"Agency". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 11.08.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/russias-lost-agency/

Under the UN Charter, respect for the right of peoples to self-determination is a fundamental principle of international relations. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) states: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status..."

However, not all nations have agency. If a people that in no way manifests its agency is burdened with responsibility for the state, it is likely to hand over the power to decide its fate to a dictator. Will the Russian people have the right to self-determination after their defeat in the war, or will their fate be decided by a coalition of the victors? To answer this question, it is necessary to clarify the concept of “agency,” to which Nikolai Karpitsky has devoted another article in the Dictionary of War on PostPravda.Info.

Agency

In the broadest sense, agency is the ability to act as an independent actor, to make one’s own decisions, and not to be subject to the will of others. In the social sense, it is the ability to be an independent agent of influence and to assert one’s interests in society or on the international stage.

The agency of an individual is determined by their free will, which is expressed in actions. Collective agency is possible only through free collective action, in which an individual fulfils themselves and receives recognition from others. However, collective actions can also be coerced, leading to the loss of collective agency and the rise of authoritarian or totalitarian social systems.

The bearer of individual agency is a free person conscious of their ability to act and make decisions independently. The bearers of collective agency are free individuals who, despite differences in beliefs and interests, voluntarily unite to express a common stance. They embody collective agency in particular social forms – a people, civil society, the state, a religious movement, and so on. If collective actions are carried out under duress, this leads to the collapse of collective agency. Collective agency does not require unanimity, for it is grounded in the common actions of free people who may hold different beliefs and frequently diverge in their views on many issues. Unanimity arises when a people renounces its agency in favour of dictatorship.

The Agency of a People

Recognition of another’s agency is expressed in the recognition of rights – in the case of a person or an association of individuals, and in the recognition of sovereignty – in the case of peoples and states. The principle enshrined in UN documents, respect for the right of peoples to self-determination, entails recognition of their ability to shape their own agency. The sovereign right of a people is enshrined in many constitutions, which declare that the source of authority lies with the people. However, if a people fails to exercise its agency in practice, a dictator will almost certainly usurp it.

Thus, the German people lost their agency when Hitler came to power. The Stalinist regime created a new “Soviet” agency that displaced the agencies of other peoples. The Palestinians did not succeed in forming their own agency, distinct from the pan-Arab one, and when the Gaza Strip effectively gained independence in 2005, the agency of the Palestinian population was usurped by the terrorist organization Hamas.

The Agency of the Ukrainian People

A people’s agency is expressed in historical moments when society succeeds in breaking social inertia. Ukraine, like many other post-Soviet countries, remained for a long time caught in the inertia of the post-Soviet era. However, society asserted its agency by rising against the post-Soviet corrupt oligarchic system, which led to the Orange Revolution (2004–2005) and the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014).

As a rule, in times of war, a rigid power vertical is established, and the agency of society diminishes. However, following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the agency of Ukrainian civil society has grown; it has asserted itself as an independent force in the country’s defence alongside the state. This is evident in the growth of the volunteer movement, the large-scale improvised production of drones, and the supplying of servicemen at the front with everything they need. Moreover, when the public believed that the authorities had passed a flawed law, mass protests broke out in many Ukrainian cities on 23 July 2025, forcing the authorities to listen to the public and alter their stance.

How do Ukrainians perceive the agency of Russians?

At the beginning of the war, many Ukrainians believed that the Putin regime was waging war against them and turned to their friends, relatives, and fellow believers in Russia in an effort to achieve mutual understanding. Today, Ukrainians are largely convinced that all of Russia is waging war against them, and attempts to reach an understanding with Russians have all but ceased. In other words, Ukrainians no longer perceive the Russian people as possessing their own agency, distinct from that of the authorities. For the same reason, they do not regard the Russian opposition, which speaks on behalf of an imaginary “other Russia,” as having genuine agency. Respect is reserved only for individual Russians who openly oppose the Putin regime and support Ukraine, but they are seen not as representatives of Russia but as solitary heroes. They are treated in the same way as anti-fascist Germans during the Second World War. After all, at that time, despite their struggle, no one recognised the agency of the German people as distinct from that of Nazi Germany.

Who will decide Russia's fate after the war?

The Russian Constitution enshrines the principle that the people are the source of power. But if the people have renounced their agency in favour of the regime, they have thereby also renounced their right to self-determination. This delegitimises Russia as a subject of international law, and it continues to be taken into account only because it poses a military threat. This raises the question: who will decide the fate of Russia in the event of its defeat in the war – the Russian people or a coalition of the victors? This issue is not yet under discussion, but history offers a precedent.

The German people, having relinquished their agency in favour of Hitler, lost the ability to determine their own post-war future, and the fate of Germany was decided by the victorious powers. Different models of agency took shape in the divided parts of Germany. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germans expressed a desire to integrate into the agency of the German people of the Federal Republic of Germany.

If, after Russia’s defeat in the war, the victorious countries also do not recognise the agency of the Russian people, this will create opportunities for developing new models of agency for the peoples of Russia. In some regions – Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and the Caucasus republics – statements asserting their own agency are already being voiced. In other regions, such as Siberia and the Far East, new models of agency have not yet taken shape, but the preconditions are already in place.

"Rashism". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 26.06.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/rashism-is-ideology-of-russian-regime/

Over the years of the war with Russia, the word “Rashism” has become firmly established in Ukrainian usage, although some political scientists regard it as a vague and unscientific notion. However, Ukrainians clearly understand what rashism is and how it differs from other forms of fascism. On May 2, 2023, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a definition of the term “rashism,” enumerating its main characteristics. This definition is descriptive in nature, and has therefore become the subject of another article by Nikolai Karpitsky for PostPravda.Info’s Dictionary of War.

Rashism

Rashism is a modern form of Russian fascism, an ideology of violently suppressing or destroying other cultural and national identities in order to expand the sphere of Russian identity’s dominance. 

The term “rashism” (from “Russian” and “fascism”) is used to denote a form of fascism that shares features with its historical manifestations – Italian fascism, German National Socialism (Nazism), and others. The ideology of rashism developed from the tradition of Russian chauvinism, which has historically had an imperial character.

Within rashist ideology, a special place is reserved for Ukraine. Rashists claim that Ukrainians and Russians are one people. Ukrainian identity is tolerated only as a provincial variant of Russian identity, while those Ukrainians who refuse to accept Russian identity as the sole valid one for themselves are treated as enemies. Whereas Hitler’s Nazism defined an enemy on the basis of race, rashism defines one on the basis of identity. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is justified by the supposed necessity of “bringing Ukraine back” and eradicating Ukrainian identity as an independent identity.

