Andrei Kuzichkin: Russian Propaganda vs. NATO. Who in the West Supports Putin?

Source: PostPravda.info 04.08.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/andrei-kuzichkin-russian-propaganda-vs-nato/

At a time when Soviet propaganda could mobilize millions of Europeans to protest against their own allies, and communist parties gained significant support despite a wave of violence and terror attacks—the effectiveness of disinformation was staggering. Today, in the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, history is disturbingly repeating itself. Pacifist slogans are once again becoming tools of Kremlin influence. Estonian publicist Andrei Kuzichkin warns: if we fail to recognize the threat in time, Russian narratives will once again poison European public debate. At PostPravda.Info, we are publishing an article by Andrei Kuzichkin, which originally appeared in Postimees.ee. In it, the author describes, among other things, the surprisingly high level of support for Putin in countries such as Italy, France, and Hungary.

Nikolai Karpitsky: Introduction

In the early 1980s, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was engaged not only in an arms race but also in a large-scale information war against the West. At that time, millions of Europeans took to the streets to protest the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles. In reality, they were demanding NATO’s disarmament—while the USSR had already unilaterally stationed hundreds of such missiles along its western borders. Simultaneously, leftist terrorist organizations inspired by Marxist ideology were active throughout Europe. They carried out bombings, kidnappings, and political assassinations, targeting NATO military facilities and representatives of big business. Despite this atmosphere of violence and danger, communist parties continued to enjoy considerable support among Europeans.

The average support for communist parties in Western Europe in the early 1980s was between 5% and 8%, but in individual countries their influence was much greater. In Greece, around 10% of voters supported the communists; in France, up to 17%; and in Italy—nearly 30%. These numbers reflect the enormous power of the Soviet propaganda machine. If even a tenth of its former influence survives today, it remains a serious force capable of shaping public opinion in Europe.

Today, Europe faces a new challenge—Russia’s war against Ukraine. Against this backdrop, the deeply rooted pacifist trend in European society, shaped after the fall of the USSR, takes on particular significance. War fatigue and the desire for peace at any cost are becoming fertile ground for the spread of Kremlin narratives. This is precisely the issue highlighted by Estonian publicist Andrei Kuzichkin.

Andrei Kuzichkin and Nikolai Karpitsky

Andrei Kuzichkin: Is Europe Capable of Responding to the Russian Threat?

Optimists allow for the possibility that Russia’s war against Ukraine might end this year. Pessimists believe it could last for decades. But the most important thing is that no one can truly imagine how the world will change after this war, what future awaits Ukraine, or what fate will befall Russia.

And although we, the people of Europe, overwhelmingly wish for Ukraine’s victory—and are making significant efforts in the form of military and humanitarian aid—I believe Putin still has the means to shift the situation in his favor and force not only Ukraine, but also Europe, into capitulation. Here are my arguments.

In June 2025, the American research center Pew Research Center published the results of a global survey conducted in 25 countries on attitudes toward Vladimir Putin and Russia. It turned out that Putin remains the most unpopular leader in the world, receiving negative ratings of 90–95% in countries such as Sweden, Poland, the Netherlands, and Spain.

However, in a country like Hungary, the level of trust in Putin has not decreased over the past year—in fact, it has risen, from 23% to 32%, largely due to the favorable stance of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán toward the Kremlin leader. Furthermore, Europe is experiencing rapid polarization of public opinion along party lines. For example, in Germany, 47% of voters for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party have a positive view of Putin.

A similar situation can be observed in Italy among supporters of the “Northern League” and “Brothers of Italy” parties. Yet far more troubling is the persistently high level of sympathy for Russia among people in various European countries. It is clear that countering Russian aggression should not be based on the image of the current leader—who may be gone tomorrow—but rather on an understanding of the long-term threat posed by the inherently aggressive nature of the Russian state. And in this regard, Europe is in a dire state.

Countries in Northern Europe and Poland have a clearly negative view of Russia, with support for Russia not exceeding 6%. But in France, nearly 20% of respondents say they have a favorable opinion of Russia. In Italy and Hungary, every third person expresses a positive attitude toward Russia, and in Greece, the share of Russia sympathizers reaches nearly 40%. Recent polls in Slovakia showed that one in three citizens there would not oppose an alliance with Russia. Meanwhile, Hungarian diplomats in Europe reportedly share at informal meetings that young people in their country are enthusiastically learning Russian, because “the future belongs to Russia.”

It is precisely this contradictory attitude toward Russia that the Putin regime exploits to weaken Europe’s position on military support for Ukraine. The toxic influence of the Russkiy mir (“Russian world”) has clearly grown in Europe over the years of war.

Europe Is Willing to Send Weapons, but Not to Fight

According to Eurobarometer data, 70% of Europeans support financial and humanitarian aid for Ukraine, and 60% are in favor of supplying military equipment. The strongest support for arms deliveries comes from Northern Europe—over 90%.

However, year by year, support for military aid to Ukraine is declining. In France, Germany, Poland, and Luxembourg, support has dropped by 10–15% over the past three years. In many European countries, less than half the population now supports continued military deliveries to Ukraine. These numbers correlate with the share of people who believe Ukraine will win the war: over 60% in Northern Europe, Poland, and the Baltic states—but less than 50% in other countries.

At the same time, Europeans are united in their unwillingness to send their own national troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping contingent. Europe is simply not ready to go to war with Russia—neither in Ukraine nor on its own soil. Opposition to sending ground troops to Ukraine ranges from 67% in Sweden and Denmark to 90% in Hungary.

According to data from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) from June 2025, 60% of Europeans say they are ready to defend their own country in the event of a military threat. However, fewer than 30% are willing to fight abroad or help neighboring countries. The leaders in readiness to defend their homeland are Lithuania, Estonia, and Hungary (over 70%). In contrast, only 14% of Slovak citizens say they would defend their own country.

A deeply alarming fact is that in the six largest NATO countries in Europe (the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Poland), less than 50% of residents support the use of military force to defend allies against Russia. This means Europe is not prepared to mobilize its population in the event of a military confrontation with Russia. And that, too, is one of the sources of strength for the Putin regime.

From a military-technical perspective, NATO is far stronger than Russia. But today, Ukraine is suffering defeats on the front lines mainly due to a lack of manpower: the country’s mobilization resources are depleted. And it is people—with the support of equipment—who must storm enemy positions and launch counteroffensives. Not the other way around.

In this regard, Russia holds a clear advantage—practically unlimited human resources, enabled by a relatively effective system of commercial military contracts. This system alone brought around 200,000 soldiers into the war against Ukraine last year (a figure confirmed by Western experts). Studies show that Europe possesses such a resource to a much lesser extent.

Is Europe a Victim of Its Own Naivety?

The set of problems that undermines the effectiveness of Europe’s defense policy and increases its vulnerability to Russian aggression is also connected to Europeans’ poor understanding of life in Russia. Russia’s complete information isolation limits the availability of credible sources on what everyday life in modern Russian society is really like.

Moreover, the Russian diaspora abroad often promotes wishful thinking as fact, spreading false narratives in the Western world about the situation in Russia. For example, the Russian opposition enthusiastically talks about the imminent collapse of the Russian Federation due to the secession of its national republics. In reality, however, these national republics are currently a key source of legitimacy for Putin’s regime—their elites are fully integrated into the Kremlin’s power system, support for Putin in regions with large non-Russian populations exceeds 80%, and ethnic organizations actively support the war in Ukraine.

