Tuesday, August 4, 2026

Nikolai Karpitsky. Technology Has Changed Warfare. Will Western Leaders Draw the Right Conclusions from Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s Analysis?

 

On July 8, 2026, another article by Valerii Zaluzhnyi was published. He is one of the most rational analysts of modern warfare. The general demonstrated his strategic talent in the autumn of 2022, when he planned and executed a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive that remains one of the most remarkable military operations of the 21st century. The central thesis of the article is that advances in military technology require a fundamental reassessment of conventional ideas about war, including the very concept of military victory. NATO no longer meets the challenges of modern warfare, as it is an alliance designed for a world that no longer exists. Are Western leaders, who bear responsibility for the fate of their nations, prepared to draw the necessary conclusions and rethink their strategic vision of war?

Can Modern Warfare Be Prepared for in Peacetime?

Four years ago, one could say without any doubt that NATO possessed clear military superiority. However, the war has changed its character. Are the NATO countries – which have indeed done a great deal in recent years to strengthen their defense capabilities – ready for this challenge?

The Russian army at the time of its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was considered the second most powerful in the world. However, if that 2022-version of the Russian army had faced the modern Ukrainian army, it would be completely destroyed in a very short time. This is because military technology has advanced dramatically over the past four and a half years. The longer countries remain at war, the more experience they accumulate and the more they develop new technologies and methods of warfare. Over the course of the conflict, the armed forces of both countries have reached a new level that remains beyond the capabilities of militaries without firsthand experience of modern warfare – even highly advanced forces such as those of NATO countries.

Many people are now talking about a turning point in the war. However, I agree with the author of the article: what we are witnessing is not a turning point at all, but a natural evolution in the character of warfare driven by new technologies. In the summer of 2024, the Russian army advanced rapidly toward Pokrovsk. Had it managed to maintain that momentum and quickly capture the city, the road to Pavlohrad would have been open across the flat steppe. In that scenario, the Russian army would have had a real opportunity to split the front in two and trigger its collapse. Ukraine was facing a critical shortage of soldiers, and only a technological revolution could have salvaged the situation. And that is exactly what happened. Soldiers on the front lines were increasingly replaced by drones and robotic systems, partially offsetting the manpower shortage. As a result, the threat of a collapse of the front largely disappeared. As General Zaluzhnyi argues, neither Russia nor Ukraine is currently capable of achieving victory on the battlefield.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s View of the Modern Battlefield

The author of the article argues that the development of modern technologies has made the accomplishment of tactical objectives on the ground almost impossible. The gray zone along the line of contact has become a kill zone, where drones destroy any moving target. The problem is no longer how to hold a particular position, but how to reach it in the first place, or how to conduct troop rotations and evacuate the wounded. Two years ago, the greatest nightmare for soldiers was finding themselves in operational encirclement, with all lines of communication under enemy fire control. Today, virtually all troops holding positions on the front line are in a situation resembling operational encirclement. Under these conditions, achieving even limited tactical objectives comes at the cost of enormous losses that are disproportionate to the results achieved. However, Russia can afford such losses, whereas Ukraine cannot. For the Russian command, soldiers are treated as cheap expendable resources that can be continuously sent into the kill zone until individual Ukrainian positions are overwhelmed by successive waves of Russian assault troops. This is how Russia’s slow, grinding offensive proceeds – an approach that fully suits Putin.

At the same time, Ukraine has managed not only to disrupt frontline logistics – which has already contributed to a fuel and energy crisis in Crimea – but also to inflict significant damage on the Russian economy, contributing to gasoline shortages. However, Valerii Zaluzhnyi believes that Ukraine’s technological advantage is temporary. Russia will soon begin employing the same technologies and methods of warfare. Since Russia and Ukraine possess roughly comparable capabilities for developing military technologies, every effective solution created by one side will eventually be adopted by the other. It is reasonable to expect that in the near future, frontline cities on both sides of the front will be isolated in much the same way as Crimea. Later, each side will place the entire territory of the opposing state under drone control. As a result, the territories of both Ukraine and Russia could become one continuous battlefield.

Are European Countries Prepared for This Type of War?

The development of combat drones has reached a new level, and Russia was unprepared for it: Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries caused gasoline shortages and fueled public discontent. However, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine itself was not prepared for systematic attacks on its energy infrastructure. Oil depots burned, fuel storage facilities were destroyed, and logistics were disrupted. Over time, every country at war adapts to the enemy’s most painful strikes – and this is only natural. Equally natural is the fact that countries not at war cannot adapt to this new type of warfare.

Many Europeans still hold the outdated view that, in the event of further Russian aggression, the combat zone would be limited to NATO’s eastern flank – Poland and the Baltic states – while the rest of Europe would remain deep in the rear. However, in the near future, the autonomy and large-scale deployment of unmanned systems will increase to such an extent that the very concept of a “deep rear” will lose all meaning. In the event of a major conflict, targets across Europe – from Portugal to Iceland – could come under threat. Moreover, Europe’s infrastructure is, in many respects, more vulnerable than Ukraine’s.

Over the years of war, Ukraine has learned to disperse critical infrastructure, create redundant capacity, and rapidly restore damaged facilities. There is no such experience in European countries. On the contrary, a significant share of their energy, transport, and industrial infrastructure is highly concentrated, which, under conditions of the mass employment of long-range drones, could make it a relatively easy target. Although Russia does not yet possess all the necessary capabilities to exert such pressure on Europe, at the current pace of technological development it will gain this capability in the foreseeable future. At that point, the main priority will no longer be holding the front line, but preserving the state’s ability to maintain the functioning of its economy, critical infrastructure, and system of governance under constant precision strikes.

Is Victory over Russia Possible?

It is impossible for Ukraine to defeat Russia on its own. As Valerii Zaluzhnyi argues, the war of attrition is now being waged far from the front line. The objective is no longer primarily to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, but to destroy logistical routes and critical infrastructure. This dramatically increases the threat to the civilian population, yet so far it has not brought the war any closer to an end. As Zaluzhnyi writes: “Talking about achieving political goals, winning the war through tactical actions on the battlefield, or even through effective strikes against logistics and critical infrastructure – clearly goes beyond the bounds of common sense.”

Western countries have ruled out direct participation in the war and, until recently, have helped Ukraine only to defend itself, not to win. Within the prevailing paradigm of Western public consciousness, peace is regarded as the normal state of affairs, while war is viewed as a temporary and exceptional event. Consequently, many believe that it will be entirely possible to reach a peace agreement with the Russian regime if the war becomes sufficiently hopeless and costly for it. This misconception is doomed to fail.

Within the prevailing paradigm of Russian public consciousness, by contrast, war is regarded as the normal state of affairs. The Russian authorities are largely insensitive to military losses and are prepared to continue the war regardless of the economic damage. Russia cannot coexist peacefully with Europe for long because the very structure of governing such a vast territory relies not on the rule of law, but on force – which sooner or later leads to renewed military expansion. Russia has now entered a phase in which it can no longer halt its aggression, and even in the event of a temporary truce, it will continue waging a hybrid war.

A reassessment of the war in Western public consciousness is a necessary precondition for victory over Russia. The new type of warfare also requires a new understanding of what victory means. Military success should no longer be measured by the amount of territory captured or liberated, but by the extent to which the enemy’s system of state governance is disrupted. The war will not end when the Russian authorities recognize the futility of continuing it, but when the Russian state loses its capacity to govern effectively – and this is precisely what Western leaders fear.