Rashism and Russian Chauvinism

Russian chauvinism has accompanied Russia’s development for centuries, manifesting both at the state level and in everyday life. At the level of state ideology, Russian chauvinism has taken various forms, from the concept of “Moscow, the Third Rome,” to the idea of communism, used to justify dictatorship, and up to the current concept of the “Russian world.” Yet its essence remained the same: the justification of military and political expansion, and the imposition of a single ideology in matters of culture, language, history, and religion. 

In everyday life, Russian chauvinism manifests itself in the belief that territories once conquered by Russia – such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia – automatically become an “integral part” of Russia. Residents of these regions are deprived of political subject status, including the right to self-determination. They are expected to adapt to the dominant Russian culture, speak Russian, and conform to the everyday norms familiar to Russians.

Meanwhile, Russians who move to these regions are not required to respect local languages and traditions. This attitude is evident in the so-called national republics within Russia, where even in major cities such as Kazan, landlords often openly state that they rent housing only to Russians. This discriminatory practice is treated as normal.

This trend was enshrined in law in August 2018, when the Law on Education was amended to remove the national languages of the republics from the list of compulsory school subjects. However, even before that, school remained the main tool for imposing the imperial version of Russian history on all the peoples of Russia.

The turning point that marked the transformation of Russian chauvinism into a fully fledged ideology of rashism came in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas. It was then that Russian propaganda began actively employing chauvinist narratives to justify military aggression and terror against the Ukrainian people. Rashism is no longer merely cultural or political arrogance, but an ideological justification of war and of war crimes committed in the name of eradicating another national identity. Even someone who does not openly support aggression but propagates narratives that justify its aims – such as the idea of a “single people” or the mission of the “Russian world” – can also be regarded as an adherent of rashist ideology.

Rashist Ideology

Rashism is an imperial ideology built on the image of an enemy, mythologised history, and the concept of Russia’s special mission to expand the so-called “Russian world.” In the rashist worldview, the modern world is a battlefield between the “soulless” West and “spiritual” Russia. 

In this discourse, Ukrainian identity is regarded as unnatural, supposedly imposed by the West to weaken Russia. By this logic, Russia “must” reclaim Ukraine by force, and Ukrainians who reject Russian identity are to be regarded as traitors and enemies. 

In rashism, the ideological constructs of “Russian culture” and “Orthodoxy” substitute for both genuine culture and genuine religiosity. This artificial construct borrows elements from both the Soviet and the Tsarist eras, creating a self-contradictory system, yet rashists themselves generally fail to recognise these contradictions.

Rashists and Their Stance

Supporters of rashism largely back Putin’s regime, as they see it as an instrument in the struggle against Ukrainian identity. At the same time, they may express dissatisfaction with the government in other areas, such as corruption, social policy, or economic management. Within the rashist camp there is also a radical wing that opposes Putin, believing him not decisive or harsh enough in the struggle against Ukraine.

In Ukrainian public consciousness, a distinction is drawn between ideological rashists and those who support rashism passively and unthinkingly, without firm conviction. The first category includes rashists in the strict sense of the word – people who knowingly justify Russia’s aggression. The second category includes the “vatniki” – ordinary people who avoid responsibility for moral choices and are inclined toward relativism: “not everything is so clear-cut,” “everyone is guilty in the conflict,” “only God knows the truth,” and so on. A separate category is made up of the “orcs”. These are criminals who joined the army for material gain or to avoid criminal punishment. Their motivation is not ideological: they commit war crimes driven by personal cruelty and a sense of impunity.

What rashists, vatniki, and orcs have in common is a lack of empathy for the victims of aggression and an unwillingness to accept responsibility for their country’s actions.

Rashism and Necro-Imperialism

If rashism represents the ideological stance of the Russian authorities, then necro-imperialism describes the actual state of Russian public consciousness and the political system. The difference is like that between communism as an ideology and Stalinism as actual practice: while the ideologically justified goal was the struggle against “class enemies,” in reality Stalinism manifested itself in mass denunciations and the repression of innocent people. Accordingly, if rashism denotes the ideology of expanding the “Russian world,” necro-imperialism describes, on the one hand, the authorities’ treatment of the population as a resource to be expended in pursuit of their goals, and, on the other, the people’s own willingness to accept such a role – evident in their readiness to die pointlessly on the front lines in Ukraine.

The ruling clique in Russia, made up largely of former security service operatives, is not bound to any particular ideology. Their attitude toward ideological constructs is purely instrumental: these constructs are used only insofar as they help maintain power. This cynicism was inherited from the Soviet security services. However, shifts in ideology according to political conditions do not alter the worldview underlying necro-imperialism.

Thus, rashism is an ideological conceptualisation of the fear of the world’s complexity and the drive to destroy everything that cannot be dominated, while necro-imperialism is the manifestation of this drive in social consciousness and the political system. 

Legal Definition of Rashism

On May 2, 2023, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution “On the use of the ideology of rashism by the political regime of the Russian Federation, and on the condemnation of the principles and practices of rashism as totalitarian and misanthropic” (No. 3078-IX).

In its statement, the Verkhovna Rada defines rashism as “a new variety of totalitarian ideology and practices that underlie the regime formed in the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin, based on the traditions of Russian chauvinism and imperialism, the practices of the Soviet communist regime, and National Socialism (Nazism); … the characteristic features and consequences of rashism are:

– systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

- cult of power and militarism;

– a cult of personality around the leader at the top of the power vertical, and the sacralisation of state institutions;

– the self-glorification of Russia and Russians through the violent suppression and/or denial of the existence of other peoples;

– the use of practices aimed at spreading the Russian language and culture, the Russian Orthodox Church, the media, political and civic institutions, and the promotion of the ideas of the “Russian world” among other peoples, in order to implement expansionist state policy;

– systematic violation of universally recognised principles and norms of international law, including respect for the sovereignty of other states, their territorial integrity and internationally recognised borders, and failure to observe the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force;

– the creation, financing, and armed support of unlawful armed groups and separatist movements on the territory of other sovereign states, and the creation and support of terrorist organisations;

the use of prohibited methods of warfare and the systematic commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity;

– the systematic organisation and perpetration of mass killings, executions, torture, deportations, the creation of artificial conditions leading to famine, other forms of mass physical terror, genocide, and persecution on ethnic, national, religious, political, or other grounds;

– the systematic use of economic and energy coercion against other states;

– regular threats to use nuclear weapons against other states and to cause technological (man-made) disasters.”

"Evil". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 22.05.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/dictionary-of-war/evil-an-evaluative-concept-or-a-reality-a-chasm-between-eyewitnesses-of-war-and-observers-from-afar/

An ordinary person perceives as evil anything that harms them or contradicts their ethical and religious beliefs. On this basis, researchers often conclude that evil is an evaluative concept and should therefore be excluded from the objective analysis of social processes. However, with the outbreak of the war, Ukrainians came to realise through their own experience that the question of evil is not abstract but existential: it is bound up with their right to life.