Another illusion is tied to the myths about the inevitable collapse of Russia’s economy due to Western sanctions and the depletion of the Kremlin’s resources to continue the war. European sanctions have indeed limited Putin’s ability to finance the war. However, the limited scope of these sanctions and their gradual, drawn-out implementation have given Russian economic and financial institutions time to adapt.

That’s why, after the 18th sanctions package was introduced, a popular joke in Russia emerged: that the 118th EU sanctions package will target the use of Russian bees as drones. It’s also an illusion to believe that the collapse of the Russian economy will lead to mass protests and that hungry Russians will take to the streets to overthrow Putin’s regime. Today, the quality of life in Russia has remained virtually unchanged compared to the pre-war period.

Domestic production and trade relations with nearly all countries in the world—including with Europe—enable Russian markets to be filled with a wide range of goods and food. Yes, systemic problems have already surfaced in many sectors of the economy. However, they are still far from reaching the scale of a national catastrophe.

The Central Bank of Russia’s strict monetary policy, combined with the financial “safety cushion” of the National Wealth Fund—amounting to 130 billion euros—will allow the Russian economy to stay afloat for a long time to come.

Some analysts are betting on war fatigue among the Russian population and mass impoverishment. However, the wealth of Putin’s oligarchs has grown during the war, and millions of Russians are benefitting from it—they won’t tire of receiving money for working in the defense industry, for military contracts, or for fallen relatives. And they won’t be ashamed of this “blood money,” because Russian mentality contains many psychological codes that make people more resistant to such losses. For example, there’s a common saying: “Shame isn’t smoke—it won’t burn your eyes.”

That’s why I watched with regret as Russian opposition activists tried to appeal to the conscience of young people working in Tatarstan at the “Alabuga” plant, which produces “Geran-2” drones based on Iranian technology. A report on this topic appeared on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda. Some commentators asked: “Do these young people really not understand that they’re building tools of death that destroy Ukrainian cities? Are they actually proud of this?!”

Unfortunately, yes. They were, are, and will be proud of it—like any engineer, specialist, or weapons manufacturer; like the creators of arms who, in every era and every country, enjoy the highest social status. This isn’t a pathology—it’s a particular psychological model based on detachment from the consequences of one’s work: it’s not the gun that kills, but the person who pulls the trigger.

If that weren’t the case, then the makers of Damascus steel sabers or AK-47 rifles should have been consumed with shame over the millions of victims of their work. Instead, they became national heroes, forging weapons in defense of their homeland. The Putin regime mercilessly exploits the “defender of the motherland” archetype and the “besieged fortress” mindset, effectively transforming Russian citizens into a nation of war.

That’s why emotional appeals to the shame and conscience of defense industry workers in Russia, Iran, or North Korea are useless. Only preparing Europe for the inevitable armed conflict with Russia will help.

This, perhaps, is the greatest illusion held by many European politicians—and by Donald Trump—that the war in Ukraine can be ended through negotiations or a “deal.” Born and raised in the USSR, involved in politics, having worked as a government official in post-perestroika Russia, and having looked Putin in the eye many times during meetings, I say this with full responsibility: it cannot be done.

I fully understand the Western elite’s reluctance to engage in open military confrontation with Putin—especially in the absence of social consensus in their own countries and given the risks of catastrophic consequences from a large-scale war on the European continent. It is, of course, possible to keep living with eyes tightly shut.

But when you finally open them, the Russian flag may already be flying over the Acropolis in Athens and the Reichstag in Berlin. The Eiffel Tower might be torn down as a symbol of LGBT values, Russian tanks could be stationed at Verdun, the Speaker of the British Parliament might be addressing the chamber in Russian, and victory parades of the East over the West may be held regularly in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

"Necro-imperialism". War Dictionary by Nikolai Kapitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 10.04.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/top-news/necro-imperialism-the-core-of-modern-russia-dictionary-of-war/

The tragedy in Kryvyi Rih prompted the editorial team of PostPravda.info to choose the term “necro-imperialism” as the subject of the next article in the Dictionary of War by Prof. Nikolai Karpitsky. On April 4, 2025, a missile strike on Kryvyi Rih took the lives of 18 people, half of whom were children. More than seventy people were injured. This attack on civilians had no military purpose. Russia continues, day after day, to kill people in Ukraine. However, when it does so in such a demonstrative and senseless way, an understanding emerges: the main motivation is necrophilia.

An ordinary person wants to live, and therefore seeks to see the world as a place where one can simply live. A Western citizen wants to believe that Russia’s war against Ukraine, though criminal, is still rationally explainable. That gives hope for a peaceful future. The concept of “necro-imperialism,” which reflects the essence of contemporary Russia, destroys that hope, and therefore cannot become popular. A Russian citizen also wants to live and thus seeks to adapt to power. However, their desire to live is in conflict with the necrophilia of that power. They are faced with a choice: to live among necrophiles, as if in hell, or to become one themselves.

Necro-imperialism

Necro-imperialism is a form of imperialism characteristic of contemporary Russia, which emerged as a result of a mutation of imperial consciousness. In the necro-imperial view, death is seen as a universal way of solving all problems, especially the problem of consolidating power. Protecting and ensuring a normal life for citizens is not treated as a task of state power at all, and all people who are not dependent on it are seen as a potential threat. Therefore, killing and destruction become sufficient goals for waging war.

At the root of necro-imperialism lies the fear of the complexity of the world and the belief that evil is embedded in the nature of modern Western civilization, based on freedom, law, and democracy. In relation to the enemy, all moral boundaries disappear—every crime is justified. Evil toward the enemy is treated as good, and good as evil. In mass consciousness, necro-imperialism gives rise to social necrophilia—a suppression of empathy, a denial of others’ right to exist, and a perception of death as a way to simplify the world.

Social Necrophilia

Social necrophilia is the spread in society of an attitude that excludes empathy and compassion, where other people are seen either as objects or as hostile forces with no right to exist. The suppression of empathy on a social level takes place through seeing the surrounding world as alien and hostile. This perception can be spontaneous or result from systematic propaganda that claims all problems come from an external enemy, inherently evil in nature.

The spread of social necrophilia is encouraged by the fear of the world’s complexity, which intensifies along with the degradation of personality and a shift to a primitive perception of reality. When this process affects masses of people, leading to personal and social degradation, the term “lumpenization” can be used. This doesn’t refer only to the lumpenproletariat, but to lumpens in all social strata—lumpen-intellectuals, lumpen-Orthodox, etc. Lumpenization facilitated the rapid spread of necrophilic sentiment in Russian society and the mutation of imperial consciousness. The war hysteria that began with the invasion of Ukraine intensified the necrophilic mood but was not its original cause.

The First Mutation of Imperial Consciousness

Archaic Russian imperialism was not a unique phenomenon—other empires also existed. In the 16th century, it was ideologically shaped as the concept of “Moscow—the Third Rome,” according to which Russia’s mission was the “gathering of lands,” as if the independent existence of nations on those lands had no value outside of Russia. In the 20th century, archaic empires either collapsed or transformed.

In the 20th century, totalitarian ideologies appeared based on a Manichean understanding of evil, according to which evil is attributed to the very essence of the enemy or the enemy side of the world. Under their influence, imperial consciousness underwent a mutation, leading to the emergence of totalitarian imperialism in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The Bolsheviks believed that evil lies in the social nature of humans, which meant the world was doomed to class struggle. To cleanse the world of evil, a world revolution was needed. The Nazis, in turn, believed that evil lies in the biological nature of “imperfect” people and justified war for world domination with the need to eliminate them.