Is this achievable? In reality, Russia has significant structural vulnerabilities. All of Siberia is connected to the rest of Russia by a single railway line. If this vital link were severed at any point, neither cargo nor troops could be transported. Will regional elites take advantage of such a situation? Anything is possible if internal contradictions within Russia intensify – between business and the state, between regional bureaucracies and the central government, and between public expectations and reality. Deepening these contradictions is also an integral part of the struggle against Russia.

Ukraine is doing only its part of this effort, but that alone is not enough. Therefore, without the involvement of other European countries – at least in the form of hybrid warfare – this objective cannot be achieved. However, the NATO alliance is unlikely to be an effective instrument, as it was created for different challenges in a different era. As Valerii Zaluzhnyi aptly observed, NATO is an alliance of the old world that no longer exists. Europe must therefore find new forms of military cooperation. But for that to happen, it is first necessary to convince Western societies, which, unfortunately, still fail to recognize that Russia has long been waging not only a conventional war against Ukraine, but also a hybrid war against Europe as a whole.
 
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Nikolai Karpitsky. Is the State an Instrument of Law or an Apparatus of Violence? Russia, Poland, and Ukraine: Historical Contradictions Can Be Overcome, but Civilizational Ones Cannot

 

At the core of political conflicts between Poland and Ukraine lies a divergent understanding of history. However, these contradictions can be overcome if historical disputes are not politicized but are instead approached through a shared understanding of the state as an instrument of the legal system designed to ensure normal social life. Political contradictions with Russia, however, are fundamentally irreconcilable. Even if enlightened liberals were to come to power in Russia, they would not be able to change the historical fact that Russia developed as a militarized state whose essence is not law but a mechanism of violence.

The Russian State and the Value of Its Citizens’ Lives

A war with Russia is like fighting a giant whose pain receptors have been switched off; one must strike in such a way that it loses the ability to move. This metaphor helps explain why many familiar mechanisms of pressure on Russia prove ineffective. Ukrainian strikes on Russia in the summer of 2026 led to a gasoline shortage and growing public dissatisfaction, but at the same time they also created new opportunities for enrichment for Putin’s associates. Over the years of war, the wealth of these elites has increased sharply, so they are not interested in ending it. Popular dissatisfaction is of no concern to the Russian authorities; what matters are only strikes that physically impede the Russian war machine: disrupting logistics, as well as the production and delivery chains of weapons.

We can see how democratic states make every effort to save their citizens who fall victim to terrorism or to actions of other states. This reflects an understanding of the state as an instrument of law, ensuring social life and the protection of citizens. Refusing to protect one’s citizens calls into question the very purpose of the state’s existence. However, in Russia the situation is different: citizens are treated as a resource and expendable material for the state. I will provide the examples.

On August 24, 2004, two Russian passenger airliners were blown up in mid-air, killing 89 people. The investigation was based on the assumption that they were blown up by suicide bombers. There were no reports of attempts to negotiate with the hijackers. However, I recall television statements arguing that this was the correct approach–that in the event of a terrorist hijacking, aircraft should be immediately destroyed. Overall, society reacted calmly to such statements, although there were occasional doubts about the risk of falling debris if planes were shot down over cities.

A week later, on September 1, 2004, Chechen terrorists seized a school in Beslan. This time, they managed to make a demand: the end of military operations in Chechnya. In response, Russian forces started shooting at the school, not caring that there were children inside. Once again, Russian society reacted calmly to these actions. After that, terrorist attacks of this kind eventually ceased, as even the terrorists came to realize that the Russian authorities were indifferent to the deaths of their own citizens.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian leadership faced a choice: allocate resources to support the population or conserve them for the war against Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, the authorities chose the latter. As a result, over the two years of the pandemic, Russia’s natural population decline exceeded by more than one million the level that could have been expected had the average trend of 2017–2019 continued. Russian society also reacted calmly to these losses, while the authorities appeared to regard them rather positively – as the removal of a burden that imposed additional social costs on the state.

The authorities view military losses in much the same way: the more people die from economically depressed regions, the lower the state’s social burden becomes. People are treated as a cheap, replaceable resource that can be expended without hesitation. This mindset is reflected on the battlefield. For example, the Ukrainian side believes it is better to sacrifice a robot than a soldier. From the Russian perspective, however, both are expendable assets; the only question is which is cheaper.

Why Is the Russian State Not for the Benefit of Its People?

Russia embodies a different civilizational model of the state, shaped by a number of historical and ideological factors.

  • First, Russia developed as a military power through continuous territorial expansion and conquest.
  • Second, the historical self-perception of Russians has been dominated by the messianic idea of “gathering the lands.” In different eras, this idea has taken different forms: the concept of the “Third Rome,” the vision of worldwide communism, and today’s belief in Russia’s unique civilizational mission. What has remained constant is the conviction that the state exists to fulfill a great historical mission, not for the well-being of its citizens.
  • Third, Russia’s vast territory required a centralized system of resource redistribution. This model of governance strengthened the vertical structure of power and fostered distrust toward federalism, local self-government, and any independent initiative from below.
  • Fourthly, there is the lingering impact of the Soviet legacy of repression and the Gulag camp system, where political prisoners were held alongside common criminals. Mass repression, collectivization, and the subsequent wave of urbanization contributed to the spread of prison subculture, which was adopted by peasants who fled to the cities and later transmitted to their children.
  • Fifth, throughout Russia’s history, state ideology has substituted for Russian national self-awareness. In many nation-states, identity is built around the people and their historical territory; however, Russian identity is associated with the state apparatus itself and the space it controls. Therefore, “Russia” is understood not so much as a country conceived as a community of people, but rather as a state hierarchy and the territories under its control.

In this paradigm, citizens are not the bearers of the state but an expendable resource. The paradox is that citizens themselves often regard such treatment as normal, because they do not believe that the state can be organized in any other way. Hence Russians’ ambivalent attitude toward the state: on the one hand, it is viewed as a necessary evil, an apparatus of violence – as they were taught in Soviet schools; on the other hand, it is seen as a means of fulfilling a historical mission, in which individual human lives are not of importance.

The Polish and Ukrainian Alternative to the Russian Understanding of the State

Western countries embody a legal model of the state that constitutes a civilizational alternative to the Russian model. The state is a social system that organizes relations between people through legal mechanisms. It includes a system of institutions that ensure the functioning of law, the protection of individuals, and the regulation of social relations, serving as the instrument through which a national legal system structures the life of society.

In the consciousness of citizens, the legitimacy of the state is inseparable from the legitimacy of the national legal system. Different states may justify their legitimacy in different ways: through history, religion, tradition, culture, or the democratic choice of citizens. For example, historical memory holds special significance in Polish public consciousness. As a result, tragic events of the past continue to be perceived as an important component of contemporary national identity.

Ukrainian political culture, by contrast, is largely shaped by the memory of the struggle for independence. To illustrate this, I refer to the essay “What Is Contemporary Ukrainian Identity?” by my Ukrainian colleague Yulia Fil, who lived in Poland for some time after the full-scale invasion and later returned to Ukraine. Through conversations with her Polish friends, she arrived at several conclusions that she reflects in her essay. I will cite a few excerpts.

Yulia Fil: “Sometime during the second year of the war, in one of the Polish podcasts I had heard the opinion that Poles seem to care more about their past: they enjoy visiting museums, castles, and ruins, whereas Ukrainians are less interested in the past and are more oriented toward the future. At first, this struck me as a somewhat speculative claim, because as someone working in the cultural sphere, I have observed a growing interest among Ukrainians in history and culture as a whole – not only their own. According to my subjective observations, this trend began to emerge after the start of the war with Russia.

