Source: PostPravda.info 2024-09-23
The prospect of a future war with NATO is now an officially endorsed project by the Russian government. On December 16, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated that starting in 2024, his ministry is preparing for a potential war between Russia and NATO in Europe. Military spending accounts for nearly one-third of the federal budget. Such expenditures indicate that the country is indeed mobilizing for a prolonged war. While war is economically unviable, dictators think differently. For them, money equates to power. This power can be reinforced not just through wealth but also through military strength. This aligns with Vladimir Putin’s temperament, as he remarked just days after Belousov’s statement that life without war is boring. The Russian president acts as a subjective factor driving the world toward a potential World War III. But are there objective conditions for the outbreak of such a conflict?
Can Russia Really Avoid Waging War Elsewhere Due to its Engagement in Ukraine?
Optimists argue that Russia cannot attack anyone else because it is bogged down in Ukraine. Consequently, it has lost Syria for good. Indeed, without relying on Assad’s regime and with no logistics in place—especially as Turkey and Israel actively intervene—regaining control over Syria seems unlikely. If the optimists are correct, Russia might soon withdraw from Africa as well. However, if Russia manages to hold onto Libya and muster additional forces for military operations in Africa, the optimists would be proven wrong.
Here’s a historical precedent: late August to early September 1941. The Soviet Army faced an unprecedented defeat on the front lines. The Battle of Moscow loomed with questionable odds of holding the city. Could anyone have predicted that at this moment, the Soviet Union would find the strength to attack Iran and occupy its northern provinces? At one point, many also hoped that if Russia got bogged down in Syria, it would be incapable of fighting elsewhere. However, the war in Syria enabled Russia to construct a military machine designed for the war in Ukraine. The fact that Russia currently lacks sufficient resources for a new war should not be reassuring. Once a machine is built, fuel for it is bound to follow sooner or later. Although the Russian military is currently constrained by the war in Ukraine, its mobilization reserves still enable the possibility of expanding the conflict to other countries in the future.
In 2022, Russia deployed all its combat-ready military units to Ukraine, effectively disabling its ability to wage another war elsewhere. Furthermore, it lost a significant portion of its modern equipment in Ukraine and had to revert to old World War I-era tactics, relying on artillery barrages and infantry assaults. Based on this, optimists believe that the Russian military is exhausted and would need several years to recover before considering a war with NATO countries. I do not share this view.
Even during the war in Ukraine, the Russian army has repeatedly increased the number of combat-ready units, addressed missile shortages, and rebuilt its arsenal of modern tanks and other equipment. However, this reconstruction may hold little strategic importance, as such equipment would likely be destroyed within the first months of a war with NATO. The battles in Donbas demonstrate that the Russian army can launch infantry offensives even without the support of modern equipment.
The Military Machine’s Functionality
It is crucial to evaluate not just the strength of the military but also the functionality of its machinery—that is, what tasks it is designed to perform. A bulldozer is more powerful than a car but would lose in a race. The same applies to armies. The most powerful army, designed for offensive operations, can be helpless in defense, as evidenced by the Soviet Army’s collapse in the early months of its war with Nazi Germany. NATO armies are technologically superior to the Russian army, but they are structured for short, localized wars and are currently ill-suited for a prolonged continental war of attrition.
The Russian army of 2022 was also built for a blitzkrieg strategy. However, after the failure of its initial offensive, it was forced to retreat and reorganize. If Western nations had provided Ukraine with sufficient military support at that time, the war might have ended already. Instead, Russia used the breathing room to construct a new military machine, one capable of waging a large-scale, continental war of attrition.
This transformation marks a strategic pivot in Russia’s military doctrine, aligning it more closely with the demands of long-term, high-intensity conflict.
The Functioning of Russia’s Military Machinery
Western countries continue to operate in peacetime mode, where their militaries are just one of many elements within the broader structure of the state. In Russia, the situation is the opposite. The state itself has become a component of the military and intelligence apparatus. This means that during peacetime, the military is merely one of the state’s tools, but in wartime, the state transforms into a part of the military machine. All state and public institutions—media, courts, government and local administration bodies, social systems, and industries—are reoriented to support the fighting army, rendering them incapable of functioning normally in peacetime.