The perception of the surrounding world as evil transforms archaic imperialism into totalitarian imperialism, in which power no longer serves the welfare of the empire but rather the continued expansion and strengthening of itself, which, in light of totalitarian ideology, is justified by the need to cleanse the hostile world of evil.

The Second Mutation – The Birth of Necro-Imperialism

The second mutation of imperial consciousness transformed totalitarian imperialism into necrophilic imperialism, or necro-imperialism. Whereas communists set for themselves the illusory goal of fighting the surrounding world, for necro-imperialists the fight itself became the goal.

This mutation culminated with the rise to power of Putin and the security services, though its roots go back to the practices of the Cheka and NKVD, where the killing of innocents was treated as a way to “simplify” society.

In modern Russia, lumpenization is promoted—lumpens take the place of specialists, displacing professionals. A trend emerges of turning lumpens into a privileged social class. Lumpens fear the complexity of the world, so they readily accept the idea that the West is the embodiment of evil and that its destruction is good, because it simplifies the world. As a result, a necrophilic mood spreads in society, according to which destruction and death are seen as a desirable simplification of reality.

Russian necro-imperialists claim that the West imposed a false national identity on Ukraine, which allegedly led to Ukraine becoming part of global evil. In their logic, the destruction of Ukrainian identity is a fight against evil, and the atrocities committed by the Russian army in Ukraine are necessary and justified. The war on Ukrainian territory is understood as a war against the West, and after the destruction of Ukraine, NATO countries should be the next target.

Necro-imperialists are driven by irrational motivations that rationally thinking politicians in democratic countries do not understand. The mistaken conclusion that Russia would not go to war because it would not benefit from it led to European countries being unprepared for war. At the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, both in Ukraine and in the West, the mistaken belief prevailed that losses in the Russian army would convince the Russian leadership of the futility of war as a way to achieve its goals. This mistake cost Ukraine heavy losses in 2024. The decision to continue a war of attrition that cannot be won stems precisely from necro-imperial, not archaic imperial logic.

“Russia”. War Dictionary by Nikolai Kapitsky

Source: PostPravda.info 18.02.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/top-news/war-dictionary-can-the-word-russia-be-used-as-the-name-of-a-country/

PostPravda.Info is launching a new project called War Dictionary. Its goal is to “correct” or clarify concepts that, for example, politicians often misunderstand. These misunderstandings lead to errors, which frequently result in the loss of lives, tragic consequences on the front lines, and in the future, may even cause a global war. “One such mistake is related to the misunderstanding of Russia’s nature and the reasons behind the ongoing war,” says the author of War Dictionary, Professor Nikolai Karpitsky, a Russian opposition figure who has been in hiding in Ukraine since 2015.

As the Russian philosopher explains, today Russia is waging war against Ukraine while simultaneously claiming that it is actually opposing the “collective West.” Meanwhile, many Western politicians believe that this war is simply a misunderstanding and that peace can be easily negotiated.

So, let’s consider what the word “Russia” really means. Can it be used as the name of a country, just as we call France, Poland, or Ukraine? Or does it refer to any territory that the Kremlin has brought under its control? Perhaps it is an empty term and a product of political ideology? “This term is crucial to understanding the war, which is why it has been addressed first,” explains Professor Nikolai Karpitsky.

Russia

The word “Russia” has two meanings. It is both the name of a modern or previous state entity in northern Eurasia and an ideological construct that replaces the concept of a country. A country is part of the world and is distinguished based on the common historical or cultural destiny of the peoples who consider it their homeland or ancestral home. For this reason, different state formations emerging on the territory of a country share the same name and are viewed as a single nation.

The Modern Russian State – The Russian Federation

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia became the name of the largest Soviet republic to gain independence. However, imperial sentiments quickly triumphed in the collective consciousness, and the collapse of the USSR came to be understood not as a liberation from the Soviet Empire but as a tragedy related to the loss of lands belonging to Russia. This was aided by the fact that the Russian government officially declared itself the successor to the Soviet Union. This sentiment became a precondition for justifying the seizure of neighboring countries’ territories, which, in the collective consciousness, is seen as a just war for the return of lost lands.

Today, Russia has lost the key features of a state. Notably, the unity of the legal sphere has been practically destroyed, with arbitrary power replacing law. Regional elections have been canceled, and the central government has lost legitimacy following the re-election of the president in violation of the Constitution. Not only is there an absence of a legal system, but there is also a lack of such an important state characteristic as universally recognized borders. The Russian government effectively nullified them when it announced the annexation of several Ukrainian territories, including those it does not control.

Country of Russia

In the collective consciousness, Russia is a vague and broad concept that can encompass various territories, which do not share a common historical or cultural destiny, such as Dagestan and Chukotka. This understanding of Russia differs from that of any other country, which is typically defined as a territory based on the people who have lived there for a significant period, according to historical standards.

In such cases, a territory is understood as a country with the same name as its nation or a union of nations with a shared historical destiny—Italy, Germany, Poland, Iran, China, India… Various states with different names may historically arise on the territory of a country, but all will be associated with that country. Sometimes, a country can stand out as the historical territory of a nation that later united other nations into a broader state, as in the case of England, which is part of the United Kingdom.

However, it is impossible to historically identify such a primary territory associated with the Russian nation that could be called a country named “Russia.” In Russian social consciousness, there is a complete absence of the idea of a primary territory of the nation, distinct from other territories acquired throughout history. Furthermore, the territory of the medieval Tsardom of Moscow, which could formally be associated with the original homeland of Russians, does not have a distinct name.

In Ukraine, this territory might be referred to as “Moscovia,” but such a concept does not exist in Russian collective consciousness. The other lands and peoples currently united under the Russian state are not bound by any common cultural or historical destiny.

Kyivan Rus cannot be the historical homeland of modern Russia, as its successor is an entirely different country—Ukraine. The Tsardom of Moscow arose through the subjugation of neighboring peoples and the genocide of the population of Novgorod, which differed from the Muscovites in language, social organization, and self-identity. Therefore, the lands of Pskov-Novgorod are mistakenly associated with the historical original homeland of Russia.

As a result, it is unclear where to draw the boundary of this ancestral homeland. The average Russian does not know where the border begins between the lands of other nations that were conquered; for example, they are convinced that the Volga River is inherently Russian. Thus, the concept of Russia as a country remains undefined and is therefore replaced in the collective consciousness by an ideological construct.

Russia as an Ideological Construct

This concept stems from the principle of defining a country not by its culture or the people inhabiting it, but by power. In Russian mass consciousness, Russia is associated not with a specific country but with an ideological construct—specifically, any territory that is or was controlled by the central government.

The boundaries of this image of Russia are not clearly defined and depend on the perspective of the bearer of mass consciousness: Russia, in its current state, includes the entire territory of the Russian Federation and the occupied regions of Ukraine; from the perspective of the recent past, it includes all the countries that were part of the USSR; from the distant past, it even includes Poland, Finland, and Alaska. As a result, Russia is equated with the Soviet Union, Peter the Great’s Russian Empire, the Tsardom of Moscow, and Kyivan Rus, which contradicts historical scholarship.

Russia and Russian Nationalism

Based on this ideological construct, a specific form of nationalism has developed in the mass consciousness of Russians. Since Russia is considered any land controlled by the authorities, it is expected that the authorities will transform these lands to make them suitable for Russian-speaking people, meaning they will provide conditions for everyone to understand the Russian language. This nationalism can take a radical form, in which other languages are seen as relics of the past that can be tolerated, except for Belarusian and Ukrainian, which are considered false or harmful languages because their existence challenges the unity of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians as one nation. This form of nationalism is reinforced by the false notion that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are one nation, or at least descended from one nation.