…Nevertheless, although Poland lost its independence during several partitions and under the influence of foreign powers, it preserved a certain continuity of statehood and gained experience in extraordinary national consolidation during periods when its statehood was lost. …Ukrainian statehood, by contrast, was short-lived and lacked continuity. Its independent manifestations can be identified mainly in the eras of Kyivan Rus’ and the Zaporizhian Sich. Consequently, when our national identity turns to history, it tends to appeal to a mythologized version of it, because our statehood flared up like a match only a few times over the course of a thousand years, while the intervals between those brief moments were periods of subjugation and foreign domination. Thus, while for Poles the history of the independent and powerful Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth has been passed down from generation to generation, we learn about our own periods of statehood mainly from school textbooks, and even there they are often presented in a mythologized form. Before us stand medieval princes whom we perceive more as characters from a fantasy game than as our ancestors, and Cossacks – freedom-loving warriors with long forelocks – with whom we also have little in common, since the Sich disappeared long ago, and our great-grandfathers could no longer tell us stories about it.

…What is genuinely Ukrainian and resonates with us today is alive – we create it every day through free art. The word free deserves special emphasis, because it means that it emerges from society itself rather than being an ideological construct imposed from above through rigid templates and symbols. It encompasses everything, from classical forms to bold experimentation.

…Once Ukrainians became interested in themselves here and now, an interest in the past also awakened. Historical podcasts have become extraordinarily popular on YouTube. We are rediscovering our past and weaving it into our present. So, was the expert in that Polish podcast mistaken?

I can still agree with him, because although Ukrainians are now developing a growing interest in their own past, it nevertheless plays a different role in the structure of our identity than it does for Poles. For Poles, the past is the foundation of identity. For us, the foundation of identity is the present, oriented toward the future while creatively reinterpreting and reimagining the past.”

I cannot fully assess the author’s opinion, because I have never been to Poland and have no opportunity to visit it. However, I am familiar with the Polish diaspora in Tomsk, my hometown in Siberia. The Polish community there has existed for more than 150 years, dating back to the Polish Uprising of 1863–1864. Throughout that time, Poles have preserved their national identity, maintained their ties to Polish culture and history, and conducted historical research on the Polish diaspora in Siberia. This distinctive attitude toward their own history sets them apart from my other fellow townspeople. Since, in Polish public consciousness, the legitimacy of the state is grounded in history, Poles cannot regard tragic events from their past, such as the Volhynia massacre, as merely abstract historical facts.

The Ukrainian perception of the state, in turn, is closely connected with the heroic narrative of the struggle for independence. At the same time, the country’s long colonial experience has fostered a certain distrust of state institutions as such and a stronger reliance on personal relationships. On the one hand, this enhances Ukrainian society’s capacity for self-organization, as demonstrated by the success of the two revolutions in 2004 and 2014, as well as by the extensive volunteer movement during Russia’s aggression. On the other hand, it also contributes to a tendency to disregard formal rules and to adopt a tolerant attitude toward corruption.

In wartime, any challenge to the heroic national narrative – even one that is well grounded in historical evidence – is perceived in Ukraine as if the country’s very struggle for survival were being called into question. It is precisely this difference in the perception of history that provides fertile ground for historical and diplomatic disputes between Ukraine and Poland, the escalation of which serves Russia’s interests.

Contradictions Between Poland and Ukraine Can Be Overcome

Historical disputes can be overcome; civilizational differences cannot. I possess neither the scholarly expertise nor the moral authority to intervene in historical disputes between Poland and Ukraine or to pass judgment on either side. However, I am convinced that historical disagreements between states can be resolved if they are not politicized but instead entrusted to professional historians. This requires shared academic forums – ideally, an international research institute devoted to disputed historical issues – where scholars from both countries could engage in discussions in accordance with academic standards of objectivity, which are fundamentally incompatible with the dictates of any political ideology.

Despite their historical disagreements, Poland and Ukraine share the same civilizational model of the state, one that differs fundamentally from the Russian model. Because of this, any contradictions between them can be addressed within a common legal conception of the state. The same approach cannot resolve contradictions with Russia, however, because those contradictions are civilizational in nature.

This raises an important question: within this legal paradigm, is it possible to arrive at a solution for how Russia should be dealt with?

Legal Justification for the Deconstruction of Empire

In the legal paradigm, the state can be defined as an instrument for implementing the norms and requirements of a national legal system in the life of society. There are different national legal systems, which include legislation, the system of law, legal culture, and law enforcement. The general principles of national legal systems serve as the foundation of international law, of which Russia is also a subject. However, this creates a contradiction in legal logic, because Russia functions as a non-legal state that systematically violates the principles of law. This means that Russia retains its international legal personality solely through military force, having lost the substantive legal foundations of its legitimacy.

After the Russian legal system was adapted to support aggressive warfare and repression, it lost its legitimacy. At present, Russia is in a condition in which it cannot stop waging war; even if the Russian authorities were to conclude a temporary ceasefire along the front line, this would likely lead to an intensification of hybrid warfare against all European countries. Therefore, these countries have the full right to counter the Russian threat in any form, provided that this does not violate their own legal principles and norms.

Do Russians have the right to self-determination and independence in the post-war period? First, the inhabitants of Russia, unlike, for example, the citizens of Ukraine or Poland, do not possess a unified collective subjectivity. Second, there are no political institutions capable of speaking on behalf of Russians. In the future, social actors may emerge representing specific regions or peoples inhabiting Russia, who will raise questions about the right to self-determination. Within Russia, such questions are structurally insoluble; therefore, the international community will face two problems: on what grounds new subjects should be recognized, and in what form their right to self-determination may be implemented.

Thus, the future fate of post-war Russia should be determined by those who make a significant contribution to its defeat – above all Ukraine, as well as other states and political forces that participate in the struggle against it. Such a coalition will face the historical task of deconstructing the empire so that Russia will never again wage wars of conquest.

Are all participants in such an anti-Russian coalition ready to assume this historical responsibility? I think not sufficiently. However, the situation can be changed if we begin discussing the legal mechanism of imperial deconstruction already now, while Russia is still advancing on the front and the end of the war is not yet in sight. This would provide a clear vision of the goal of the struggle against Russia, which would contribute to additional motivation to overcome disagreements between states and to more effectively mobilize forces for a common victory.
 
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Nikolai Karpitsky. Sexual Humiliation as an Instrument of Russian Military Policy

 
In archaic authoritarian societies, sexual relations are not regarded as a private matter between two individuals but as an object of public control, where society itself determines their permissible forms and character. Only in relatively recent times in democratic countries have sexual relations come to be understood primarily as a sphere of personal freedom and individual choice. Such an approach is unacceptable to the contemporary Russian authorities, which in their attitude toward sexuality demonstrate not merely conservatism but a drive to revive the most primitive forms of social control. As a result, sexual humiliation becomes one of the instruments used to maintain the system of power and to mobilize society for war.

If one looks at the Russian–Ukrainian war from the outside, a paradoxical picture emerges. A person who, through his behavior and manner of speech, demonstrates a lack of empathy, indifference to human life, and at the same time fear of his own death and loss of power, has found himself at the head of a vast country. His only political talent is the ability to adapt to those above him in the hierarchy. Having come to see himself as a great statesman and conqueror, he has unleashed a war against a neighboring nation.

What is striking, however, is not this, but the fact that, by the will of one person, hundreds of thousands of Russians are sent to kill inhabitants of a neighboring country who have done them no harm. Many go to war voluntarily and are prepared to die pointlessly rather than oppose those who started it. Moreover, a significant part of Russian society has supported the war against a people who were until recently considered fraternal, despite the fact that many Russians still have relatives or friends in Ukraine.

