Translation from Russian: Postimees 07.05.2026.
URL: https://rus.postimees.ee/8464998/nikolay-karpickiy-rossiya-ne-mozhet-otkazatsya-ot-dalneyshey-voennoy-ekspansii
URL: https://rus.postimees.ee/8464998/nikolay-karpickiy-rossiya-ne-mozhet-otkazatsya-ot-dalneyshey-voennoy-ekspansii
Recent attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often rely on conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for such a war. Philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky argues, however, that preparation for war is an endless process, and therefore wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.
Is Russia ready to open a second front against the Baltic states? At first glance, this seems contrary to common sense, since the Russian army is bogged down in Ukraine. However, history offers examples of countries at war launching new military campaigns even in times of crisis. At the end of August 1941, when Adolf Hitler began the operation to encircle Kyiv and destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, the Soviet Union invaded Iran and occupied its northern territories.
A more recent example came in August 2024, when Ukraine, unable to contain the Russian offensive in Donbas, launched a military operation in the Kursk region. From a military standpoint, it is illogical to open a new front and redirect forces there from critical sectors when the enemy enjoys superiority in manpower and materiel. However, in such cases, political considerations outweigh military ones.
Attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often stem from conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for war. Yet preparation for war is an endless process, so wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.
The Russian army was also unprepared for this new type of warfare when it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. If Vladimir Putin had waited until it was fully prepared, he would never have been able to start the war. Armies adapt during war itself, which is why the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces are now among the most experienced in the world in conducting modern warfare.
When we calculate the military or economic feasibility of aggression, we often project our own assumptions onto the adversary. That is why many people do not believe an attack on the Baltic states is possible. But Vladimir Putin has a different picture of the world in mind. He may decide to begin a new war regardless of the situation on the Ukrainian front or in the Russian economy.
That decision will be made at the moment when, based on his own internal perceptions, the Kremlin dictator believes that a window of opportunity for such an attack has opened.
Is Russia ready to open a second front against the Baltic states? At first glance, this seems contrary to common sense, since the Russian army is bogged down in Ukraine. However, history offers examples of countries at war launching new military campaigns even in times of crisis. At the end of August 1941, when Adolf Hitler began the operation to encircle Kyiv and destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, the Soviet Union invaded Iran and occupied its northern territories.
A more recent example came in August 2024, when Ukraine, unable to contain the Russian offensive in Donbas, launched a military operation in the Kursk region. From a military standpoint, it is illogical to open a new front and redirect forces there from critical sectors when the enemy enjoys superiority in manpower and materiel. However, in such cases, political considerations outweigh military ones.
Attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often stem from conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for war. Yet preparation for war is an endless process, so wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.
The Russian army was also unprepared for this new type of warfare when it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. If Vladimir Putin had waited until it was fully prepared, he would never have been able to start the war. Armies adapt during war itself, which is why the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces are now among the most experienced in the world in conducting modern warfare.
When we calculate the military or economic feasibility of aggression, we often project our own assumptions onto the adversary. That is why many people do not believe an attack on the Baltic states is possible. But Vladimir Putin has a different picture of the world in mind. He may decide to begin a new war regardless of the situation on the Ukrainian front or in the Russian economy.
That decision will be made at the moment when, based on his own internal perceptions, the Kremlin dictator believes that a window of opportunity for such an attack has opened.
A State Becomes Aggressive When It Assumes a Messianic Role
To assess the reality of the threat of Russian aggression, one must take into account that both people and states often act against their own interests. It may be advantageous to steal from a neighbor, but most people do not do so. Becoming a criminal means changing one’s destiny through a particular life choice. The same applies to states: most countries coexist peacefully with their neighbors, even when they have the opportunity to conquer them.
A state becomes aggressive when it assumes a “higher mission.” For example, the Shah’s Iran cooperated with Israel because doing so was beneficial. But the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to destroy the Jewish state, sacrificing the well-being of its own country and the lives of its citizens for the sake of this “mission.” Political and economic conditions are secondary here: they determine the timing and form of aggression, but they are not its root cause.
Russia Is a Country That Has Lost the Meaning of Life
Every state has a purpose and a meaning underlying its existence and functioning. But if that purpose is false, then the meaning of existence itself is lost.