Thus, the modern understanding of Russia has been shaped not by cultural and historical experiences but by ideology and correlates not with a country but with territory controlled—or once controlled—by the central government. This serves as justification for new wars of conquest, including Russia’s current war against Ukraine. It means that the very concept of Russia encompasses ideological attitudes that are destructive and push toward further wars. Awareness of this has led to Russia being frequently referred to as “Mordor” in everyday communication in Ukraine, a term borrowed from Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.

The Siberian philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky gave a talk on “The War and the Crisis of Religious Identity”

The Siberian philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky, who today lives on the edge of the war in Sloviansk (Donetsk Oblast), gave a talk on “The War and the Crisis of Religious Identity”, stating that the problem of religious dissent arises when “canonical rules only exacerbate, rather than resolve, internal contradictions. [. . .] In times of peace, these contradictions can remain hidden, but war highlights them.”

In his opinion, the mechanism by which religion is transformed into ideology is activated when “the tension to convey one's own moral position in society is embodied not in religious preaching, but in demands on everyone, even those with different beliefs.” In this case, the appeal is made to the “ideology of fundamental values” in an “imitation of religion” that transforms faith into a “parody in favour of power”.

This is in fact the parable of the “religious revival” of post-Soviet Russia, where religion has been bent to serve ideology, achieving an even more oppressive result than the propaganda of state atheism itself.

Karpitsky defines the compulsory orthodoxy of today's Russians as obryadoveriye (обрядоверие), uncritical "ritualism" that submits to religious authorities and observes their formal practices, which “adapt to socio-political conditions, ending up serving only the ruling political power.”

After all, this is how Orthodoxy interpreted things even in Soviet times, against which the religious dissent of Father Gleb Yakunin and many others developed, people like Father Aleksandr Men, killed in 1990 by the dark forces of a regime that was changing its skin, so as not to lose its power.

The ideology of values ends up projecting itself as an imperial and universal vision, addressed to the will of the Most High as the source of every principle of world order, justifying dictatorship and war against the “enemies of the true faith”.

Read the full article here: Religious dissidents in Orthodox Russia. by Stefano Caprio // Fondazione PIME Onlus – AsiaNews 03/15/2025

Nikolai Karpitsky. Can Russia be civilized? ‘An entire generation is responsible for the terror in Ukraine’

Source: PostPravda.info 20.01.2025

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/can-russia-be-civilized-an-entire-generation-is-responsible-for-the-terror-in-ukraine-opinion/

Russia Threatens Europe Again, Just as the Soviet Union Once Did. Fear of this threat prompts two opposing reactions. The first is an attempt to convince oneself that there is no danger. In this case, the West must justify Russia’s actions, as pro-Russian politicians do. The second option is to find a true explanation for Kremlin policy. However, this requires accepting a dark reality, as analyzed in PostPravda.Info by Prof. Nikolai Karpitsky, a Russian opposition figure who fled Siberia in 2015 and settled in eastern Ukraine.

After the publication of the article “War as an End in Itself: Why Russia Won’t Run Out of Volunteers to Die in Ukraine?”, I received a question from Mr. Michał Talma-Sutt of Berlin, asking whether feudalism, deeply rooted in Russian history, is the best explanation for the “Russian fatalism” I had written about. This framing of the question reflects the perception of those in Europe who see a real threat from Russia. I am grateful to Mr. Michał for the opportunity to give a detailed answer, not just to him but to all representatives of European culture trying to understand Russia.

Is Russia’s Unresolved Feudalism a Relic of the Past?

Mr. Michał proposes explaining the dehumanization and aggressiveness of the Russian regime as manifestations of ancient feudalism. According to him, this reference does not fully explain the brutality of the current regime in Moscow, but it can partly describe its structure. Every political leader – whether a warlord or a feudal lord – irrevocably and unquestionably decides the fate of the people. He chooses who should live and who should die.

In Mr. Michał’s view, this unresolved feudalism, deeply embedded in Russia’s history, has led to the current power hierarchy in the country, with the main feudal lord – Putin – at the top, the master and ruler of life and death for those under him. The relationship between the lowest and highest levels of this pyramid is based on bribery – the modern equivalent of feudal tribute. This system, Mr. Michał writes in his letter, is quite terrifying.

Such an interpretation of the current Russian system indeed looks terrifying to a modern Western person, but from my point of view, it is overly optimistic. After all, by speaking of feudalism, Mr. Michał was referring to an archaic phenomenon. If this is the case, then Russia is moving against the tide of history, which means that time is on our side and works against Russia. But if it turns out that Russia’s current regime is not a relic of the past but a new historical phenomenon, then there is no hope that history is on our side.

Of course, Mr. Michał was referring to feudalism not in the strict historical sense but in a broader sense, as a manifestation of archaic relations based on non-economic coercion towards people of lower social status. The dictatorship in Russia is based on such relations, but it must be emphasized that these are characteristic of the entire post-Soviet space.

Although Ukraine is a democratic country, such archaic relations are also characteristic of Ukrainian bureaucracy and even academic circles. I was surprised to learn that in Ukraine, it is considered inappropriate if a scholar defending their doctoral dissertation does not pay a substantial sum of money to their academic supervisors. My Ukrainian colleagues did not see this as a bribe but as a completely justified tribute that a person must pay to move up the social ladder.

Since this is indeed a manifestation of archaic behavior, there is hope that the situation will change in the future. However, I believe that, unfortunately, the dictatorship in Russia is not a relic of the past but a modern phenomenon, although built on archaic relations.

Is There Social and Spiritual Progress in History?

Let’s imagine that we are not talking about states, but about small human communities. Take, for example, a gang of criminals willing to kill for money and, on the other hand, a group of volunteers who selflessly help people in need. They both seem to be representatives of the same species, homo sapiens, yet they are so diametrically opposed in every way, it’s as if they belong to different classes.

If we assume that the gang of criminals is archaic, a relic of the past, then there is hope that it will gradually disappear. But how would that happen? Would criminal organizations transform into charitable or volunteer organizations? We have to admit, that sounds absurd. Therefore, we might assume that criminal gangs existed and will continue to exist—not because they are remnants of the past that we haven’t yet shaken off, but because specific individuals choose to become criminals.

Becoming a criminal or a volunteer is a matter of individual free will. Unfortunately, most people are unaware that they have free will, and thus they make decisions inertially, adapting to the circumstances and social structure around them. However, the more rigid and aggressive that structure is, the more a person loses their independence, becoming just a function of that structure. Regaining independence is possible only by renouncing attachment to one’s social status, which provides normal living conditions. Few people are capable of this.

Therefore, if a criminal social structure already exists, one should not expect to be able to convince anyone within it to engage in charitable activities.

This illustration helps us understand why brutal despotisms have, for centuries, coexisted alongside cultured and free states. This has been the case throughout history, both in feudal times and in the present. In medieval Europe, there were kings and independent cities that enjoyed Magdeburg rights. There were ruthless despotisms like the Tsardom of Moscow, but there were also republics with a high level of socio-cultural development, such as the Novgorod Republic.

Even today, alongside modern civilized democracies, barbaric dictatorships exist. Unlike the obvious progress in technology, we do not see progress in humanism. Cruelty and violence are reproduced in each new era. This happens because technical knowledge can be accumulated and passed on to future generations, but values are only reproduced through free self-determination, and each generation must choose them anew. This is why different people choose good or evil, and based on that choice, incompatible social systems arise: a gang of criminals and a volunteer organization, the dictatorship in Russia and Western democracy. This has always been the case in human history.