The Formation of a Prison-Camp Subculture

What is wrong with Russians? In fact, the problem is not the nation itself, but the social system that maintains hierarchy through various mechanisms, including sexual humiliation. This involves sexual insults, sexualized violence, the threat of such violence, or its symbolic imitation, as well as the reduction of social status by equating a person with a defenseless object of sexual violence.

In authoritarian societies, especially in wartime, the humiliation of women is more widespread, but under the current Kremlin regime, men have become the primary targets of sexual humiliation. However, one might object that this phenomenon exists only within a prison-camp subculture and is therefore marginal. But is that really the case?

One of the key stages in Russia’s history was the 1930s, when collectivization coincided with mass repression. Millions of people from various social strata passed through the system of labor camps. It was there that the prison-camp subculture was formed, gradually permeating the everyday life of urban residents. For many peasants, moving to the city was perceived as an opportunity to escape the collective farm system. Having lost traditional forms of rural life, they encountered in the city the behavioral norms of the prison-camp subculture, without realizing that anything different was possible. Over time, these norms were transmitted to subsequent generations and eventually began to be perceived not as an exception, but as a habitual way of human interaction.

Perversion of Human Dignity

The goal of Russian policy regarding LGBT people is not, in fact, to combat non-traditional sexual orientation. On the contrary, its purpose is to institutionalize sexual violence as one of the instruments of power. This refers to violence that implies symbolic or real homosexual subjugation. This process is accompanied by the perversion of the very concept of human dignity.

As I understand it, human dignity is the preservation of oneself and one’s personality despite external circumstances: whatever happens, a person remains themselves. Only through the perversion of the concept of human dignity does it become possible for people to mass-support the killing of their friends and relatives in a neighboring country at the whim of a single individual.

In contemporary Russian society, general civic norms are being displaced by norms formed within the prison-camp subculture, in which people subjected to sexual humiliation belong to a specially designated untouchable caste. In terms of social stigmatization, this caste is among the most devalued groups known in the history of various societies.

Sexual Humiliation in “Black” and “Red” Zones

In Russia, penal institutions are divided into “black zones,” where order is governed by criminal authorities, and “red zones,” where the administration dominates. In “black zones,” transfer into the caste of the sexually humiliated is carried out by criminals themselves through physical sexual violence. In “red zones,” this is carried out by the institution’s administration, but most often not through physical sexual acts, but through their symbolic substitution.

In the prison-camp subculture, any equal interaction with a sexually humiliated person leads to the loss of one’s own status. For example, using their dishes is considered a sign of belonging to their caste. Exploiting this, the administration of “red zones” sometimes stages provocations: a prisoner is first deprived of normal food and then offered food in dishes previously used by a member of the lowest caste. If the prisoner cannot withstand it or fails to notice the trick, they themselves are transferred into the caste of the sexually humiliated.

In such a subculture, preserving human dignity means avoiding sexual humiliation at any cost. As a result, betrayal, deception, violence, or the humiliation of others are perceived as acceptable or even honorable actions if they allow one to avoid a decline in status.

The Russian authorities could eradicate sexual violence in the “zones” if they issued the relevant directives. However, they regard the hierarchy based on sexual humiliation as an additional tool for governing society. For this reason, they see the LGBT movement as a threat to the established system of symbolic relations of power and subordination. The Russian authorities are not opposed to homosexual relations themselves; they are opposed to treating the passive participants in such relations as human beings. It is precisely for this reason that legislation targeting LGBT people is continually being tightened in Russia.

The Essence of Russian Policy in the Sexual Sphere

The goal of the Russian authorities is to impose on society a distorted conception of human dignity. According to this logic, any actions – no matter how cruel, immoral, or criminal – are considered acceptable if they allow a person to avoid moving downward within the social hierarchy, at the very bottom of which stands the caste of the sexually humiliated.

After all, anyone can end up at the very bottom. In Russia, any businessman or high-ranking official can be arrested and, if he does not demonstrate sufficient obedience, the prison administration may receive the relevant instructions. Fear of such a prospect pushes people to adopt a distorted understanding of human dignity in order to preserve their social status. Any act, even the most dishonorable one, is seen as an expression of dignity if it saves a person from the threat of ending up at the lowest level of the social hierarchy. Within this system of coordinates, if you are sexually humiliated, it is regarded as a loss of human dignity; but if you do the same to another person, it is instead interpreted as confirmation of your dignity.

Propaganda about the defense of traditional values serves as an ideological cover for Russian policy in the sexual sphere. For this purpose, the Kremlin authorities enlist religious leaders who spread a narrative about a godless and demonic West that allegedly destroys traditional moral norms by supporting LGBT rights. In particular, such claims have been repeatedly voiced in the speeches of Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church. However, neither Patriarch Kirill nor other Russian authorities address the issue of sexual violence in prisons, the army, or in the occupied territories.

The Russian authorities use both prison administrations and representatives of the criminal milieu to maintain among prisoners a constant fear of losing social status through sexual humiliation. They have extended this practice to the army as well, applying various forms of sexual humiliation to soldiers who refuse to take part in deadly assaults.

At a certain point, this fear becomes so strong that it outweighs even the fear of death. Then a psychological mechanism is triggered that transforms fear into a perverted sense of dignity, manifested in a willingness to kill pointlessly and to die just as pointlessly. This contributes to the formation of a form of gnostic fatalism, characterized by a sense of the loss of the value of life and the inevitability of death. However horrific such a worldview may be, its alternative – ending up in the caste of the sexually humiliated – is perceived by Russian soldiers as an even more terrifying prospect.

Yet there are also millions of Russians who support the war while enjoying peaceful life in the rear and do not feel any immediate threat of sexual humiliation. They perceive Kremlin policy in the sexual sphere as liberation from their own conscience and as a justification for any immoral actions, believing that everything is permitted to them as long as it does not lead to a loss of social status.
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Monday, June 15, 2026

Nikolai Karpitsky. The Messianic Idea of Russia. Article Two. Is Russia’s Greatness More Important Than One’s Own Religion and the Lives of Fellow Believers?

 

It would seem that supporting a war of conquest accompanied by war crimes is incompatible with religious conscience. How can a religious person remain indifferent when the residents of a neighboring country – including fellow believers – are denied the right to live? Before the war, Russian Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Muslims, and Krishnaites communicated with their fellow believers in Ukraine, recognizing a shared identity. Yet when faced with the choice between supporting a war against a neighboring people and preserving fellowship with their Ukrainian co-believers, most of them chose the war. Is it possible to change their minds? How did it happen that the messianic idea of Russia became more important to them not only than the lives of their fellow believers, but even than their own religion?

If support for the war were merely connected to ignorance or misunderstanding resulting from exposure to Russian propaganda, they could perhaps be persuaded otherwise by the testimony of fellow believers and friends from Ukraine whom they had trusted before the war. However, this is not simply a matter of misconceptions, but of embracing a new goal-setting in defiance of their previous religious experience and relationships with fellow believers. This new goal-setting is accompanied by a particular type of collective emotional experience – a quasi-religious experience.

The Goal-Setting of Social Institutions

Why is Russia unable to abandon military expansion? This is connected to its goal-setting, namely the messianic idea of gathering lands. Goal-setting is an orientation toward a goal or mission that gives meaning to existence.

There are two types of goal-setting in social institutions:

The goal-setting of some institutions is expressed through supporting the internal life of a community, communication among its members, and the satisfaction of their needs. Examples include hobby clubs or regional associations, whose existence is justified simply by maintaining a shared space for communication and mutual support.

The goal-setting of other institutions lies in something external to the internal life of the community. For example, a political party has meaning only insofar as it implements a particular political program. If this task is not fulfilled, the party loses its reason for existence, even if its members still enjoy meeting and socializing with one another.