The operational mechanism of Russia’s military machine is determined by its method of resource distribution. Before 2022, the state acted as an adjunct or ballast to monopolies trading natural resources, with profits stored in Western countries. Due to sanctions, these revenues can no longer be stored in the West, so they are redirected to military production and the payment of contract soldiers. These funds then trickle into impoverished regions that previously suffered from underfunding. This creates a social support base for the war effort, as poverty drives people to enlist in contract service at such a rate that forced mobilization becomes unnecessary.
The deaths of contract soldiers evoke little sympathy, allowing the majority of the Russian population to simply ignore the war. This cycle sustains both the war effort and the state’s wartime economy. The reallocation of resources to military needs ensures continued social stability in poorer regions, while the indifference of the general population minimizes domestic resistance to the ongoing conflict.
This transformation underscores how deeply the Russian state has integrated into its military structure, operating as a single entity optimized for war. As a result, the distinction between peacetime governance and wartime mobilization has been effectively erased in Russia’s current political and economic system.
If the war were to end, Russia’s economy would need to transition to peacetime operations, and the flow of financial resources to impoverished regions would cease. A democratic country might invest in rebuilding industry and providing social protection for its population. However, a dictatorship, which has historically plundered its own nation, is unlikely to do so. Meanwhile, people in these regions have grown accustomed to their new income levels, and the sudden loss of this financial support could trigger widespread, spontaneous anger with unpredictable social consequences.
Additionally, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, morally degraded and socially detached after experiencing the war, would return from the frontlines. These individuals would demand privileges and channel their frustration and hatred toward others. This creates a volatile mix, making post-war stability difficult to achieve. As a result, if Russia withdraws from the war in Ukraine, it will face a stark choice: either descend into domestic instability or initiate a new conflict to divert attention and sustain the system.
The Likelihood of World War III
At present, the likelihood of a Third World War remains exceptionally low due to several factors. First, while the Russian army is making advances in Donbas, threatening the entire eastern front, the Russian leadership appears unwilling to divert its focus to other areas. Even when regions like Kursk faced attacks, no forces were redirected from Donbas to respond. This indicates that the Kremlin is unlikely to allocate resources for military operations against NATO countries in the near future.
The current priority for Russia is maintaining its momentum in Ukraine, as the leadership remains singularly focused on achieving its objectives there. This narrow focus, coupled with the resource limitations caused by the ongoing conflict, reduces the immediate risk of escalating the war to a global scale.
Several factors currently lower the probability of a Russian escalation toward a global conflict. First, Vladimir Putin is unlikely to take radical actions in a situation marked by uncertainty, especially as figures like Donald Trump intentionally amplify global unpredictability. Second, China has not yet decided on its strategic direction: while it continues to build military power and threatens Taiwan, it simultaneously seeks a technological breakthrough to overcome its economic challenges through peaceful development.
A world war is unlikely without strong allies. At present, only two nations—Russia and Iran—maintain imperial ambitions and seek to expand their influence through military force, making them natural allies. However, with Israel’s defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria, Iran’s imperial plans have faltered. This leaves Russia without significant allies in the event of a global conflict.
Should NATO Fear a Russian Invasion?
In the near term, it is unlikely that Russia poses a direct threat to NATO member states. However, the future is unpredictable, and the situation could shift if NATO countries fail to prepare for a potential conflict. If Russia were to free up hundreds of thousands of soldiers following a truce in Ukraine, it might attempt to challenge NATO. This warrants a deeper examination of a hypothetical Russia-NATO war scenario, using insights from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
On November 1, 2023, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s leading military strategist, published an essay in The Economist highlighting key takeaways from the war in Ukraine. He emphasized that Russia has drawn Ukraine into a positional war, where it holds an advantage. To reverse the tide, Ukraine must transition to maneuver warfare, requiring superiority in five priority areas. These insights are also relevant for other nations that might face Russian aggression.
The first priority is air power—control of the skies is essential for large-scale ground operations. In this domain, Russia outmatches Ukraine but would face significant disadvantages against NATO countries, which possess overwhelming air superiority. Some tasks traditionally performed by manned aircraft are now carried out by drones, an area both Ukraine and Russia are actively developing. However, Russia’s larger production capabilities give it an edge in drone warfare.