Archaic relations persist in our lives as remnants of the past, but they can also mutate into entirely new phenomena. Indeed, today’s Russia is genetically derived from the cruel, archaic despotism of the Tsardom of Moscow, which saw its mission in “gathering lands,” that is, building an empire through ruthless conquests.

In the modern world, there is no place for such archaic societies, so at the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian Empire was replaced by a totalitarian dictatorship. The communist ideology of seeking class enemies caused a mutation of Russian imperial consciousness into a new form based on totalitarian ideology. The secret services, which carried out this terror, were indifferent to specific types of ideology. They lived in a world where absolutely anyone could turn out to be an enemy or an informant, even a close friend.

In 2000, it was none other than these very same people who ultimately and once again seized power in Russia. This led to the second mutation of Russian imperial consciousness into a new form – necro-imperialism. Its signs are that human life loses its value, personal identity means nothing, and death and destruction are seen not only as means but also as ends in themselves.

Attitudes Towards Good and Evil

In the face of the diversity of historical concepts, the average person doesn’t know whom to trust, and so begins to see historical teachings as an abstraction. Therefore, I propose looking at this problem on a personal level, which allows us to discuss the relationship to good and evil in history. Every individual and every generation makes its own choice between good and evil. Parents can influence their children’s choices through their authority, but they cannot make the choice for them. Historical inertia influences generational choices, but each generation must make a new decision between good and evil. The past is merely the material from which people build their own lives.

A generation’s self-determination begins with the choices made by individuals. Sometimes this happens as early as childhood. It can happen, for example, that a good school is located next to a school where bullying has become the norm because two or three students imposed this practice on everyone else. The rest agreed to participate in order to maintain their place in the social hierarchy. This is a form of adaptation. In a more supportive school, they would behave in the opposite way. This is exactly what is happening across Russia now.

Everything starts with an individual’s self-definition, through which a person realizes who they are. From this, their orientation towards good or evil is revealed, contributing to the formation of a social model of relations. The nature of this model determines what kind of social structures will emerge based on it. This could be a criminal gang or a group of volunteers. Moreover, these communities involve indecisive individuals in their activities, creating social inertia that influences generational choices. Based on these choices, some countries follow the path of civilized development, while others fall into dictatorship.

At what point did the wrong choice of generation lead to dictatorship in Russia?

The pivotal moment when a generational choice led to dictatorship in Russia occurred during the late 1990s. Throughout Russian history, inertia toward dictatorship had consistently gained strength, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a brief opportunity to reverse this course. This could have happened if the generation of the 1990s had made the right choice. However, it required substantial effort, and that opportunity was ultimately lost.

In the autumn of 1999, Russian citizens were gripped by fear due to a series of terrorist bombings targeting residential buildings. People were dying in the night, before they had a chance to wake up. The terror subsided only after the Moscow branch of the FSB was caught in the act, attempting to plant explosives in an apartment building in Ryazan. Russian society struggled to process this information.

Of course, it’s terrifying to fall asleep knowing your home could be bombed by terrorists, but there’s some comfort in hoping that security services might protect you. Far more terrifying, however, is the possibility that the security services themselves could blow up your home—and that no one could protect you from them.

This fear led us, the Russian people, to place our trust in a representative of those security services—Vladimir Putin. A few months later, he was elected president. This generational choice was an act of betrayal, because those who voted for Putin betrayed the future of their children. It was this betrayal that catalyzed the second mutation of imperial consciousness and directly paved the way for the war with Ukraine. A generation that betrayed its own children will tolerate any crime to avoid the shame of waging a genocidal war against a neighboring nation.

The idea of historical progress, while offering hope for the future, can also lead to misguided political strategies. After all, if the current regime in Russia is seen as an archaic manifestation standing against the tide of history, wouldn’t it make sense to gradually civilize it by fostering cooperation with civilized nations?

This was the thinking of many European politicians before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It’s akin to trying to civilize a gang of criminals by inviting them to the theater or ballet. However, if we recognize that Russian necro-imperial despotism is a new historical phenomenon, one that can only be defeated through force, this realization might motivate the civilized world to unite and fight to dismantle the criminal social system in Russia.

Nikolai Karpitsky. Russia is preparing for war with NATO. These are the strengths of the Kremlin and the West

Source: PostPravda.info 27.12.2024

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/reports/russia-is-preparing-for-war-with-nato-these-are-the-strengths-of-the-kremlin-and-the-west-analysis/

The prospect of a future war with NATO is now an officially endorsed project by the Russian government. On December 16, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated that starting in 2024, his ministry is preparing for a potential war between Russia and NATO in Europe. Military spending accounts for nearly one-third of the federal budget. Such expenditures indicate that the country is indeed mobilizing for a prolonged war. While war is economically unviable, dictators think differently. For them, money equates to power. This power can be reinforced not just through wealth but also through military strength. This aligns with Vladimir Putin’s temperament, as he remarked just days after Belousov’s statement that life without war is boring. The Russian president acts as a subjective factor driving the world toward a potential World War III. But are there objective conditions for the outbreak of such a conflict?

Can Russia Really Avoid Waging War Elsewhere Due to its Engagement in Ukraine?

Optimists argue that Russia cannot attack anyone else because it is bogged down in Ukraine. Consequently, it has lost Syria for good. Indeed, without relying on Assad’s regime and with no logistics in place—especially as Turkey and Israel actively intervene—regaining control over Syria seems unlikely. If the optimists are correct, Russia might soon withdraw from Africa as well. However, if Russia manages to hold onto Libya and muster additional forces for military operations in Africa, the optimists would be proven wrong.

Here’s a historical precedent: late August to early September 1941. The Soviet Army faced an unprecedented defeat on the front lines. The Battle of Moscow loomed with questionable odds of holding the city. Could anyone have predicted that at this moment, the Soviet Union would find the strength to attack Iran and occupy its northern provinces? At one point, many also hoped that if Russia got bogged down in Syria, it would be incapable of fighting elsewhere. However, the war in Syria enabled Russia to construct a military machine designed for the war in Ukraine. The fact that Russia currently lacks sufficient resources for a new war should not be reassuring. Once a machine is built, fuel for it is bound to follow sooner or later. Although the Russian military is currently constrained by the war in Ukraine, its mobilization reserves still enable the possibility of expanding the conflict to other countries in the future.

In 2022, Russia deployed all its combat-ready military units to Ukraine, effectively disabling its ability to wage another war elsewhere. Furthermore, it lost a significant portion of its modern equipment in Ukraine and had to revert to old World War I-era tactics, relying on artillery barrages and infantry assaults. Based on this, optimists believe that the Russian military is exhausted and would need several years to recover before considering a war with NATO countries. I do not share this view.

Even during the war in Ukraine, the Russian army has repeatedly increased the number of combat-ready units, addressed missile shortages, and rebuilt its arsenal of modern tanks and other equipment. However, this reconstruction may hold little strategic importance, as such equipment would likely be destroyed within the first months of a war with NATO. The battles in Donbas demonstrate that the Russian army can launch infantry offensives even without the support of modern equipment.