However, in conversations with their friends, relatives, and fellow believers in Russia, Ukrainians began to hear different responses: some said that no one can know the whole truth, and that calling the full-scale invasion of Ukraine evil is merely a subjective judgment; others claimed that both sides are to blame for the war and Russia cannot be blamed alone; still others openly described the aggression as good and the resistance of the Ukrainian people as evil. 

Anyone who directly witnesses the evil of war cannot agree with such interpretations of evil:

 – agnosticism – “We cannot know who is to blame for the war”;

 – subjectivism – “You consider the war against you evil – but that is your subjective judgment; we think otherwise”;

 – relativism – “It is impossible to clearly determine what constitutes evil, because in war everyone is to blame, both the aggressor and the victim of aggression.”

 – antihumanism – “We attacked you because you are evil that must be destroyed”.

For Ukrainians, it is of existential importance to have a definition of evil that does not depend on subjective judgments or ideological biases.

Evil

Evil in the broadest sense is that whose existence is unacceptable in light of values; it is that which exists despite everything thought not to be allowed to exist. However, this definition requires clarification, as it admits of two opposing interpretations that must be regarded as mistaken because they undermine the moral compass.

Misinterpretations of Evil

1. The Absolutisation of Evil

The first mistake is to ascribe evil to the very essence of humanity, life, the world, or any part of it. Such an understanding makes evil absolute and leads to a hostile perception of reality and the justification of misanthropic ideologies. History offers examples: The Bolsheviks ascribed evil to the social nature of “class enemies,” while the Nazis attributed it to the racial or biological nature of their victims. Russia’s current aggression against Ukraine is likewise justified by the notion that evil is allegedly inherent in the nature of Western civilisation – a civilisation Russia claims to oppose.

From the standpoint of theistic religions, such a position is utterly unacceptable, for to claim that evil is inherent in the very essence of something is to accuse God of creating evil. Although historical doctrines have attributed evil to the essence of God or to the material world, they have always proved destructive to traditional cultures. In contrast, in ancient thought, evil was understood as the absence or deficiency of good, while Christianity saw it as the denial of the fullness of life resulting from a mistaken exercise of free will.

2. Moral Relativism

The second mistake lies in reducing evil solely to a subjective judgment. In this case, a person labels as evil anything that seems bad to them in a particular situation. Yet what is bad for one may be good for another. For example, one man was rejected by a girl, while another became the one she chose. This gives rise to the idea that evil is merely a construct or an illusion, and thus even Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is deemed ‘ambiguous,’ depending on subjective perception. Ultimately, this leads to moral relativism, which ignores the difference between the aggressor and their victim.

The Unacceptability of Subjective Judgments in the Objective Analysis of Social Phenomena

Both stances, the absolutisation of evil and moral relativism, are actively used to manipulate public opinion. When addressing one audience, Russian propaganda relies on the notion of the West as absolute evil, an enemy Russia is allegedly ‘forced’ to fight on Ukrainian territory. For the other audience, arguments are framed in terms of moral relativism: everyone is to blame for the conflict – Russia, Ukraine, and the West – and therefore it is unfair to blame Russia alone.

The scientific approach to the analysis of social phenomena rules out ethical, religious, and subjective judgments. In this context, evil as an evaluative category should be set outside the scope of scientific analysis. Therefore, it is important to distinguish the concept of evil from the subjective judgment of ‘what is bad,’ since such judgments depend on views and circumstances and can even be reversed. Instead, the concept of evil should reflect objective reality and be independent of personal opinions and beliefs.

Evil as the Denial of the Right to Exist

The common core of views about evil across different cultural traditions is this: evil is a form of the absence or negation of life, a deficient reality that brings suffering. Thus, disease is the absence of health, and death is the negation of life. In the social dimension, evil manifests itself as the denial of other people’s right to exist. This is manifested in actions or attitudes that directly or indirectly deny the value of human life. Such social phenomena are objective and do not depend on subjective judgments.

However, not every harm caused by an action testifies to evil. An act is evil only when it is motivated or justified by the denial of another’s right to exist, and this is precisely the objective criterion of evil, independent of subjective opinion. This approach allows us to formulate the concept of evil at the interpersonal and social levels.

Russia’s Military Aggression Is Objectively Evil

Evil is embodied in actions that cause harm and suffering and express an attitude toward others that, to some degree, denies their existence.

The objectivity of evil does not mean that it possesses an essence of its own. Evil is a characteristic of attitude, not of essence. Yes, the nature of a criminal is not, in itself, evil. On the contrary, evil manifests itself when a person denies their humanity. By attributing evil to the very essence of humanity, we thereby justify denying people their right to exist, and in doing so, we reproduce evil ourselves.

The decision to attack Ukraine fits the definition of evil given above. Vladimir Putin stated that the purpose of the invasion is “denazification”. This term masks a policy aimed at destroying Ukrainian identity, as can be seen in the occupied territories. Thus, the war was launched on the premise of denying Ukrainians the right to exist. This is an objective fact, independent of subjective judgments.

The denial of reality can manifest not only in direct violence but also in disregard, when the victim ceases to be perceived as a living individual. This is evident in how many Russians sincerely believe the propaganda about Ukraine’s ‘salvation’ from the Nazis, even though they could have learned the truth from their Ukrainian friends, relatives, or fellow believers. In other words, they perceive even their loved ones in Ukraine not as living human beings, but as abstractions. Such disregard is another form of denying existence, not aggressive in form, but leading to the same consequences: support for war, mass violence, and killings. However, even if a person firmly believes they wish Ukrainians well, sincerely convinced that Russia is ‘liberating’ Ukraine, they nonetheless become an accomplice to evil. The subjective perception of one’s own act as good does not change the fact that, objectively, it is an embodiment of evil.

One of the most dangerous consequences of war is becoming accustomed to evil – its normalization. The seizure of territories, torture, and the killing of civilians cease to be regarded as utterly unacceptable. However, this “normalisation” is subjective: it does not negate the objective basis of understanding evil as an attitude toward people which denies their very existence. It was this attitude that was put into practice in the war against an entire nation.

Andrei Kuzichkin: Russian Propaganda vs. NATO. Who in the West Supports Putin?

Source: PostPravda.info 04.08.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/andrei-kuzichkin-russian-propaganda-vs-nato/

At a time when Soviet propaganda could mobilize millions of Europeans to protest against their own allies, and communist parties gained significant support despite a wave of violence and terror attacks—the effectiveness of disinformation was staggering. Today, in the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, history is disturbingly repeating itself. Pacifist slogans are once again becoming tools of Kremlin influence. Estonian publicist Andrei Kuzichkin warns: if we fail to recognize the threat in time, Russian narratives will once again poison European public debate. At PostPravda.Info, we are publishing an article by Andrei Kuzichkin, which originally appeared in Postimees.ee. In it, the author describes, among other things, the surprisingly high level of support for Putin in countries such as Italy, France, and Hungary.