NATO’s technological and logistical advantages would likely outweigh Russia’s strengths in the event of a direct conflict. However, Russia’s ability to adapt, leverage asymmetric tactics, and sustain prolonged engagements cannot be underestimated. Ensuring readiness in air power, technology, and strategy remains critical for NATO to maintain its deterrence posture.
The second priority is electronic warfare (EW) aimed at jamming enemy communication and navigation signals. Over the past decade, Russia has modernized its EW forces, creating a new branch of the military and developing 60 new types of equipment, while Ukraine has only just begun to build this capability. In this area, Russia again holds an advantage but may lose it, as NATO countries’ information technologies are significantly more advanced. In the future, NATO countries could gain an edge in this critical area, especially considering advancements in artificial intelligence technologies.
The third priority is counter-battery fire, neutralizing the enemy’s artillery. Here, Russia holds an advantage not only over Ukraine but also over NATO countries. While NATO produces higher-quality munitions, it does not produce them in sufficient quantities. Kamikaze drones, which are actively used by both Ukraine and Russia, have partially taken over traditional artillery tasks.
The fourth priority highlighted by Valerii Zaluzhnyi is mine-clearing technology to enable effective offensives. However, after Ukraine’s transition to a defensive posture, it became apparent that its capacity to lay minefields to halt enemy infantry was extremely limited. In this priority area, not only Ukraine but also other European nations have been entirely unprepared, having signed the convention banning the use of anti-personnel mines and destroyed their stockpiles. How do they plan to stop Russian infantry attacks? Fortunately, the United States has not joined this convention, but will a decision to supply mines to Europe be made in time, despite legal and bureaucratic challenges?
The fifth priority is building reserves. Russia has developed a mechanism to replenish its army without forced mobilization and is gradually increasing the number of combat-ready units. While these forces are sufficient to breach Ukrainian defenses at various points along the front, they are insufficient to capitalize on breakthroughs, resulting in a slow offensive. According to military leadership estimates, confirmed by Valerii Zaluzhnyi at the end of 2023, Ukraine would need to mobilize 450,000–500,000 reservists to meet the army’s needs for 2024. However, mobilization was carried out late and faced significant challenges, so the number of recruits who joined the Ukrainian army fell far short of this goal. As a result, throughout 2024, the balance of power on the battlefield has been slowly shifting in Russia’s favor.
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that, on October 18, 2022, Ukraine passed Law No. 8109, which suspended conscription during the period of martial law. This means that in this critical area, Russia has an absolute advantage over Ukraine, and, in my opinion, it would hold a similar advantage over NATO countries in the event of a military confrontation.
In summary, by 2024, Ukraine lacked an advantage in any of the priority areas outlined by Valerii Zaluzhnyi, explaining the success of the Russian army. However, Zaluzhnyi did not consider another critical factor—the quality of military command. After his removal, a management crisis emerged within the Ukrainian armed forces, which has yet to be resolved, leading to tragic situations on the frontlines.
In the event of a war between Russia and NATO countries, Russia would hold an advantage in at least three of the priority areas. However, NATO countries would have an absolute advantage in the first priority area—air superiority—which extends beyond air power to include precision-guided missiles. This advantage could be decisive, allowing NATO to deliver a devastating, disarming first strike that might lead to victory.
But what if, after this initial strike, NATO opts for a ceasefire and begins negotiations with Russia to return to the pre-war status quo? In that scenario, Russia would recover from the blow and drag NATO into a positional war, where it would have an absolute advantage in three priority areas. If the conflict becomes prolonged, advanced technological weaponry would eventually be depleted, and the outcome would hinge on massed soldiers on the battlefield, much like the current situation on Ukraine’s fronts.
Russia could have been stopped in Ukraine both in 2022 and 2023, but there was no political will among Western nations to achieve this. If the war expands to NATO countries, they would have the capability to defeat Russia, but this would require the political resolve that has so far been lacking.
As for Putin, even he does not yet know what he will do. He is not currently ready for a war with NATO but is actively preparing for one and closely watching the actions of Western leaders. If they demonstrate a clear focus on victory rather than a temporary truce, he will likely refrain from attacking NATO countries—just as he might have refrained from attacking Ukraine had he seen a strong and decisive move from the West toward its defense.