The Military Machine’s Functionality

It is crucial to evaluate not just the strength of the military but also the functionality of its machinery—that is, what tasks it is designed to perform. A bulldozer is more powerful than a car but would lose in a race. The same applies to armies. The most powerful army, designed for offensive operations, can be helpless in defense, as evidenced by the Soviet Army’s collapse in the early months of its war with Nazi Germany. NATO armies are technologically superior to the Russian army, but they are structured for short, localized wars and are currently ill-suited for a prolonged continental war of attrition.

The Russian army of 2022 was also built for a blitzkrieg strategy. However, after the failure of its initial offensive, it was forced to retreat and reorganize. If Western nations had provided Ukraine with sufficient military support at that time, the war might have ended already. Instead, Russia used the breathing room to construct a new military machine, one capable of waging a large-scale, continental war of attrition.

This transformation marks a strategic pivot in Russia’s military doctrine, aligning it more closely with the demands of long-term, high-intensity conflict.

The Functioning of Russia’s Military Machinery

Western countries continue to operate in peacetime mode, where their militaries are just one of many elements within the broader structure of the state. In Russia, the situation is the opposite. The state itself has become a component of the military and intelligence apparatus. This means that during peacetime, the military is merely one of the state’s tools, but in wartime, the state transforms into a part of the military machine. All state and public institutions—media, courts, government and local administration bodies, social systems, and industries—are reoriented to support the fighting army, rendering them incapable of functioning normally in peacetime.

The operational mechanism of Russia’s military machine is determined by its method of resource distribution. Before 2022, the state acted as an adjunct or ballast to monopolies trading natural resources, with profits stored in Western countries. Due to sanctions, these revenues can no longer be stored in the West, so they are redirected to military production and the payment of contract soldiers. These funds then trickle into impoverished regions that previously suffered from underfunding. This creates a social support base for the war effort, as poverty drives people to enlist in contract service at such a rate that forced mobilization becomes unnecessary.

The deaths of contract soldiers evoke little sympathy, allowing the majority of the Russian population to simply ignore the war. This cycle sustains both the war effort and the state’s wartime economy. The reallocation of resources to military needs ensures continued social stability in poorer regions, while the indifference of the general population minimizes domestic resistance to the ongoing conflict.

This transformation underscores how deeply the Russian state has integrated into its military structure, operating as a single entity optimized for war. As a result, the distinction between peacetime governance and wartime mobilization has been effectively erased in Russia’s current political and economic system.

If the war were to end, Russia’s economy would need to transition to peacetime operations, and the flow of financial resources to impoverished regions would cease. A democratic country might invest in rebuilding industry and providing social protection for its population. However, a dictatorship, which has historically plundered its own nation, is unlikely to do so. Meanwhile, people in these regions have grown accustomed to their new income levels, and the sudden loss of this financial support could trigger widespread, spontaneous anger with unpredictable social consequences.

Additionally, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, morally degraded and socially detached after experiencing the war, would return from the frontlines. These individuals would demand privileges and channel their frustration and hatred toward others. This creates a volatile mix, making post-war stability difficult to achieve. As a result, if Russia withdraws from the war in Ukraine, it will face a stark choice: either descend into domestic instability or initiate a new conflict to divert attention and sustain the system.

The Likelihood of World War III

At present, the likelihood of a Third World War remains exceptionally low due to several factors. First, while the Russian army is making advances in Donbas, threatening the entire eastern front, the Russian leadership appears unwilling to divert its focus to other areas. Even when regions like Kursk faced attacks, no forces were redirected from Donbas to respond. This indicates that the Kremlin is unlikely to allocate resources for military operations against NATO countries in the near future.

The current priority for Russia is maintaining its momentum in Ukraine, as the leadership remains singularly focused on achieving its objectives there. This narrow focus, coupled with the resource limitations caused by the ongoing conflict, reduces the immediate risk of escalating the war to a global scale.

Several factors currently lower the probability of a Russian escalation toward a global conflict. First, Vladimir Putin is unlikely to take radical actions in a situation marked by uncertainty, especially as figures like Donald Trump intentionally amplify global unpredictability. Second, China has not yet decided on its strategic direction: while it continues to build military power and threatens Taiwan, it simultaneously seeks a technological breakthrough to overcome its economic challenges through peaceful development.

A world war is unlikely without strong allies. At present, only two nations—Russia and Iran—maintain imperial ambitions and seek to expand their influence through military force, making them natural allies. However, with Israel’s defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria, Iran’s imperial plans have faltered. This leaves Russia without significant allies in the event of a global conflict.

Should NATO Fear a Russian Invasion?

In the near term, it is unlikely that Russia poses a direct threat to NATO member states. However, the future is unpredictable, and the situation could shift if NATO countries fail to prepare for a potential conflict. If Russia were to free up hundreds of thousands of soldiers following a truce in Ukraine, it might attempt to challenge NATO. This warrants a deeper examination of a hypothetical Russia-NATO war scenario, using insights from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

On November 1, 2023, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s leading military strategist, published an essay in The Economist highlighting key takeaways from the war in Ukraine. He emphasized that Russia has drawn Ukraine into a positional war, where it holds an advantage. To reverse the tide, Ukraine must transition to maneuver warfare, requiring superiority in five priority areas. These insights are also relevant for other nations that might face Russian aggression.

The first priority is air power—control of the skies is essential for large-scale ground operations. In this domain, Russia outmatches Ukraine but would face significant disadvantages against NATO countries, which possess overwhelming air superiority. Some tasks traditionally performed by manned aircraft are now carried out by drones, an area both Ukraine and Russia are actively developing. However, Russia’s larger production capabilities give it an edge in drone warfare.

NATO’s technological and logistical advantages would likely outweigh Russia’s strengths in the event of a direct conflict. However, Russia’s ability to adapt, leverage asymmetric tactics, and sustain prolonged engagements cannot be underestimated. Ensuring readiness in air power, technology, and strategy remains critical for NATO to maintain its deterrence posture.

The second priority is electronic warfare (EW) aimed at jamming enemy communication and navigation signals. Over the past decade, Russia has modernized its EW forces, creating a new branch of the military and developing 60 new types of equipment, while Ukraine has only just begun to build this capability. In this area, Russia again holds an advantage but may lose it, as NATO countries’ information technologies are significantly more advanced. In the future, NATO countries could gain an edge in this critical area, especially considering advancements in artificial intelligence technologies.

The third priority is counter-battery fire, neutralizing the enemy’s artillery. Here, Russia holds an advantage not only over Ukraine but also over NATO countries. While NATO produces higher-quality munitions, it does not produce them in sufficient quantities. Kamikaze drones, which are actively used by both Ukraine and Russia, have partially taken over traditional artillery tasks.

The fourth priority highlighted by Valerii Zaluzhnyi is mine-clearing technology to enable effective offensives. However, after Ukraine’s transition to a defensive posture, it became apparent that its capacity to lay minefields to halt enemy infantry was extremely limited. In this priority area, not only Ukraine but also other European nations have been entirely unprepared, having signed the convention banning the use of anti-personnel mines and destroyed their stockpiles. How do they plan to stop Russian infantry attacks? Fortunately, the United States has not joined this convention, but will a decision to supply mines to Europe be made in time, despite legal and bureaucratic challenges?

The fifth priority is building reserves. Russia has developed a mechanism to replenish its army without forced mobilization and is gradually increasing the number of combat-ready units. While these forces are sufficient to breach Ukrainian defenses at various points along the front, they are insufficient to capitalize on breakthroughs, resulting in a slow offensive. According to military leadership estimates, confirmed by Valerii Zaluzhnyi at the end of 2023, Ukraine would need to mobilize 450,000–500,000 reservists to meet the army’s needs for 2024. However, mobilization was carried out late and faced significant challenges, so the number of recruits who joined the Ukrainian army fell far short of this goal. As a result, throughout 2024, the balance of power on the battlefield has been slowly shifting in Russia’s favor.