Nikolai Karpitsky: Introduction

In the early 1980s, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was engaged not only in an arms race but also in a large-scale information war against the West. At that time, millions of Europeans took to the streets to protest the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles. In reality, they were demanding NATO’s disarmament—while the USSR had already unilaterally stationed hundreds of such missiles along its western borders. Simultaneously, leftist terrorist organizations inspired by Marxist ideology were active throughout Europe. They carried out bombings, kidnappings, and political assassinations, targeting NATO military facilities and representatives of big business. Despite this atmosphere of violence and danger, communist parties continued to enjoy considerable support among Europeans.

The average support for communist parties in Western Europe in the early 1980s was between 5% and 8%, but in individual countries their influence was much greater. In Greece, around 10% of voters supported the communists; in France, up to 17%; and in Italy—nearly 30%. These numbers reflect the enormous power of the Soviet propaganda machine. If even a tenth of its former influence survives today, it remains a serious force capable of shaping public opinion in Europe.

Today, Europe faces a new challenge—Russia’s war against Ukraine. Against this backdrop, the deeply rooted pacifist trend in European society, shaped after the fall of the USSR, takes on particular significance. War fatigue and the desire for peace at any cost are becoming fertile ground for the spread of Kremlin narratives. This is precisely the issue highlighted by Estonian publicist Andrei Kuzichkin.

Andrei Kuzichkin and Nikolai Karpitsky

Andrei Kuzichkin: Is Europe Capable of Responding to the Russian Threat?

Optimists allow for the possibility that Russia’s war against Ukraine might end this year. Pessimists believe it could last for decades. But the most important thing is that no one can truly imagine how the world will change after this war, what future awaits Ukraine, or what fate will befall Russia.

And although we, the people of Europe, overwhelmingly wish for Ukraine’s victory—and are making significant efforts in the form of military and humanitarian aid—I believe Putin still has the means to shift the situation in his favor and force not only Ukraine, but also Europe, into capitulation. Here are my arguments.

In June 2025, the American research center Pew Research Center published the results of a global survey conducted in 25 countries on attitudes toward Vladimir Putin and Russia. It turned out that Putin remains the most unpopular leader in the world, receiving negative ratings of 90–95% in countries such as Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, and Spain.

However, in a country like Hungary, the level of trust in Putin has not decreased over the past year—in fact, it has risen, from 23% to 32%, largely due to the favorable stance of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán toward the Kremlin leader. Furthermore, Europe is experiencing rapid polarization of public opinion along party lines. For example, in Germany, 47% of voters for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party have a positive view of Putin.

A similar situation can be observed in Italy among supporters of the “Northern League” and “Brothers of Italy” parties. Yet far more troubling is the persistently high level of sympathy for Russia among people in various European countries. It is clear that countering Russian aggression should not be based on the image of the current leader—who may be gone tomorrow—but rather on an understanding of the long-term threat posed by the inherently aggressive nature of the Russian state. And in this regard, Europe is in a dire state.

Countries in Northern Europe and Poland have a clearly negative view of Russia, with support for Russia not exceeding 6%. But in France, nearly 20% of respondents say they have a favorable opinion of Russia. In Italy and Hungary, every third person expresses a positive attitude toward Russia, and in Greece, the share of Russia sympathizers reaches nearly 40%. Recent polls in Slovakia showed that one in three citizens there would not oppose an alliance with Russia. Meanwhile, Hungarian diplomats in Europe reportedly share at informal meetings that young people in their country are enthusiastically learning Russian, because “the future belongs to Russia.”

It is precisely this contradictory attitude toward Russia that the Putin regime exploits to weaken Europe’s position on military support for Ukraine. The toxic influence of the Russkiy mir (“Russian world”) has clearly grown in Europe over the years of war.

Europe Is Willing to Send Weapons, but Not to Fight

According to Eurobarometer data, 70% of Europeans support financial and humanitarian aid for Ukraine, and 60% are in favor of supplying military equipment. The strongest support for arms deliveries comes from Northern Europe—over 90%.

However, year by year, support for military aid to Ukraine is declining. In France, Germany, Poland, and Luxembourg, support has dropped by 10–15% over the past three years. In many European countries, less than half the population now supports continued military deliveries to Ukraine. These numbers correlate with the share of people who believe Ukraine will win the war: over 60% in Northern Europe, Poland, and the Baltic states—but less than 50% in other countries.

At the same time, Europeans are united in their unwillingness to send their own national troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping contingent. Europe is simply not ready to go to war with Russia—neither in Ukraine nor on its own soil. Opposition to sending ground troops to Ukraine ranges from 67% in Sweden and Denmark to 90% in Hungary.

According to data from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) from June 2025, 60% of Europeans say they are ready to defend their own country in the event of a military threat. However, fewer than 30% are willing to fight abroad or help neighboring countries. The leaders in readiness to defend their homeland are Lithuania, Estonia, and Hungary (over 70%). In contrast, only 14% of Slovak citizens say they would defend their own country.

A deeply alarming fact is that in the six largest NATO countries in Europe (the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Poland), less than 50% of residents support the use of military force to defend allies against Russia. This means Europe is not prepared to mobilize its population in the event of a military confrontation with Russia. And that, too, is one of the sources of strength for the Putin regime.

From a military-technical perspective, NATO is far stronger than Russia. But today, Ukraine is suffering defeats on the front lines mainly due to a lack of manpower: the country’s mobilization resources are depleted. And it is people—with the support of equipment—who must storm enemy positions and launch counteroffensives. Not the other way around.

In this regard, Russia holds a clear advantage—practically unlimited human resources, enabled by a relatively effective system of commercial military contracts. This system alone brought around 200,000 soldiers into the war against Ukraine last year (a figure confirmed by Western experts). Studies show that Europe possesses such a resource to a much lesser extent.

Is Europe a Victim of Its Own Naivety?

The set of problems that undermines the effectiveness of Europe’s defense policy and increases its vulnerability to Russian aggression is also connected to Europeans’ poor understanding of life in Russia. Russia’s complete information isolation limits the availability of credible sources on what everyday life in modern Russian society is really like.

Moreover, the Russian diaspora abroad often promotes wishful thinking as fact, spreading false narratives in the Western world about the situation in Russia. For example, the Russian opposition enthusiastically talks about the imminent collapse of the Russian Federation due to the secession of its national republics. In reality, however, these national republics are currently a key source of legitimacy for Putin’s regime—their elites are fully integrated into the Kremlin’s power system, support for Putin in regions with large non-Russian populations exceeds 80%, and ethnic organizations actively support the war in Ukraine.