A similar distinction can also be observed at the level of states. Some states are oriented toward internal development, the welfare of the population, and peaceful coexistence with their neighbors. Others structure their existence around a particular mission. Such states are prepared to wage aggressive wars, even when doing so is destructive to themselves.

Every religion exists in two dimensions: in the inner lives of people as a spiritual tradition, and in external public life as a religious social institution. However, as a social institution, religion differs from secular institutions precisely in the nature of its goal-setting.

The goal-setting of secular institutions exists within the social sphere. They address specific political, economic, or cultural tasks and help organize public life. The goal-setting of religious institutions is oriented toward a higher realm – that is, toward transcendent being beyond everyday life. Their ultimate purpose is connected with human salvation, liberation from suffering, or overcoming the meaninglessness of existence through turning toward a higher reality.

Because of this, under normal conditions religion and secular society can coexist without interfering with one another, since they pursue different aims in social life and in relation to transcendent being.

The Messianic Idea of Russia Distorts Religious Goal-Setting

Under conditions of dictatorship, the Russian authorities demand complete loyalty from social institutions, including religious ones, as well as support for the war against Ukraine. In these circumstances, religious organizations face a choice: either adopt a neutral position, thereby risking marginalization and repression, or adapt themselves to the demands of the authorities. However, such adaptation requires altering religious goal-setting in such a way that the goal of religious salvation comes to be viewed as secondary to a supposedly higher objective – the fulfillment of Russia’s historical mission.

As a result, an ideology emerges that is religious in form but political in its goal-setting, and which can be classified neither as a religion nor as a secular worldview. At its core lies a fusion of religious practice with political messianism, allowing it to be characterized as a quasi-religion.

As early as the fifteenth century, during the confrontation between the Principality of Moscow and Novgorod, the messianic idea of the “gathering of lands” began to take shape. Initially, it received Orthodox religious justification through the concept of “Moscow as the Third Rome.” Later, during the Soviet period, it was reinterpreted within the framework of atheistic communist ideology while retaining its expansionist character. The current situation demonstrates that support for this messianic idea is not unique to the Orthodox Church, since it is shared by representatives of many different confessions, including Protestants, Muslims, and Krishnaites.

The Russian Quasi-Religion

Most Russians are convinced that they live in the most peace-loving country in the world – one that has never attacked anyone, but has only repeatedly been subjected to external aggression. In other words, they regard all wars fought by Russia as defensive, while the expansion of Russian territory resulting from these wars is interpreted as the liberation of other peoples and their voluntary reunification with Russia. Put differently, Russians perceive aggressive wars as the just restoration of world order. Only by becoming part of Russia, in their view, do other peoples acquire the true meaning of their existence.

In order to justify war within a religious context, it is necessary to portray the enemy not merely as a political rival, but as the embodiment of absolute evil and an enemy of God. As a result, the surrounding world comes to be perceived as a kingdom of evil opposed by Russia. The West is portrayed as the incarnation of evil forces seeking to destroy traditional values, religion, and the “Russian world.” Consequently, the idea of human salvation is replaced by the idea of struggle against Western civilization.

In religion, movement toward a higher transcendent principle may be accompanied by spiritual struggle against dark otherworldly forces that hinder human salvation. In a quasi-religion, however, the image of these dark forces is projected onto Western civilization as a whole. Ukraine is viewed as an apostate that has fallen away from Russia and sided with evil, and therefore must either be brought back by force or destroyed. For this reason, Russian believers not only refuse to listen to their Ukrainian fellow believers, but recoil from them with religious horror, as though they were people who had crossed over to the side of demonic forces.

As religion is gradually displaced by quasi-religion, inner religious experiences are replaced by experiences resembling psychological dependency. They can be compared to addiction: a person experiences euphoria from participation in a “great mission,” but when confronted with the truth and moments of mental clarity, they undergo something akin to withdrawal symptoms. This, in turn, provokes aggression toward anyone attempting to convey truthful information to them. As a result, they once again return to listening to propagandists in order to regain the euphoric state.

On the basis of this quasi-religious experience, adherents of different religions develop a new shared identity with all those who recognize Russia’s mission as the highest value, while excluding their Ukrainian fellow believers from this community. The round table discussion “World Religions Against the Ideology of Nazism and Fascism in the 21st Century,” held in the building of the State Duma of the Russian Federation on March 29, 2022, clearly demonstrated how representatives of different confessions unite around a dualistic perception of the world based on the opposition between “us” and “them,” good and absolute evil. Through their speeches at the round table, they effectively proclaimed a new quasi-religion in relation to which their traditional religious differences were regarded as secondary. Since these speeches did not provoke any significant critical reaction from their followers, it can be concluded that this quasi-religion has become one of the most important social factors shaping religious consciousness in Russia – a factor that cannot be ignored.
 
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Nikolai Karpitsky. Russia’s Messianic Idea. Article One. The Baltic States Under Threat

 

Are the Baltic states threatened by a Russian invasion? The Kremlin leader may well decide that a window of opportunity has opened precisely now. The Russian army has experience fighting a modern war. In the event of an attack on the Baltic states, it would take at least several months for European armies and the military-industrial complex to adapt to the modern type of warfare. U.S. President Donald Trump is demonstrating his unwillingness to come to the aid of Europeans. But are there real preconditions for such an invasion? Western intelligence services still do not see signs of preparations for it, and a number of political and economic arguments can be made against such a scenario. However, there is another argument that is often overlooked – Russia’s messianic goal-setting, which is what brought a man like Putin to power.

Could Russia attack the Baltic states before the war in Ukraine ends?

There are strong arguments as to why Russia cannot start a new war right now. First, from a military standpoint, it is not yet ready for a new war. Second, Russia is already bogged down in the war against Ukraine and therefore cannot divert forces to a new conflict. Third, attacking other countries would worsen Russia’s already difficult economic situation and intensify public dissatisfaction.

In response to the first argument, it can be noted that preparation for war is an endless process, because as an army is modernized, it simultaneously becomes obsolete. The situation is constantly changing, and if wars only began when armies were fully prepared, no country would ever be able to start one. History teaches that wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured. The Russian army was also unprepared for this new type of warfare when it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Armies adapt during the course of war itself, and through this process they become stronger than even the most powerful peacetime armies. Therefore, at present the Russian and Ukrainian armies are among the strongest in the world, despite the fact that by formal indicators they may lag behind NATO armies.

In response to the second argument, one can cite examples of countries at war launching new military campaigns even in times of crisis. At the end of August 1941, while Hitler was carrying out the operation to encircle Kyiv and destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, the Soviet Union launched a new large-scale military campaign at the very moment of this military catastrophe – it invaded Iran and occupied its northern part.

Finally, there is a more recent example. In August 2024, the position of the Ukrainian army in Donbas was critical. The Russian army was advancing toward Pokrovsk, and no one knew whether it could be stopped or whether the front would collapse. At that time, drones still did not play the role they do today, and there was a catastrophic shortage of soldiers. It was precisely at this moment that the Ukrainian army launched a successful offensive in the Kursk region, even though such an offensive required Ukraine to redeploy forces from Donbas. The Russian command did not expect this, because it operated according to military logic: after all, opening a new front is disadvantageous precisely for the side with fewer resources. Even any gamer who plays computer strategy games knows this.

In such cases, political considerations outweigh military ones. Especially since an attack on one or several Baltic states also has its own military logic behind it: if the Ukrainian section of the front has become practically impregnable, why not strike at a vulnerable sector? Even if the blitzkrieg of “Tallinn in three days” fails, a ceasefire in the Baltics could be traded for an end to military aid to Ukraine.