This situation is exacerbated by the fact that, on October 18, 2022, Ukraine passed Law No. 8109, which suspended conscription during the period of martial law. This means that in this critical area, Russia has an absolute advantage over Ukraine, and, in my opinion, it would hold a similar advantage over NATO countries in the event of a military confrontation.

In summary, by 2024, Ukraine lacked an advantage in any of the priority areas outlined by Valerii Zaluzhnyi, explaining the success of the Russian army. However, Zaluzhnyi did not consider another critical factor—the quality of military command. After his removal, a management crisis emerged within the Ukrainian armed forces, which has yet to be resolved, leading to tragic situations on the frontlines.

In the event of a war between Russia and NATO countries, Russia would hold an advantage in at least three of the priority areas. However, NATO countries would have an absolute advantage in the first priority area—air superiority—which extends beyond air power to include precision-guided missiles. This advantage could be decisive, allowing NATO to deliver a devastating, disarming first strike that might lead to victory.

But what if, after this initial strike, NATO opts for a ceasefire and begins negotiations with Russia to return to the pre-war status quo? In that scenario, Russia would recover from the blow and drag NATO into a positional war, where it would have an absolute advantage in three priority areas. If the conflict becomes prolonged, advanced technological weaponry would eventually be depleted, and the outcome would hinge on massed soldiers on the battlefield, much like the current situation on Ukraine’s fronts.

Russia could have been stopped in Ukraine both in 2022 and 2023, but there was no political will among Western nations to achieve this. If the war expands to NATO countries, they would have the capability to defeat Russia, but this would require the political resolve that has so far been lacking.

As for Putin, even he does not yet know what he will do. He is not currently ready for a war with NATO but is actively preparing for one and closely watching the actions of Western leaders. If they demonstrate a clear focus on victory rather than a temporary truce, he will likely refrain from attacking NATO countries—just as he might have refrained from attacking Ukraine had he seen a strong and decisive move from the West toward its defense.

Nikolai Karpitsky. Party of the Dead against Putin's Russia

Source: PostPravda.info 21.10.2024

URL: https://postpravda.info/en/stories/freedom-of-speech-en/party-of-the-dead/

On October 7, a “nicht verstehen” action against “Putinversteher” and Putin's policies was held in Bonn in front of the Russian consulate in Germany, timed to coincide with his birthday. The protest action was organized by the German branch of the “Party of the Dead”. Its founder, Maxim Evstropov, advocates the defense of the dead against the encroachments of the current Russian government. The activists placed a candle “for the repose of Putin's soul” and wished him a speedy “day of death”. The Party of the Dead emerged as an artistic and political project in 2017 in St. Petersburg and became known for its actions, performances and other events in Russia. The Kremlin authorities swiftly recognized it as a danger and began to persecute the members of the party. As a result many activists were forced to emigrate and now hold similar actions in different countries around the world. However, I think that such a party could only emerge in Russia and only in Russia the meaning of its actions is self-evident. It is connected to the special attitude towards death that is cultivated in modern Russia. 

The Cult of Death in Russia

Russia has waged wars of conquest throughout its history using the same tactics, ruthlessly expending masses of soldiers in suicidal attacks. This is the same tactic Russia is using now in Ukraine. What is surprising, however, is that Russian soldiers both before and now are willing to obediently march to their death over the corpses of their comrades. This willingness to die senselessly is linked to a special mood in which life ceases to be valuable enough to fight for. This special necrophilic mood is accompanied by a loss of the sense of life. In Russia it is somehow transmitted from one person to another, but outside Russia it is difficult to explain what it is at all. Maxim Evstropov describes it as follows: “While in Russia, I constantly felt that many people are in a state of ‘derealization’. It seems to them that they are not really living, nothing really happens to them. And in general, everything that happens in Russia seems to be “not real.” Some things that are common for Russians are really hard to comprehend, especially for an outsider. And the 'derealizer' is a psychological defense reaction against the horror that is going on.” (Derealizer is Maxim Evstropov's neologism, meaning a force or psychological mechanism that leads to the loss of a sense of reality).

Soldiers in the Russian army were always treated as expendable, but still the Orthodox Russian emperors believed that after death a person was no longer in their power, but in the power of God. However, the communists denied the existence of God and used the cult of dead heroes for their ideological purposes. Therefore, even now in Russia it is believed that if a hero survived, he is some kind of inferior hero. Only death can make a person a real hero. For example, pro-Russian propagandists used the fact that the Azov and other defenders of Mariupol surrendered and did not die as an argument that they are in fact false heroes. However, in the Ukrainian consciousness, real heroism is manifested not in death, but in the will to live, which the Azovites demonstrated by choosing captivity, which is more terrible than death.

The ideology of the Soviet Union contradictorily combined the ideals of a happy prosperous life with the cultivation of death and necrophilic symbolism. Soviet songs and movies cultivated heroic death, a mausoleum was built in the capital's Red Square, and the Kremlin wall was turned into a cemetery. Even the coat of arms of the Soviet Union was created in the likeness of a tombstone wreath. However, in the Soviet Union, the necrophilic attitude occupied a limited place in the system of ideology and propaganda, without canceling people's desire for a happy life. The current Russian authorities do not rely on any particular ideology, despite what many might believe, but instead promote such an idea of the world, in which the necrophilic attitude is expressed not in ideological formulations, but in a vague feeling that distorts the perception of events and devalues life. 

The difference between the necrophilic attitude in the Soviet Union and in present-day Russia is evident in the way Victory Day over fascism is celebrated. In the Soviet Union, death was glorified, but the holiday itself was perceived as a reminder of a tragedy that should never be repeated. Victory Day in today's Russia is held under the slogan “We can do it again!” and has turned into a celebration of imperial grandeur, for the sake of which any human sacrifice is justified. A neologism has emerged to name this bacchanalia - “pobedobesie”, which can be roughly translated as “victoradness”, i.e. - victory madness, but it's important to note, that the word “besit’sa”, to act crazy, has the same root as the word - “bes”, an imp or demon, so may be “victorimping” or “demonry” would be a better translation.  It is in fact a “substitution of the Victory Day celebration with a mad rampage of demonic forces”. 

In 2011, journalists from the independent TV2 television company in Tomsk decided to counter this bacchanalia of imperial grandeur with the “Immortal Regiment” procession. They naively hoped that if ordinary people came out with portraits of their dead ancestors, they would shame those who turn the memory of the war into a necrophilic carnival. However, the Russian authorities appropriated the initiative of the “Immortal Regiment” and themselves began to organize processions with portraits of the dead, not in memory of the tragedy, but in support of imperial ambitions. This was their way of saying: “Even the dead support us! Our power extends not only to the living, but also to the dead!” Only the fear that portraits of those killed in Ukraine would appear in the “Immortal Regiment” procession, and thus people would recognize the scale of military losses, forced the Russian authorities to cancel this necrophilic social event.  

No one has the right to appropriate the voices of the dead

The Party of the Dead opposes the use of the dead as another resource for power and cultural and political necrophilia in contemporary Russia, which manifests itself in a militaristic and patriotic death cult and the absence of a project for the future. Maxim Evstropov, the party's founder states: “Posts in support of Putin are now distributed even from the social media accounts of those long gone. When votes are counted in elections, dead people vote. There were even cases when dead deputies voted in the State Duma. The dead are not allowed to be dead, the living are not allowed to be alive.” The Party of the Dead opposes this with a principle enshrined in its charter: “No one - no social group or individual living person - has the privileged and exclusive right to speak on behalf of the dead.”