Another illusion is tied to the myths about the inevitable collapse of Russia’s economy due to Western sanctions and the depletion of the Kremlin’s resources to continue the war. European sanctions have indeed limited Putin’s ability to finance the war. However, the limited scope of these sanctions and their gradual, drawn-out implementation have given Russian economic and financial institutions time to adapt.

That’s why, after the 18th sanctions package was introduced, a popular joke in Russia emerged: that the 118th EU sanctions package will target the use of Russian bees as drones. It’s also an illusion to believe that the collapse of the Russian economy will lead to mass protests and that hungry Russians will take to the streets to overthrow Putin’s regime. Today, the quality of life in Russia has remained virtually unchanged compared to the pre-war period.

Domestic production and trade relations with nearly all countries in the world—including with Europe—enable Russian markets to be filled with a wide range of goods and food. Yes, systemic problems have already surfaced in many sectors of the economy. However, they are still far from reaching the scale of a national catastrophe.

The Central Bank of Russia’s strict monetary policy, combined with the financial “safety cushion” of the National Wealth Fund—amounting to 130 billion euros—will allow the Russian economy to stay afloat for a long time to come.

Some analysts are betting on war fatigue among the Russian population and mass impoverishment. However, the wealth of Putin’s oligarchs has grown during the war, and millions of Russians are benefitting from it—they won’t tire of receiving money for working in the defense industry, for military contracts, or for fallen relatives. And they won’t be ashamed of this “blood money,” because Russian mentality contains many psychological codes that make people more resistant to such losses. For example, there’s a common saying: “Shame isn’t smoke—it won’t burn your eyes.”

That’s why I watched with regret as Russian opposition activists tried to appeal to the conscience of young people working in Tatarstan at the “Alabuga” plant, which produces “Geran-2” drones based on Iranian technology. A report on this topic appeared on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda. Some commentators asked: “Do these young people really not understand that they’re building tools of death that destroy Ukrainian cities? Are they actually proud of this?!”

Unfortunately, yes. They were, are, and will be proud of it—like any engineer, specialist, or weapons manufacturer; like the creators of arms who, in every era and every country, enjoy the highest social status. This isn’t a pathology—it’s a particular psychological model based on detachment from the consequences of one’s work: it’s not the gun that kills, but the person who pulls the trigger.

If that weren’t the case, then the makers of Damascus steel sabers or AK-47 rifles should have been consumed with shame over the millions of victims of their work. Instead, they became national heroes, forging weapons in defense of their homeland. The Putin regime mercilessly exploits the “defender of the motherland” archetype and the “besieged fortress” mindset, effectively transforming Russian citizens into a nation of war.

That’s why emotional appeals to the shame and conscience of defense industry workers in Russia, Iran, or North Korea are useless. Only preparing Europe for the inevitable armed conflict with Russia will help.

This, perhaps, is the greatest illusion held by many European politicians—and by Donald Trump—that the war in Ukraine can be ended through negotiations or a “deal.” Born and raised in the USSR, involved in politics, having worked as a government official in post-perestroika Russia, and having looked Putin in the eye many times during meetings, I say this with full responsibility: it cannot be done.

I fully understand the Western elite’s reluctance to engage in open military confrontation with Putin—especially in the absence of social consensus in their own countries and given the risks of catastrophic consequences from a large-scale war on the European continent. It is, of course, possible to keep living with eyes tightly shut.

But when you finally open them, the Russian flag may already be flying over the Acropolis in Athens and the Reichstag in Berlin. The Eiffel Tower might be torn down as a symbol of LGBT values, Russian tanks could be stationed at Verdun, the Speaker of the British Parliament might be addressing the chamber in Russian, and victory parades of the East over the West may be held regularly in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

"Necro-imperialism". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 10.04.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/top-news/necro-imperialism-the-core-of-modern-russia-dictionary-of-war/

The tragedy in Kryvyi Rih prompted the editorial team of PostPravda.info to choose the term “necro-imperialism” as the subject of the next article in the Dictionary of War by Prof. Nikolai Karpitsky. On April 4, 2025, a missile strike on Kryvyi Rih took the lives of 18 people, half of whom were children. More than seventy people were injured. This attack on civilians had no military purpose. Russia continues, day after day, to kill people in Ukraine. However, when it does so in such a demonstrative and senseless way, an understanding emerges: the main motivation is necrophilia.

An ordinary person wants to live, and therefore seeks to see the world as a place where one can simply live. A Western citizen wants to believe that Russia’s war against Ukraine, though criminal, is still rationally explainable. That gives hope for a peaceful future. The concept of “necro-imperialism,” which reflects the essence of contemporary Russia, destroys that hope, and therefore cannot become popular. A Russian citizen also wants to live and thus seeks to adapt to power. However, their desire to live is in conflict with the necrophilia of that power. They are faced with a choice: to live among necrophiles, as if in hell, or to become one themselves.

Necro-imperialism

Necro-imperialism is a form of imperialism characteristic of contemporary Russia, which emerged as a result of a mutation of imperial consciousness. In the necro-imperial view, death is seen as a universal way of solving all problems, especially the problem of consolidating power. Protecting and ensuring a normal life for citizens is not treated as a task of state power at all, and all people who are not dependent on it are seen as a potential threat. Therefore, killing and destruction become sufficient goals for waging war.

At the root of necro-imperialism lies the fear of the complexity of the world and the belief that evil is embedded in the nature of modern Western civilization, based on freedom, law, and democracy. In relation to the enemy, all moral boundaries disappear—every crime is justified. Evil toward the enemy is treated as good, and good as evil. In mass consciousness, necro-imperialism gives rise to social necrophilia—a suppression of empathy, a denial of others’ right to exist, and a perception of death as a way to simplify the world.

Social Necrophilia

Social necrophilia is the spread in society of an attitude that excludes empathy and compassion, where other people are seen either as objects or as hostile forces with no right to exist. The suppression of empathy on a social level takes place through seeing the surrounding world as alien and hostile. This perception can be spontaneous or result from systematic propaganda that claims all problems come from an external enemy, inherently evil in nature.

The spread of social necrophilia is encouraged by the fear of the world’s complexity, which intensifies along with the degradation of personality and a shift to a primitive perception of reality. When this process affects masses of people, leading to personal and social degradation, the term “lumpenization” can be used. This doesn’t refer only to the lumpenproletariat, but to lumpens in all social strata—lumpen-intellectuals, lumpen-Orthodox, etc. Lumpenization facilitated the rapid spread of necrophilic sentiment in Russian society and the mutation of imperial consciousness. The war hysteria that began with the invasion of Ukraine intensified the necrophilic mood but was not its original cause.