For example, the meaning of the Soviet Union’s existence lay in spreading the communist system, which is why it sacrificed the well-being of its citizens in order to expand its influence throughout the world. Abandoning this mission because of exhausted resources and the bankruptcy of the communist idea meant losing the very meaning of its existence, which led to the inevitable collapse of the USSR.
Modern Russia has returned to the mission of “gathering lands,” though now stripped of communist ideology. It was precisely this mission that transformed the Principality of Moscow into the Russia that, throughout its history, waged wars of conquest. This mission first took shape in the 15th century, when Moscow destroyed the people of Novgorod as an independent ethnic group with their own language, culture, and social traditions.
Paradoxically, most Russians believe they live in the most peaceful country in the world — one that has never attacked anyone, but has only repeatedly been the victim of external aggression while always emerging victorious in every war. This blindness is explained by the fact that many Russians perceive aggressive wars as the just restoration of world order.
For them, Russia is any territory on which a Russian person has ever set foot and which has at some point been under Moscow’s rule. And it does not matter whether this was 500 years ago or 30 years ago. In this worldview, countries that break away from Russian control violate the natural order of the world, while everyone who actively resists Russia’s expansion serves global evil.
After the victory of the revolution in Russia in August 1991, the democratic movement sought to build a new Russia as a peaceful and self-sufficient country. However, Russia is “stitched together” from different national territories that were incorporated into it by force. The rejection by Yeltsin’s liberals of the mission of “gathering lands” as state ideology led to the emergence of centrifugal forces within the country and to the separation of the national peripheries from Moscow.
During the First Chechen War of 1994–1996, most Russians supported peace and an end to hostilities in the Caucasus, because it is unnatural for people to support the suffering and death brought about by war. Russian reformer Yegor Gaidar then said: “Better 100 years of negotiations than one day of war.” However, those same Russians overwhelmingly supported the Second Chechen War in 1999. One reason for this shift in public sentiment was fear of the country’s collapse, which was associated with chaos and a threat to personal survival.
In the view of most Russians, the West seeks to dismantle and destroy Russia. Therefore, the war against Ukraine is perceived by them as a defensive and just war waged by Russia against Western aggression. Accordingly, an attack on the Baltic states would likewise be perceived merely as a necessary defensive operation within the broader war that the West is allegedly already waging against Russia.
Abandoning the doctrine of confrontation with the West and the policy of expanding the “Russian world” under the paradigm that “Russia’s borders never end” would threaten the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s regime, which would then simply lose the very meaning of its existence.
An Attack on the Baltic States Can Be Prevented
Vladimir Putin is confident of mass support from Russians in the event of an invasion of the Baltic states. The readiness of the Russian army, possible military and economic losses, and the situation on the Ukrainian front are of secondary importance to him — the mission matters more. However, the prospect of a collective military response from NATO could deter him from attacking the Baltic states. But does he believe such a response would actually occur?
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for an automatic military response; it merely states that member states will provide assistance to the victim of aggression in whatever form they deem necessary. But what kind of assistance would Donald Trump consider necessary? Since he has demonstrated grievances toward other alliance members and reluctance to come to their aid in the event of war, Putin may believe that such assistance would be limited to another round of sanctions and calls for negotiations.
At the same time, since there is currently no observable transfer of Russian troops to the borders of the Baltic states, there is still time to act. The strongest step NATO could take would be a political declaration stating that, in the event of Russian aggression, all alliance countries would automatically enter the war without requiring additional approval from their political leadership.
It is possible that secret protocols for automatic responses to certain scenarios of Russian aggression already exist. However, Putin, convinced of his own impunity, will continue testing the alliance through provocations until he encounters a decisive military response. Therefore, a political declaration from NATO regarding the immediate use of force in the event of Russian aggression against alliance member states must be clearly communicated to the Kremlin.
Until such a declaration exists, the Baltic states can adopt the Ukrainian experience of creating a “wall of drones” and establishing high-tech defensive lines on land and underground, on water and underwater, in the air, and in space. Putin’s regime is already experiencing economic and military decline and is therefore, like a wounded beast, mortally dangerous. There can never be too much defense; there can only be too little time to prepare for war.