The third argument is connected to the mistaken belief that actions can always be explained rationally by taking into account factors such as benefit and external circumstances. In reality, both people and states very often act contrary to their own interests, and the motivations behind their actions can vary widely, ranging from rational to irrational.

For some, material gain is the primary motivation, which makes it possible to predict the behavior of politicians such as Donald Trump. For others, it is a messianic idea that influences the decisions of Vladimir Putin.

Why Are Some States Peaceful While Others Are Aggressive?

Why do some states coexist peacefully with their neighbors, while others constantly wage wars? Does this depend on the political situation, the history of the people, or something else? The same can be observed among individuals. There are aggressive people who will inevitably attack someone as soon as the opportunity arises, and there are kind, peaceful people who would never behave that way. The difference between them is rooted in their differing attitudes toward life, which define both the meaning of their lives and their identities as individuals. In a similar way, the character of a state is determined by the mission that, in the eyes of its inhabitants, gives meaning to its existence.

Like people, states can be either peaceful or aggressive. In relation to some, we are confident that they would not attack weaker neighbors even if they knew they could do so with impunity. But there are also states ready to unleash war even if they themselves would suffer enormous losses as a result. The priority value of peaceful states is the life and well-being of their citizens. Their mission lies in development and in ensuring the prosperity of their own country. Aggressive states, however, see their mission in something external to the everyday lives of their citizens and therefore are willing to sacrifice those citizens’ lives.

For example, under the Shah’s Iran cooperated with Israel for pragmatic reasons, whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to destroy the Jewish state and is willing to make sacrifices for that goal. In this case, the destruction of another country takes priority over the prosperity of one’s own.

What Is Goal-Setting?

A mission is a goal that gives meaning to existence. That is, it is not just any goal, but one determined through a free choice of values. This choice, which defines both the meaning of a person’s life and the mission of a state, will be referred to here as “goal-setting.”

The loss of goal-setting leads to disillusionment with the meaning of existence. For example, the goal-setting of the Soviet Union was the construction of a global communist system. This supreme mission was considered more important than the well-being of citizens and served as justification for countless sacrifices of human lives. Mass disillusionment with this mission led to the collapse of the entire Soviet system.

Russia’s Imperial Mission

The process of transforming the Principality of Moscow into Russia began in the fifteenth century with the annexation of the Novgorod Republic, which led to the destruction of one of the East Slavic peoples with its own language, culture, and social traditions. This was justified by the mission of the “gathering of lands,” around which a centralized state took shape, constantly expanding its borders through military conquest.

Later, Russia’s wars of expansion led to the physical destruction of a whole series of other peoples. Renouncing this mission would have meant losing the very meaning of Russia’s existence, and therefore any sacrifice could be justified in its name. The brutal oppression of its own subjects contributed to making them willing to fight and die for this mission, while the Russian authorities ruthlessly expended human lives in every war.

However, we know that people can change. Could Russia have changed by abandoning its goal-setting? I believe this was possible, although extremely difficult to achieve. Such an attempt was made after the victory of the democratic revolution in Russia in August 1991. Masses of people supported the democratic movement in the hope of building a new Russia as a peaceful and civilized country. However, it very quickly became clear that if Russia lost its imperial mission, nothing would remain capable of holding together all the territories that had been forcibly incorporated into it. The centrifugal forces within the country frightened not only the authorities but also ordinary Russians, for it is precisely they who are the main bearers of the messianic consciousness on which politicians parasitize.

During the First Chechen War of 1994–1996, the majority of Russians supported peace and an end to the fighting in the Caucasus. Any normal person intuitively senses the unnaturalness of war, and at that moment Russians were psychologically unprepared to justify the suffering and death caused by it. However, opposition to the war did not amount to a rejection of the Russian messianic idea. Gradually, fear of the country’s collapse – which was associated with chaos and a threat to personal survival – outweighed fear of war, and by 1999 Russians were already massively supporting a new war in Chechnya.

The reason for the mass support of Vladimir Putin and all the aggressive wars he unleashed is that, for many Russians, he became the embodiment of the mission of the “gathering of lands.” It is telling that many of those who had opposed him before 2014 switched to supporting him after the occupation of Crimea. Today they may express dissatisfaction with the war in Ukraine, but this dissatisfaction is not caused by the criminal nature of the war; rather, it stems from the belief that the war has not been successful enough. Therefore, many of them would support military intervention in the Baltic states as long as there remained hope for its success.

So, Will Russia Attack the Baltic States?

A new war in Europe depends not so much on objective factors as on the subjective perceptions of one man – Vladimir Putin – who himself does not know how he will act. However, Russia’s very goal-setting, which he seeks to embody, implies that military expansion cannot stop with Ukraine alone.

So is a new war inevitable? Imagine that you have let a kleptomaniac or a sexual predator into your house. You believe that committing a crime there would not be beneficial for him, and to be completely sure, you even make certain that no opportunity presents itself. But you overlook the main thing: he will inevitably commit a crime when, according to his own subjective perceptions, he considers it possible – perceptions that you cannot rationally calculate.

Historically, it so happened that the deviant behavior of one man – Vladimir Putin – coincided with a deviant historical phenomenon: Russia’s goal-setting. Therefore, he will inevitably start a new war against one or several European countries as soon as, according to his own subjective perceptions, he decides that a window of opportunity has opened.
 
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Thursday, May 14, 2026

Nikolai Karpitsky. Will Russian Zoomers Break the Cycle of Imperial Consciousness?



Russian imperial consciousness is reproduced from generation to generation through the family, the school system, and the very structure of everyday life. But is there hope that, in the new information age, this continuity will be broken? In Russia, young people have migrated en masse into the online space, where they form subcultures and acquire new knowledge and communication skills independently of school and family. However, the Russian authorities intend to restrict the free internet as much as possible. What could this lead to?

Who Are Zoomers?

People born from the mid-1990s to the early 2010s are the first generation of the digital age, often referred to as Generation Z, or zoomers. A typical representative of this generation cannot imagine life without the internet, smartphones, and social media; is less inclined toward smoking and alcohol consumption; and places a strong emphasis on a healthy lifestyle. Zoomers perceive themselves as cosmopolitans of a free online space, within which they unite into communities and form subcultures. It is there that they master the English language, which they were unable to learn properly at school, and gain a sense of freedom from national borders.

The Unpredictable Consequences of Information Technologies

Social processes are difficult to predict – they usually have to be explained after the fact. Who could have foreseen that the spread of information technologies would lead to the uprising of the archaic around the world and contribute to Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election? Nevertheless, this can be explained in hindsight.

A primitive and archaic worldview prevented many people from keeping pace with modern life, confining them within a small and familiar world. However, the new information space created by digital technologies destroyed this comfort zone by drawing them into the wider world – and this changed the balance of political forces. Zoomers, however, are still too young to become a comparable force in major politics. Decades must pass before the current participants in youth subcultures grow up and enter the elite that determines the direction of society’s development.

Meanwhile, the Russian authorities have long mobilized in support of everyone oriented toward archaic – and such people do not need the internet for this. The authorities intend to keep the younger generation in an informational reservation as a resource for replenishing manpower at the front and therefore are consistently fighting against the free internet. But is this actually possible?

As the experience of the ten-year occupation of eastern regions of Ukraine has shown, theoretically, this is possible. One of my students, who communicated with young people in territories occupied since 2014, noted that they seemed to have stopped developing: “While we are active in life, looking for jobs to support ourselves during our studies and making our own decisions, the local youth are infantile – it would never occur to them to decide anything for themselves.” During the full-scale invasion, all these young people were sent to die at the front. Can the same be done to the entirety of Russia’s youth? I believe that this is precisely one of the goals behind the struggle against the free internet.