The First Mutation of Imperial Consciousness

Archaic Russian imperialism was not a unique phenomenon—other empires also existed. In the 16th century, it was ideologically shaped as the concept of “Moscow—the Third Rome,” according to which Russia’s mission was the “gathering of lands,” as if the independent existence of nations on those lands had no value outside of Russia. In the 20th century, archaic empires either collapsed or transformed.

In the 20th century, totalitarian ideologies appeared based on a Manichean understanding of evil, according to which evil is attributed to the very essence of the enemy or the enemy side of the world. Under their influence, imperial consciousness underwent a mutation, leading to the emergence of totalitarian imperialism in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The Bolsheviks believed that evil lies in the social nature of humans, which meant the world was doomed to class struggle. To cleanse the world of evil, a world revolution was needed. The Nazis, in turn, believed that evil lies in the biological nature of “imperfect” people and justified war for world domination with the need to eliminate them.

The perception of the surrounding world as evil transforms archaic imperialism into totalitarian imperialism, in which power no longer serves the welfare of the empire but rather the continued expansion and strengthening of itself, which, in light of totalitarian ideology, is justified by the need to cleanse the hostile world of evil.

The Second Mutation – The Birth of Necro-Imperialism

The second mutation of imperial consciousness transformed totalitarian imperialism into necrophilic imperialism, or necro-imperialism. Whereas communists set for themselves the illusory goal of fighting the surrounding world, for necro-imperialists the fight itself became the goal.

This mutation culminated with the rise to power of Putin and the security services, though its roots go back to the practices of the Cheka and NKVD, where the killing of innocents was treated as a way to “simplify” society.

In modern Russia, lumpenization is promoted—lumpens take the place of specialists, displacing professionals. A trend emerges of turning lumpens into a privileged social class. Lumpens fear the complexity of the world, so they readily accept the idea that the West is the embodiment of evil and that its destruction is good, because it simplifies the world. As a result, a necrophilic mood spreads in society, according to which destruction and death are seen as a desirable simplification of reality.

Russian necro-imperialists claim that the West imposed a false national identity on Ukraine, which allegedly led to Ukraine becoming part of global evil. In their logic, the destruction of Ukrainian identity is a fight against evil, and the atrocities committed by the Russian army in Ukraine are necessary and justified. The war on Ukrainian territory is understood as a war against the West, and after the destruction of Ukraine, NATO countries should be the next target.

Necro-imperialists are driven by irrational motivations that rationally thinking politicians in democratic countries do not understand. The mistaken conclusion that Russia would not go to war because it would not benefit from it led to European countries being unprepared for war. At the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, both in Ukraine and in the West, the mistaken belief prevailed that losses in the Russian army would convince the Russian leadership of the futility of war as a way to achieve its goals. This mistake cost Ukraine heavy losses in 2024. The decision to continue a war of attrition that cannot be won stems precisely from necro-imperial, not archaic imperial logic.

“Russia”. War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 18.02.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/top-news/war-dictionary-can-the-word-russia-be-used-as-the-name-of-a-country/

PostPravda.Info is launching a new project called War Dictionary. Its goal is to “correct” or clarify concepts that, for example, politicians often misunderstand. These misunderstandings lead to errors, which frequently result in the loss of lives, tragic consequences on the front lines, and in the future, may even cause a global war. “One such mistake is related to the misunderstanding of Russia’s nature and the reasons behind the ongoing war,” says the author of War Dictionary, Professor Nikolai Karpitsky, a Russian opposition figure who has been in hiding in Ukraine since 2015.

As the Russian philosopher explains, today Russia is waging war against Ukraine while simultaneously claiming that it is actually opposing the “collective West.” Meanwhile, many Western politicians believe that this war is simply a misunderstanding and that peace can be easily negotiated.

So, let’s consider what the word “Russia” really means. Can it be used as the name of a country, just as we call France, Poland, or Ukraine? Or does it refer to any territory that the Kremlin has brought under its control? Perhaps it is an empty term and a product of political ideology? “This term is crucial to understanding the war, which is why it has been addressed first,” explains Professor Nikolai Karpitsky.

Russia

The word “Russia” has two meanings. It is both the name of a modern or previous state entity in northern Eurasia and an ideological construct that replaces the concept of a country. A country is part of the world and is distinguished based on the common historical or cultural destiny of the peoples who consider it their homeland or ancestral home. For this reason, different state formations emerging on the territory of a country share the same name and are viewed as a single nation.

The Modern Russian State – The Russian Federation

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia became the name of the largest Soviet republic to gain independence. However, imperial sentiments quickly triumphed in the collective consciousness, and the collapse of the USSR came to be understood not as a liberation from the Soviet Empire but as a tragedy related to the loss of lands belonging to Russia. This was aided by the fact that the Russian government officially declared itself the successor to the Soviet Union. This sentiment became a precondition for justifying the seizure of neighboring countries’ territories, which, in the collective consciousness, is seen as a just war for the return of lost lands.

Today, Russia has lost the key features of a state. Notably, the unity of the legal sphere has been practically destroyed, with arbitrary power replacing law. Regional elections have been canceled, and the central government has lost legitimacy following the re-election of the president in violation of the Constitution. Not only is there an absence of a legal system, but there is also a lack of such an important state characteristic as universally recognized borders. The Russian government effectively nullified them when it announced the annexation of several Ukrainian territories, including those it does not control.

Country of Russia

In the collective consciousness, Russia is a vague and broad concept that can encompass various territories, which do not share a common historical or cultural destiny, such as Dagestan and Chukotka. This understanding of Russia differs from that of any other country, which is typically defined as a territory based on the people who have lived there for a significant period, according to historical standards.

In such cases, a territory is understood as a country with the same name as its nation or a union of nations with a shared historical destiny—Italy, Germany, Poland, Iran, China, India… Various states with different names may historically arise on the territory of a country, but all will be associated with that country. Sometimes, a country can stand out as the historical territory of a nation that later united other nations into a broader state, as in the case of England, which is part of the United Kingdom.

However, it is impossible to historically identify such a primary territory associated with the Russian nation that could be called a country named “Russia.” In Russian social consciousness, there is a complete absence of the idea of a primary territory of the nation, distinct from other territories acquired throughout history. Furthermore, the territory of the medieval Tsardom of Moscow, which could formally be associated with the original homeland of Russians, does not have a distinct name.

In Ukraine, this territory might be referred to as “Moscovia,” but such a concept does not exist in Russian collective consciousness. The other lands and peoples currently united under the Russian state are not bound by any common cultural or historical destiny.

