianity saw it as the denial of the fullness of life resulting from a mistaken exercise of free will.

2. Moral Relativism

The second mistake lies in reducing evil solely to a subjective judgment. In this case, a person labels as evil anything that seems bad to them in a particular situation. Yet what is bad for one may be good for another. For example, one man was rejected by a girl, while another became the one she chose. This gives rise to the idea that evil is merely a construct or an illusion, and thus even Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is deemed ‘ambiguous,’ depending on subjective perception. Ultimately, this leads to moral relativism, which ignores the difference between the aggressor and their victim.

The Unacceptability of Subjective Judgments in the Objective Analysis of Social Phenomena

Both stances, the absolutisation of evil and moral relativism, are actively used to manipulate public opinion. When addressing one audience, Russian propaganda relies on the notion of the West as absolute evil, an enemy Russia is allegedly ‘forced’ to fight on Ukrainian territory. For the other audience, arguments are framed in terms of moral relativism: everyone is to blame for the conflict – Russia, Ukraine, and the West – and therefore it is unfair to blame Russia alone.

The scientific approach to the analysis of social phenomena rules out ethical, religious, and subjective judgments. In this context, evil as an evaluative category should be set outside the scope of scientific analysis. Therefore, it is important to distinguish the concept of evil from the subjective judgment of ‘what is bad,’ since such judgments depend on views and circumstances and can even be reversed. Instead, the concept of evil should reflect objective reality and be independent of personal opinions and beliefs.

Evil as the Denial of the Right to Exist

The common core of views about evil across different cultural traditions is this: evil is a form of the absence or negation of life, a deficient reality that brings suffering. Thus, disease is the absence of health, and death is the negation of life. In the social dimension, evil manifests itself as the denial of other people’s right to exist. This is manifested in actions or attitudes that directly or indirectly deny the value of human life. Such social phenomena are objective and do not depend on subjective judgments.

However, not every harm caused by an action testifies to evil. An act is evil only when it is motivated or justified by the denial of another’s right to exist, and this is precisely the objective criterion of evil, independent of subjective opinion. This approach allows us to formulate the concept of evil at the interpersonal and social levels.

Russia’s Military Aggression Is Objectively Evil

Evil is embodied in actions that cause harm and suffering and express an attitude toward others that, to some degree, denies their existence.

The objectivity of evil does not mean that it possesses an essence of its own. Evil is a characteristic of attitude, not of essence. Yes, the nature of a criminal is not, in itself, evil. On the contrary, evil manifests itself when a person denies their humanity. By attributing evil to the very essence of humanity, we thereby justify denying people their right to exist, and in doing so, we reproduce evil ourselves.

The decision to attack Ukraine fits the definition of evil given above. Vladimir Putin stated that the purpose of the invasion is “denazification”. This term masks a policy aimed at destroying Ukrainian identity, as can be seen in the occupied territories. Thus, the war was launched on the premise of denying Ukrainians the right to exist. This is an objective fact, independent of subjective judgments.

The denial of reality can manifest not only in direct violence but also in disregard, when the victim ceases to be perceived as a living individual. This is evident in how many Russians sincerely believe the propaganda about Ukraine’s ‘salvation’ from the Nazis, even though they could have learned the truth from their Ukrainian friends, relatives, or fellow believers. In other words, they perceive even their loved ones in Ukraine not as living human beings, but as abstractions. Such disregard is another form of denying existence, not aggressive in form, but leading to the same consequences: support for war, mass violence, and killings. However, even if a person firmly believes they wish Ukrainians well, sincerely convinced that Russia is ‘liberating’ Ukraine, they nonetheless become an accomplice to evil. The subjective perception of one’s own act as good does not change the fact that, objectively, it is an embodiment of evil.

One of the most dangerous consequences of war is becoming accustomed to evil – its normalization. The seizure of territories, torture, and the killing of civilians cease to be regarded as utterly unacceptable. However, this “normalisation” is subjective: it does not negate the objective basis of understanding evil as an attitude toward people which denies their very existence. It was this attitude that was put into practice in the war against an entire nation.