The Struggle Against the Free Internet – a Transition from Authoritarianism to Totalitarianism

Until 2011, there were no restrictions on the internet in Russia for the same reason that the authorities are now trying to restrict it as much as possible: Russian dictator Vladimir Putin did not and does not understand what the internet is or what significance it has in the life of a modern person.

In 2012, a registry of banned websites was introduced, which internet providers were required to block. In 2014, the Prosecutor General’s Office received the authority to block websites without a court order. On November 1, 2019, “The Sovereign Internet Law” came into force, providing for the installation of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment on operators’ networks in order to establish full control over the network and isolate the Russian internet from the global web. After the start of the full-scale war on February 24, 2022, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and numerous independent media outlets were blocked. The transition from selective blocking to total political censorship had begun. In January 2026, the State Duma granted the FSB the authority to shut down any forms of communication – internet access and mobile communications – in any region of the country. From that moment on, internet access in Russia ceased to be a right and became a privilege granted by the authorities.

By blocking the internet, the Kremlin intends to confine young people to an informational reservation cut off from the outside world. But is an apolitical youth capable of resisting this?

Ukrainian and Russian Zoomers

Whereas Ukrainian zoomers generally seek to integrate the possibilities of new information technologies into their social lives, their Russian peers are, more often than not, escapists. This is explained by the different paths Ukraine and Russia have taken in the 21st century.

Ukrainian youth witnessed two democratic revolutions, and this instilled in them a belief in their own strength and in the possibility of influencing public life. They want a new Ukraine – free from corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy and open to every talented person. Young people are ready to fight for such a country, as the Cardboard Maidan demonstrated.

In Russia, by contrast, an authoritarian regime became established – initially in a relatively soft form: the authorities adhered to an unspoken social contract with the population: “You do not interfere in politics, and we do not interfere in your private life.” This encouraged young people to retreat into the online space. There emerged a social stratum of young people who wanted nothing to do with Russian social reality and had no interest in what was happening in the country. Conversations about politics in their circles were considered almost indecent – as reminders of the world from which they wished to distance themselves completely.

After the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the authoritarian Kremlin regime finally transformed into a totalitarian one, seeking to control every sphere of human life, including the internet. Nevertheless, escapist zoomers try not to notice this.

On the one hand, this is an escape from responsibility for social life. From a Ukrainian point of view, such a position is perceived as a manifestation of infantilism and irresponsibility, as well as silent complicity in the crimes committed by Russia.

On the other hand, Russian zoomers are the first generation to shape themselves independently of the state within their own subcultures. And this offers a chance to finally break the vicious chain through which Russian imperial consciousness has been reproduced from generation to generation. It is a kind of escape that leaves open the possibility of returning to reality – armed with newly acquired knowledge and skills.

The Russian authorities cannot allow this and will do everything possible to fill the still largely apolitical consciousness of zoomers with their own ideological content. Yet the archaic worldview promoted by Kremlin propaganda is completely incompatible with the image of the informational future. On the one hand, there is a world without borders, the ability to communicate with anyone from any corner of the Earth, and access to the entirety of humanity’s cultural heritage and all modern scientific achievements at the distance of a single click. On the other hand, there is a return to medieval “spiritual bonds” supposedly meant to protect society from the influence of modern civilization.

Modern Russian youth will have to make their choice.

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Wednesday, May 13, 2026

Nikolai Karpitsky. Russia Cannot Renounce Further Military Expansion


 
Recent attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often rely on conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for such a war. Philosopher Nikolai Karpitsky argues, however, that preparation for war is an endless process, and therefore wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.

Is Russia ready to open a second front against the Baltic states? At first glance, this seems contrary to common sense, since the Russian army is bogged down in Ukraine. However, history offers examples of countries at war launching new military campaigns even in times of crisis. At the end of August 1941, when Adolf Hitler began the operation to encircle Kyiv and destroy the Soviet Southwestern Front, the Soviet Union invaded Iran and occupied its northern territories.

A more recent example came in August 2024, when Ukraine, unable to contain the Russian offensive in Donbas, launched a military operation in the Kursk region. From a military standpoint, it is illogical to open a new front and redirect forces there from critical sectors when the enemy enjoys superiority in manpower and materiel. However, in such cases, political considerations outweigh military ones.

Attempts to calculate the timing of a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states often stem from conditional assumptions about Russia’s readiness for war. Yet preparation for war is an endless process, so wars begin not when armies are ready, but when political conditions have matured.

The Russian army was also unprepared for this new type of warfare when it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. If Vladimir Putin had waited until it was fully prepared, he would never have been able to start the war. Armies adapt during war itself, which is why the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces are now among the most experienced in the world in conducting modern warfare.

When we calculate the military or economic feasibility of aggression, we often project our own assumptions onto the adversary. That is why many people do not believe an attack on the Baltic states is possible. But Vladimir Putin has a different picture of the world in mind. He may decide to begin a new war regardless of the situation on the Ukrainian front or in the Russian economy.

That decision will be made at the moment when, based on his own internal perceptions, the Kremlin dictator believes that a window of opportunity for such an attack has opened.

A State Becomes Aggressive When It Assumes a Messianic Role

To assess the reality of the threat of Russian aggression, one must take into account that both people and states often act against their own interests. It may be advantageous to steal from a neighbor, but most people do not do so. Becoming a criminal means changing one’s destiny through a particular life choice. The same applies to states: most countries coexist peacefully with their neighbors, even when they have the opportunity to conquer them.

A state becomes aggressive when it assumes a “higher mission.” For example, the Shah’s Iran cooperated with Israel because doing so was beneficial. But the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to destroy the Jewish state, sacrificing the well-being of its own country and the lives of its citizens for the sake of this “mission.” Political and economic conditions are secondary here: they determine the timing and form of aggression, but they are not its root cause.

Russia Is a Country That Has Lost the Meaning of Life

Every state has a purpose and a meaning underlying its existence and functioning. But if that purpose is false, then the meaning of existence itself is lost.

For example, the meaning of the Soviet Union’s existence lay in spreading the communist system, which is why it sacrificed the well-being of its citizens in order to expand its influence throughout the world. Abandoning this mission because of exhausted resources and the bankruptcy of the communist idea meant losing the very meaning of its existence, which led to the inevitable collapse of the USSR.

Modern Russia has returned to the mission of “gathering lands,” though now stripped of communist ideology. It was precisely this mission that transformed the Principality of Moscow into the Russia that, throughout its history, waged wars of conquest. This mission first took shape in the 15th century, when Moscow destroyed the people of Novgorod as an independent ethnic group with their own language, culture, and social traditions.

Paradoxically, most Russians believe they live in the most peaceful country in the world — one that has never attacked anyone, but has only repeatedly been the victim of external aggression while always emerging victorious in every war. This blindness is explained by the fact that many Russians perceive aggressive wars as the just restoration of world order.

For them, Russia is any territory on which a Russian person has ever set foot and which has at some point been under Moscow’s rule. And it does not matter whether this was 500 years ago or 30 years ago. In this worldview, countries that break away from Russian control violate the natural order of the world, while everyone who actively resists Russia’s expansion serves global evil.

After the victory of the revolution in Russia in August 1991, the democratic movement sought to build a new Russia as a peaceful and self-sufficient country. However, Russia is “stitched together” from different national territories that were incorporated into it by force. The rejection by Yeltsin’s liberals of the mission of “gathering lands” as state ideology led to the emergence of centrifugal forces within the country and to the separation of the national peripheries from Moscow.