Kyivan Rus cannot be the historical homeland of modern Russia, as its successor is an entirely different country—Ukraine. The Tsardom of Moscow arose through the subjugation of neighboring peoples and the genocide of the population of Novgorod, which differed from the Muscovites in language, social organization, and self-identity. Therefore, the lands of Pskov-Novgorod are mistakenly associated with the historical original homeland of Russia.

As a result, it is unclear where to draw the boundary of this ancestral homeland. The average Russian does not know where the border begins between the lands of other nations that were conquered; for example, they are convinced that the Volga River is inherently Russian. Thus, the concept of Russia as a country remains undefined and is therefore replaced in the collective consciousness by an ideological construct.

Russia as an Ideological Construct

This concept stems from the principle of defining a country not by its culture or the people inhabiting it, but by power. In Russian mass consciousness, Russia is associated not with a specific country but with an ideological construct—specifically, any territory that is or was controlled by the central government.

The boundaries of this image of Russia are not clearly defined and depend on the perspective of the bearer of mass consciousness: Russia, in its current state, includes the entire territory of the Russian Federation and the occupied regions of Ukraine; from the perspective of the recent past, it includes all the countries that were part of the USSR; from the distant past, it even includes Poland, Finland, and Alaska. As a result, Russia is equated with the Soviet Union, Peter the Great’s Russian Empire, the Tsardom of Moscow, and Kyivan Rus, which contradicts historical scholarship.

Russia and Russian Nationalism

Based on this ideological construct, a specific form of nationalism has developed in the mass consciousness of Russians. Since Russia is considered any land controlled by the authorities, it is expected that the authorities will transform these lands to make them suitable for Russian-speaking people, meaning they will provide conditions for everyone to understand the Russian language. This nationalism can take a radical form, in which other languages are seen as relics of the past that can be tolerated, except for Belarusian and Ukrainian, which are considered false or harmful languages because their existence challenges the unity of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians as one nation. This form of nationalism is reinforced by the false notion that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are one nation, or at least descended from one nation.

Thus, the modern understanding of Russia has been shaped not by cultural and historical experiences but by ideology and correlates not with a country but with territory controlled—or once controlled—by the central government. This serves as justification for new wars of conquest, including Russia’s current war against Ukraine. It means that the very concept of Russia encompasses ideological attitudes that are destructive and push toward further wars. Awareness of this has led to Russia being frequently referred to as “Mordor” in everyday communication in Ukraine, a term borrowed from Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.

The Siberian philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky gave a talk on “The War and the Crisis of Religious Identity”

The Siberian philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky, who today lives on the edge of the war in Sloviansk (Donetsk Oblast), gave a talk on “The War and the Crisis of Religious Identity”, stating that the problem of religious dissent arises when “canonical rules only exacerbate, rather than resolve, internal contradictions. [. . .] In times of peace, these contradictions can remain hidden, but war highlights them.”

In his opinion, the mechanism by which religion is transformed into ideology is activated when “the tension to convey one's own moral position in society is embodied not in religious preaching, but in demands on everyone, even those with different beliefs.” In this case, the appeal is made to the “ideology of fundamental values” in an “imitation of religion” that transforms faith into a “parody in favour of power”.

This is in fact the parable of the “religious revival” of post-Soviet Russia, where religion has been bent to serve ideology, achieving an even more oppressive result than the propaganda of state atheism itself.

Karpitsky defines the compulsory orthodoxy of today's Russians as obryadoveriye (обрядоверие), uncritical "ritualism" that submits to religious authorities and observes their formal practices, which “adapt to socio-political conditions, ending up serving only the ruling political power.”

After all, this is how Orthodoxy interpreted things even in Soviet times, against which the religious dissent of Father Gleb Yakunin and many others developed, people like Father Aleksandr Men, killed in 1990 by the dark forces of a regime that was changing its skin, so as not to lose its power.

The ideology of values ends up projecting itself as an imperial and universal vision, addressed to the will of the Most High as the source of every principle of world order, justifying dictatorship and war against the “enemies of the true faith”.

Read the full article here: Religious dissidents in Orthodox Russia. by Stefano Caprio // Fondazione PIME Onlus – AsiaNews 03/15/2025

Nikolai Karpitsky. Can Russia be civilized? ‘An entire generation is responsible for the terror in Ukraine’

Source: PostPravda.info 20.01.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/can-russia-be-civilized-an-entire-generation-is-responsible-for-the-terror-in-ukraine-opinion/

Russia Threatens Europe Again, Just as the Soviet Union Once Did. Fear of this threat prompts two opposing reactions. The first is an attempt to convince oneself that there is no danger. In this case, the West must justify Russia’s actions, as pro-Russian politicians do. The second option is to find a true explanation for Kremlin policy. However, this requires accepting a dark reality, as analyzed in PostPravda.Info by Prof. Nikolai Karpitsky, a Russian opposition figure who fled Siberia in 2015 and settled in eastern Ukraine.

After the publication of the article “War as an End in Itself: Why Russia Won’t Run Out of Volunteers to Die in Ukraine?”, I received a question from Mr. Michał Talma-Sutt of Berlin, asking whether feudalism, deeply rooted in Russian history, is the best explanation for the “Russian fatalism” I had written about. This framing of the question reflects the perception of those in Europe who see a real threat from Russia. I am grateful to Mr. Michał for the opportunity to give a detailed answer, not just to him but to all representatives of European culture trying to understand Russia.

Is Russia’s Unresolved Feudalism a Relic of the Past?

Mr. Michał proposes explaining the dehumanization and aggressiveness of the Russian regime as manifestations of ancient feudalism. According to him, this reference does not fully explain the brutality of the current regime in Moscow, but it can partly describe its structure. Every political leader – whether a warlord or a feudal lord – irrevocably and unquestionably decides the fate of the people. He chooses who should live and who should die.

In Mr. Michał’s view, this unresolved feudalism, deeply embedded in Russia’s history, has led to the current power hierarchy in the country, with the main feudal lord – Putin – at the top, the master and ruler of life and death for those under him. The relationship between the lowest and highest levels of this pyramid is based on bribery – the modern equivalent of feudal tribute. This system, Mr. Michał writes in his letter, is quite terrifying.

Such an interpretation of the current Russian system indeed looks terrifying to a modern Western person, but from my point of view, it is overly optimistic. After all, by speaking of feudalism, Mr. Michał was referring to an archaic phenomenon. If this is the case, then Russia is moving against the tide of history, which means that time is on our side and works against Russia. But if it turns out that Russia’s current regime is not a relic of the past but a new historical phenomenon, then there is no hope that history is on our side.

Of course, Mr. Michał was referring to feudalism not in the strict historical sense but in a broader sense, as a manifestation of archaic relations based on non-economic coercion towards people of lower social status. The dictatorship in Russia is based on such relations, but it must be emphasized that these are characteristic of the entire post-Soviet space.