To describe its activities the Party of the Dead uses the term “necroactivism”, which includes public art events and political actions in the form of street performances, where protest ideas are expressed through artistic means. For example, in 2018, at the May Day demonstration in St. Petersburg, Varya Mikhailova was detained for walking in the Party of the Dead column with the painting “9 Stages of Decomposition of the Leader”. It was a collage of a series of photographs capturing grass sprouting through Putin's portrait. Varya was awarded a colossal fine for those times, and the artwork itself was ordered by the court to be destroyed, despite the fact that the work was a digital collage and not a physical object.

The Party of the Dead is built on anarchist principles. Participants of street actions could gather in one place, could act synchronously in different places and even countries, despite the fact that sometimes they do not know each other personally. The party lacks centralized management and the usual signs of organization. Its activities are coordinated either by its ideological inspirer Maxim Evstropov or by the initiators of specific actions. During the actions, the Party of the Dead members hide their faces with skull masks, preserving their anonymity. In this way they symbolically identify themselves with the dead. If the Russian state speaks on behalf of the dead as a usurper of power over them, the participants of the actions do not separate themselves from the dead, they perceive themselves as their equals, believing that in a sense, albeit symbolically, the dead themselves gain subjectivity through such actions and act as critics of the state, war, hierarchies and ideas, exposing the absurdity of power.

Persecution of the Party of the Dead in Russia

Until 2022, Russian authorities systematically detained and fined Party of the Dead members, but criminal prosecutions began after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, when the Party of the Dead spoke out against the aggressive war and Russian military necropolitics. Many party members were forced to emigrate, establishing branches in different countries. The most active branches currently operate in Georgia and Germany. Those who stayed in Russia live under constant threat of arrest.

Thus, while staying in Georgia Maxim Evstropov learned from the media that in January 2023 a trial started against him, and in February 2023 the court decided to arrest him in absentia. I'm trying to imagine what a court hearing might look like. The judge is asking questions to an empty chair where the defendant, who has no idea he is being tried, should be sitting. The court-appointed lawyer answers instead of the absent person accused, asking to soften the measure of restraint, to replace the usual arrest in absentia with house arrest in absentia... Theater of the absurd! However, in Russia, the line between absurdity and reality has long been erased and now, it seems, everything is possible.

The basis for the prosecution was an anonymous message in social networks describing a then-upcoming action of the Party of the Dead, which Maxim did not even attend. Here I will provide the text in full and in its original form, with no capital letters, so that everyone can evaluate for themselves how insignificant a reason for mass searches, political persecution and criminal punishment can be. This short message is rather artistic in nature, as it uses the artistic device of alternating fragments of two different texts, one of which is an Easter greeting:

in the very heart of the russian world - in the russian cemetery - a bright easter holiday took place recently. no one rose from the dead.

“russia will rise free,” says death

“if,” say the spartans

death hopes for the best

christ is risen!

- and the conscript has not yet

by death trampling death

- the groom has arrived

christ is risen

-  and we have flies over here 

christ is risen indeed

- and patriarch kirill of the russian orthodox church blesses the war and thinks that turning cities into ruins, exterminating their inhabitants, as well as raping and pillaging for the sake of some pseudo-imperialist bullshit in a z-shaped circumvention of all the commandments is ok fine and sacred

well, godspeed!”

The author's black humor, which is typical for the performances of the Party of the Dead, peeks through the lines of this message. I know Maxim very well, we graduated from the same philosophy department, we worked together, I knew his son and his wife, who was my student, and therefore I can say that the performances of the Party of the Dead, albeit in a sarcastic manner, express his absolutely serious attitude towards death as well as his existential, not just political, rejection of the regime in Russia. If ordinary politicians cover up their non-seriousness by imitating serious activity, in the Party of the Dead it is the opposite, a serious attitude to death and power is covered up by grotesque play and black humor.

Is the Party of the Dead a political opposition?

The Russian opposition is increasingly making me feel ashamed, but this is quite natural. After all, Russians have no common self-identification or understanding of themselves as one people, so there can be no all-Russian opposition. There are people who wish to identify as the Russian opposition, but are engaged in imitation instead. Maxim Evstropov is not an oppositionist, but a political artist, an art activist. But he is also a philosopher, so he gives a philosophical understanding of his political activity. I respect Maxim as a philosopher, as a colleague, and as a professional - a candidate of philosophical sciences, author of scientific articles and monographs, but his philosophical language is very different from mine, and is not always clear to me. Therefore, I will try to present his position as I understood it, although he may disagree with my interpretations in some respects.

The political situation in Russia is such that the complete helplessness of the opposition only causes despair. Maxim explains that political despair is a situation of political impossibility, loss of hopes and illusions. It can be called “political death,” which is quite akin to the position of an animal or a corpse. This despair is total and becomes the background of every action and every thought. However, Maxim believes that the possibility of overcoming despair lies in despair itself. To do this, one must despair absolutely. One must despair in order to act. This is how “political death” becomes the starting point of political struggle. Humor is one of the keys to turning despair into action. When there is nothing left to lose, all that remains is laughter. 

Humor makes it possible to look at any situation from two perspectives: a serious one, where everything has unconditional significance, and a non-serious one, where all significance turns into nothing. Laughter is affective in its nature - it is an affect that exists both inside and outside of a lived experience, of a situation, it is a transcendence of the self, an outsider's view. In the moment of ridicule, things lose their defined boundaries. However, in a situation of political despair, humor becomes black. It does not justify or legitimize political death in any way, but at the same time it opens a way out of the life situation into the space of freedom. Maxim believes that the “way out” of despair lies in a paradox: to get rid of despair, one must despair. Black humor lives political death and forms a new phenomenon with it, which we can observe in the street actions and performances of the Party of the Dead.

Let me give an example of how political desperation in a situation where elections are impossible led the Russian opposition to a dead end. Some members of the opposition called for a protest vote, others for an election boycott, and as a result neither strategy was implemented. The Party of the Dead translated this political despair into action and called for a vote for the dead, stating, “We remind you that this sub-fascist police state is essentially dead (strength is in truth, and truth is in death), it has buried its future, it is made up of apartment pyramids of corpses who still can't admit that they are already dead. They will persist for a long time to come, but the soil is more persistent.” The black humor of such an appeal really broke down the boundaries into which the Russian opposition had driven itself. 

The philosophy of the Party of the Dead allows us to better understand what is happening not only inside Russia, but also on the front. When the AFU captured a bridgehead in the Kursk region, many hoped that the Russian command would transfer forces from Donbass to this region, which in turn would lead to a weakening of the Russian offensive in that direction. But nothing of the sort happened. Maxim Evstropov explains it this way: “It must be that the task of the so-called ‘special military operation’ is to seize and turn the Ukrainian territories into the ‘Russian world’, i.e. into something uninhabitable. In this case, the loss of its own territories (Kursk, Belgorod region, etc.) is of no significant importance for the Russian Federation, because they already represent the “Russian world”, i.e. they are not designed for life. The fact that some people still live there is more of an unfortunate coincidence from the authorities' point of view”.

I call Russia's current state system necroimperialism because it cultivates death and is unacceptable for the living. Maxim Evstropov believes that it is unacceptable not only for the living, but also for the dead. 

Translation: Sasha Starost.