During the First Chechen War of 1994–1996, most Russians supported peace and an end to hostilities in the Caucasus, because it is unnatural for people to support the suffering and death brought about by war. Russian reformer Yegor Gaidar then said: “Better 100 years of negotiations than one day of war.” However, those same Russians overwhelmingly supported the Second Chechen War in 1999. One reason for this shift in public sentiment was fear of the country’s collapse, which was associated with chaos and a threat to personal survival.

In the view of most Russians, the West seeks to dismantle and destroy Russia. Therefore, the war against Ukraine is perceived by them as a defensive and just war waged by Russia against Western aggression. Accordingly, an attack on the Baltic states would likewise be perceived merely as a necessary defensive operation within the broader war that the West is allegedly already waging against Russia.

Abandoning the doctrine of confrontation with the West and the policy of expanding the “Russian world” under the paradigm that “Russia’s borders never end” would threaten the collapse of Vladimir Putin’s regime, which would then simply lose the very meaning of its existence.

An Attack on the Baltic States Can Be Prevented

Vladimir Putin is confident of mass support from Russians in the event of an invasion of the Baltic states. The readiness of the Russian army, possible military and economic losses, and the situation on the Ukrainian front are of secondary importance to him — the mission matters more. However, the prospect of a collective military response from NATO could deter him from attacking the Baltic states. But does he believe such a response would actually occur?

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for an automatic military response; it merely states that member states will provide assistance to the victim of aggression in whatever form they deem necessary. But what kind of assistance would Donald Trump consider necessary? Since he has demonstrated grievances toward other alliance members and reluctance to come to their aid in the event of war, Putin may believe that such assistance would be limited to another round of sanctions and calls for negotiations.

At the same time, since there is currently no observable transfer of Russian troops to the borders of the Baltic states, there is still time to act. The strongest step NATO could take would be a political declaration stating that, in the event of Russian aggression, all alliance countries would automatically enter the war without requiring additional approval from their political leadership.

It is possible that secret protocols for automatic responses to certain scenarios of Russian aggression already exist. However, Putin, convinced of his own impunity, will continue testing the alliance through provocations until he encounters a decisive military response. Therefore, a political declaration from NATO regarding the immediate use of force in the event of Russian aggression against alliance member states must be clearly communicated to the Kremlin.

Until such a declaration exists, the Baltic states can adopt the Ukrainian experience of creating a “wall of drones” and establishing high-tech defensive lines on land and underground, on water and underwater, in the air, and in space. Putin’s regime is already experiencing economic and military decline and is therefore, like a wounded beast, mortally dangerous. There can never be too much defense; there can only be too little time to prepare for war.

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Saturday, May 2, 2026

"Propaganda". War Dictionary by Nikolai Karpitsky

 
The photo shows the Ostankino TV Tower, which is used to broadcast Kremlin propaganda. Photo: Nikita Nikitenko on Unsplash

In another article for the Dictionary of War on PostPravda.Info, Nikolai Karpitsky explains what propaganda is and introduces key concepts – manipulation, falsehood, and indoctrination – that help explain how it operates during the Russian–Ukrainian war.

Propaganda

Propaganda is a system for shaping people’s emotional and ideological attitudes toward social phenomena, ideas, and worldviews. It may be directed either at mass audiences or at specific target groups. When its aim becomes the formation of a particular worldview, it turns into an instrument of indoctrination.

Shaping Attitudes Toward Phenomena and Ideas

Propaganda does not always rely on manipulation and falsehood. Some of its forms are based on the truthful presentation of facts and appeals to positive emotions (such as the pursuit of justice or patriotism) and are aimed at improving social conditions (for example, combating corruption or resisting external aggression). However, even in such cases, a necessary element remains emotional influence – suggestion or deliberate persuasion – aimed at shaping a particular attitude toward social phenomena and ideas.

The desire to impose one’s own perception on others is also characteristic of everyday communication, especially on social media. In its most aggressive form, this occurs when a person not only expresses an opinion but also seeks to provoke an emotional reaction in their interlocutor, using a propaganda technique – emotional pressure. However, we can speak of propaganda only when such practices are systematic and purposeful.

Moral or religious preaching, like propaganda, also seeks to persuade people by using vivid imagery, emotional arguments, and appeals to authority. However, propaganda more often pursues political goals, whereas preaching pursues moral or religious ones – although in practice the boundary between them may be blurred. The fundamental difference is that preaching encourages a person to make a conscious and free choice, whereas propaganda pushes them toward accepting a predetermined position, disregarding the possibility of such a choice.

Propagandistic Manipulation

Propaganda may employ manipulative techniques. The main ones include:

– the use of truthful but incomplete information;
– substitution of the context of the interpretation or evaluation of the event;
– the provocation of strong emotional reactions in which psychological defense mechanisms hinder adequate perception;
– appeals to false authority.

For example, the claim that corruption exists in Ukraine and that therefore the country is doomed to defeat in the war is a manipulation based on incomplete information. In reality, the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts depends on the development of civil society, and in Ukraine this process is progressing with varying degrees of success, in line with general patterns observed in European countries.

The assertion that corruption levels in Ukraine and Russia are the same, and that therefore these countries are fundamentally no different, constitutes a substitution of context. Meanwhile, the claim that discussing corruption “plays into the enemy’s hands” appeals to a sensitive perception of social reality and triggers psychological defense mechanisms. Each of these manipulations may be reinforced by references to false authorities – bloggers, analysts, public opinion, or officials.

Propagandistic Falsehood

Its main types are:

– Factual falsehood – the assertion of false facts and the denial of verified ones.
– Contextual falsehood – the interpretation of accurate facts within a context that reverses their meaning. Such a context may consist of a worldview imposed by propaganda.
– Intentional falsehood – a biased presentation of accurate facts that creates a new context for their interpretation. If a person does not share the imposed worldview, the facts are presented in a way that encourages them to change their views.

An example of factual falsehood is the claim that it was not Russia but Ukraine that started the war.
An example of contextual falsehood is the claim that Russia was forced to attack Ukraine in order to defend itself from NATO – here, facts are placed within the context of a nonexistent threat.
An example of intentional falsehood is the claim that in any conflict there are no completely innocent parties and that each side bears some responsibility. In this case, facts are presented in a way that leads to a false conclusion. The propagandist does not insist directly on an interpretation within their worldview but instead suggests acknowledging real mistakes on the Ukrainian side in order to push toward the misleading conclusion that the responsibility of the perpetrator is comparable to that of the victim.

Indoctrination

Official Kremlin propaganda functions as a tool of indoctrination and leads to a rupture in the shared space of mutual understanding with those outside its sphere of influence. Indoctrination is the systematic influence on people’s consciousness aimed at shaping a particular ideology, worldview, or picture of reality, resulting in a transformation of values and perception. As a result, a person begins to perceive cause-and-effect relationships in society differently and assigns new – sometimes even opposite – meanings to social phenomena.

In the Soviet Union, total indoctrination was carried out on the basis of communist ideology, which could be rationally understood, making it possible to engage in debate with its adherents. Contemporary Kremlin propaganda, by contrast, imposes an irrational picture of the world in which ideology plays an instrumental role and can be replaced when necessary. This allows the Russian leadership to secure support from people with different ideological views, united by a shared worldview based on the demonization of the opponent.

Such a worldview distorts inner experience and the perception of reality to such an extent that any common ground for mutual understanding between its adherents and others disappears. As a result, meaningful discussion between them becomes practically impossible. Accordingly, propaganda that shapes public opinion within Russia often remains incomprehensible beyond its borders. For this reason, the Russian leadership constructs different propaganda systems for different audiences – separately for domestic and external consumption.
 
Nikolai Karpitsky
 
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