Although Ukraine is a democratic country, such archaic relations are also characteristic of Ukrainian bureaucracy and even academic circles. I was surprised to learn that in Ukraine, it is considered inappropriate if a scholar defending their doctoral dissertation does not pay a substantial sum of money to their academic supervisors. My Ukrainian colleagues did not see this as a bribe but as a completely justified tribute that a person must pay to move up the social ladder.

Since this is indeed a manifestation of archaic behavior, there is hope that the situation will change in the future. However, I believe that, unfortunately, the dictatorship in Russia is not a relic of the past but a modern phenomenon, although built on archaic relations.

Is There Social and Spiritual Progress in History?

Let’s imagine that we are not talking about states, but about small human communities. Take, for example, a gang of criminals willing to kill for money and, on the other hand, a group of volunteers who selflessly help people in need. They both seem to be representatives of the same species, homo sapiens, yet they are so diametrically opposed in every way, it’s as if they belong to different classes.

If we assume that the gang of criminals is archaic, a relic of the past, then there is hope that it will gradually disappear. But how would that happen? Would criminal organizations transform into charitable or volunteer organizations? We have to admit, that sounds absurd. Therefore, we might assume that criminal gangs existed and will continue to exist—not because they are remnants of the past that we haven’t yet shaken off, but because specific individuals choose to become criminals.

Becoming a criminal or a volunteer is a matter of individual free will. Unfortunately, most people are unaware that they have free will, and thus they make decisions inertially, adapting to the circumstances and social structure around them. However, the more rigid and aggressive that structure is, the more a person loses their independence, becoming just a function of that structure. Regaining independence is possible only by renouncing attachment to one’s social status, which provides normal living conditions. Few people are capable of this.

Therefore, if a criminal social structure already exists, one should not expect to be able to convince anyone within it to engage in charitable activities.

This illustration helps us understand why brutal despotisms have, for centuries, coexisted alongside cultured and free states. This has been the case throughout history, both in feudal times and in the present. In medieval Europe, there were kings and independent cities that enjoyed Magdeburg rights. There were ruthless despotisms like the Tsardom of Moscow, but there were also republics with a high level of socio-cultural development, such as the Novgorod Republic.

Even today, alongside modern civilized democracies, barbaric dictatorships exist. Unlike the obvious progress in technology, we do not see progress in humanism. Cruelty and violence are reproduced in each new era. This happens because technical knowledge can be accumulated and passed on to future generations, but values are only reproduced through free self-determination, and each generation must choose them anew. This is why different people choose good or evil, and based on that choice, incompatible social systems arise: a gang of criminals and a volunteer organization, the dictatorship in Russia and Western democracy. This has always been the case in human history.

Archaic relations persist in our lives as remnants of the past, but they can also mutate into entirely new phenomena. Indeed, today’s Russia is genetically derived from the cruel, archaic despotism of the Tsardom of Moscow, which saw its mission in “gathering lands,” that is, building an empire through ruthless conquests.

In the modern world, there is no place for such archaic societies, so at the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian Empire was replaced by a totalitarian dictatorship. The communist ideology of seeking class enemies caused a mutation of Russian imperial consciousness into a new form based on totalitarian ideology. The secret services, which carried out this terror, were indifferent to specific types of ideology. They lived in a world where absolutely anyone could turn out to be an enemy or an informant, even a close friend.

In 2000, it was none other than these very same people who ultimately and once again seized power in Russia. This led to the second mutation of Russian imperial consciousness into a new form – necro-imperialism. Its signs are that human life loses its value, personal identity means nothing, and death and destruction are seen not only as means but also as ends in themselves.

Attitudes Towards Good and Evil

In the face of the diversity of historical concepts, the average person doesn’t know whom to trust, and so begins to see historical teachings as an abstraction. Therefore, I propose looking at this problem on a personal level, which allows us to discuss the relationship to good and evil in history. Every individual and every generation makes its own choice between good and evil. Parents can influence their children’s choices through their authority, but they cannot make the choice for them. Historical inertia influences generational choices, but each generation must make a new decision between good and evil. The past is merely the material from which people build their own lives.

A generation’s self-determination begins with the choices made by individuals. Sometimes this happens as early as childhood. It can happen, for example, that a good school is located next to a school where bullying has become the norm because two or three students imposed this practice on everyone else. The rest agreed to participate in order to maintain their place in the social hierarchy. This is a form of adaptation. In a more supportive school, they would behave in the opposite way. This is exactly what is happening across Russia now.

Everything starts with an individual’s self-definition, through which a person realizes who they are. From this, their orientation towards good or evil is revealed, contributing to the formation of a social model of relations. The nature of this model determines what kind of social structures will emerge based on it. This could be a criminal gang or a group of volunteers. Moreover, these communities involve indecisive individuals in their activities, creating social inertia that influences generational choices. Based on these choices, some countries follow the path of civilized development, while others fall into dictatorship.

At what point did the wrong choice of generation lead to dictatorship in Russia?

The pivotal moment when a generational choice led to dictatorship in Russia occurred during the late 1990s. Throughout Russian history, inertia toward dictatorship had consistently gained strength, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a brief opportunity to reverse this course. This could have happened if the generation of the 1990s had made the right choice. However, it required substantial effort, and that opportunity was ultimately lost.

In the autumn of 1999, Russian citizens were gripped by fear due to a series of terrorist bombings targeting residential buildings. People were dying in the night, before they had a chance to wake up. The terror subsided only after the Moscow branch of the FSB was caught in the act, attempting to plant explosives in an apartment building in Ryazan. Russian society struggled to process this information.

Of course, it’s terrifying to fall asleep knowing your home could be bombed by terrorists, but there’s some comfort in hoping that security services might protect you. Far more terrifying, however, is the possibility that the security services themselves could blow up your home—and that no one could protect you from them.

This fear led us, the Russian people, to place our trust in a representative of those security services—Vladimir Putin. A few months later, he was elected president. This generational choice was an act of betrayal, because those who voted for Putin betrayed the future of their children. It was this betrayal that catalyzed the second mutation of imperial consciousness and directly paved the way for the war with Ukraine. A generation that betrayed its own children will tolerate any crime to avoid the shame of waging a genocidal war against a neighboring nation.

The idea of historical progress, while offering hope for the future, can also lead to misguided political strategies. After all, if the current regime in Russia is seen as an archaic manifestation standing against the tide of history, wouldn’t it make sense to gradually civilize it by fostering cooperation with civilized nations?

This was the thinking of many European politicians before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It’s akin to trying to civilize a gang of criminals by inviting them to the theater or ballet. However, if we recognize that Russian necro-imperial despotism is a new historical phenomenon, one that can only be defeated through force, this realization might motivate the civilized world to unite and fight to dismantle the criminal social system in Russia.